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Our choices and decisions do not only a®ect ourselves. Whatever we do has
an impact on the well-being of others. Someone can thus take a decision that is
best for her/himself, but is very bad for everyone else. To make things even more
complicated, sometimes the result of our decisions depends on the behavior of others.
The expectations we have about their behavior are then important for our decisions.
For example, why do we wait for a red tra±c light and cross the road when it turns
to green? We expect that following this rule is safest because we expect that others
will follow this rule as well.
The tra±c light example has two features that help guaranteeing a desirable
overall outcome. Firstly, the objectives of individuals are in line with general well-
being. For an individual it is safest to wait for the red light and doing so increases
overall safety. Secondly, although tra±c is potentially very dangerous, the behavior
of its participants can be coordinated in an easy way. The tra±c lights inform
everyone whether to cross the road or not. Since everyone expects everyone else to
obey the rules, tra±c lights help to avoid dangerous situations.
However, decisions that are optimal from an individual's perspective do not
necessarily lead to desirable overall outcomes. In this thesis I analyze two of these
situations in more detail: bank runs and referenda. In bank runs, withdrawing
deposits from a bank reduces the risks of an individual's portfolio, but increases
the risk of the bank's default. I ¯rst analyze whether these individuals can be
coordinated to reach a more desirable overall outcome. I then investigate in what
way the expectations held by individuals about the behavior of others matter for
the outcome. In a referendum, someone can decide not to participate because of the
involved e®orts, but then the participating voters do not necessarily represent the
population anymore. Here, I address the question of whether, and if so how, the
referendum can be designed in such a way that the individual decisions do lead to
the outcome preferred by the majority of the population.
1
Zwart, Sanne (2007), Coordination, Expectations and Crises
European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/123422 INTRODUCTION
The ¯rst two chapters deal with bank runs. A bank run occurs when customers of
a bank fear that it has insu±cient money to honor its debts and therefore withdraw
their deposits in large numbers before it is too late. The bank has to call in on
loans it made, which in turn implies closing businesses. When it still does not have
enough cash, it might limit withdrawals or may have to default. In either way people
and businesses will have problems making their payments, which causes problems
for their suppliers and so on. An economic crisis can be the result. One of the
most recent bank runs occurred in Argentina in 2001. The Argentine economy was
in trouble and people fearing the worst began withdrawing large sums of money
from their bank accounts. Banks saw their reserves shrink very quickly and became
reluctant to honor more requests for withdrawals. People became frustrated since
they could not access their own money. Scenes of Argentines banging pots and pans
in front of their banks spread around the world.
Bank runs can a®ect individual banks, but also countries. Argentina had bor-
rowed heavily from foreign investors. For years, those investors were willing to renew
the loans at the end of the contractual period. However, this automatic renewal was
not a given. In 2001, Argentina's economic situation worried investors. Fears of a
possible default made investors reluctant to renew their loans: they wanted to be
repaid before it was too late. Investors massively °ed out of the country, and a
severe crisis was the result. Although in Argentina's case most scholars agree that
the economy was in serious trouble, the banking system did not necessarily have to
face a run. People were °eeing because they feared that a bank run would occur,
which then indeed happened because they °ed. Likewise, defaulting countries might
have had enough money to repay the investors who run if most of the investors had
renewed their loans. In these situations, better coordination among investors could
have avoided the country's default. The di±cult thing is that it is easy to write a
postmortem about whether a run could have been avoided or not, but at the time
when investors make their decisions the situation may not be so clear.
In the ¯rst chapter I analyze how coordination among investors can be improved.
More precisely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can help a country in trou-
ble. It does so by granting a loan. By helping the country to meet its repayment
obligations, investors might be convinced that the country has enough money to
repay its debt. In this way the IMF can persuade investors not to ask for repayment
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but instead renew their loans. When fewer investors need to be repaid, the country's
default might be avoided. The IMF loan thus helps the investors to coordinate on
making a decision that is not only best for themselves, but also for everyone else,
including the country.
However, there is a problem: the fact that the IMF grants a loan can also be
bad news for investors. Apparently the country is in such a bad condition that the
IMF ¯nds it necessary to intervene. I build a model to assess the impact of IMF
loans, taking into account both the loan's positive liquidity e®ect and its negative
informational e®ect. When the IMF has a large budget available for loans, it indeed
succeeds in convincing investors to renew their debt and thereby it helps to avoid
the country's default. The IMF makes an assessment of the country's situation
and due to its large budget it can grant a loan that is likely to tackle the problems.
Although investors are alarmed when the IMF deems a loan necessary, they are thus
convinced that the loan is su±ciently large to avoid default. On the other hand,
when the IMF has a limited budget for granting loans, it makes things worse for the
country. When observing an IMF loan, investors not only realize that the country
might be in trouble, but also that the loan is probably too small to be of any help.
Instead of being persuaded to renew their loans, investors want to have their money
back before the country defaults. Countries that borrow money from the IMF have
been studied extensively. One of the ¯ndings is that an IMF loan has a more positive
e®ect when it is below the limit set for that country. This is in line with a key result
of my model. The IMF helps the country and meanwhile conveys the message that
a larger loan is not necessary to avoid the country's default. Investors are assured
that default will be avoided and are willing to renew their loans.
In the second chapter I focus on the role of information in bank runs. Investors
run because they expect the country to default. They base their expectations on the
information they have. But they also choose the quality of their information. They
could decide to spend a lot of time and money collecting information from various
sources in order to construct a more reliable picture of the country's situation. But
they could also decide that this is a waste of resources. Especially when on the
basis of some readily available information they think that the country is in a very
bad or in a very good condition, they do not want to spend money on getting more
precise information. In the former case they are rather sure that the country will
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have problems and they want to be repaid, in the latter case they do not see any
potential problems with renewing their loans. Information is most valuable when it
is not clear in what condition the country is.
Since the investors' decisions depend on their information, it is clear that the
occurrence of bank runs depends on the availability of reliable information. But
in turn, the probability of a bank run is important for the decision whether or not
to acquire more accurate information. I analyze these mutual dependencies in a
theoretical model. The main contribution is for the case when the decision whether
or not to acquire additional information is a real decision, so when the cost of this
information is neither too high nor too low. In models where investors rely on the
same readily available information, they have the same expectations and take the
same decisions. The two possible outcomes are extreme cases: either all investors
renew their loans, or all investors demand repayment. But one of these outcomes is
eliminated when additional information is not too costly. Suppose for example that
the country's situation is rather bad but that default will probably be avoided if all
investors renew their loans. But even then, it can still happen that the country's
situation turns out to be so bad that it has to default anyway. Although without
additional information staying would be optimal, an investor can make a better
decision when s/he has more accurate information about the country's situation:
depending on whether this information is good or bad s/he can either stay or run.
By helping investors to make the right decision, additional information thus leads
to a higher investment return. Hence, investors will acquire additional information
when it is not too costly. But then the outcome where all investors renew their loans
cannot occur anymore: it is destabilized by the possibility to acquire additional
information.
The third chapter deals with another setting in which individual decisions do not
necessarily lead to desirable overall outcomes: referenda. The aim of a referendum
is to consult the population about a speci¯c proposal or law, but often the outcome
is valid only if a minimum participation rate, a quorum, is met. When voters decide
whether or not to cast their votes, they weigh the moral duty they feel for ful¯lling
their task as citizens in a democracy, the e®orts of going to the polling booths and
the bene¯ts from the possible outcomes. Some will then decide to stay at home
rather than going to the polling booth. Again, although this can be optimal for an
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individual, it will distort the outcome of the referendum. When people can abstain
from voting, it can occur that the majority of the participating voters is in favor
while the majority of the population is against. This can happen when for example
the proposal a®ects the proponents more than the opponents. Proponents are then
more inclined to vote than opponents and thus can be the majority among the
participating voters, but a minority in the population. To guarantee a certain degree
of representativeness, several referenda have a quorum. But a quorum can have
unintended consequences, as shown by a recent referendum in Italy. In this country,
a referendum was held about lifting stringent requirements on test-tube pregnancies
and on research using stem cells from embryos. One of the main opponents was the
Roman Church. However, instead of encouraging their followers to vote against the
proposal, they had a di®erent strategy. They urged people to go to the beach on
the referendum day instead of to the polling booths. By discouraging people from
voting, they hoped that the quorum would not be met and that the referendum
would be invalid. And their strategy worked out: the participation rate was only
26%, far below the required level of 50%.
The Italian example indicates that imposing a quorum does not necessarily im-
prove representation. I build a model to better understand the e®ect of a quorum
on the referendum outcome. A positive result is that when the quorum is appro-
priately set, it can guarantee that the outcome of the referendum is in line with
the population majority. The intuition is as follows. Suppose proponents are more
likely to participate. The proposal can thus be accepted although the majority of
the population is against. When the quorum is set in such a way that in these cases
it is not met, the referendum outcome will represent the preference of the popula-
tion majority. However, there is also bad news for the advocates of referenda. Its
intended e®ect is not very robust. Especially in any of the following three cases
rejection is more likely: when going to the ballot box makes voters to care more
about the referendum outcome; when insu±cient knowledge or a lack of political
power makes it impossible to set the quorum at the appropriate level; or when, as
in the Italian referendum, pressure groups strategically use the quorum. Although
di±cult to compare, the shortcomings of a referendum with a quorum seem to be
more serious than the problems with representation that motivated imposing the
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quorum. Hence, it is probably optimal to have a referendum without a quorum, in
particular when both opponents and proponents have high participation rates.
In this thesis I analyze situations in which decisions that are optimal from an
individual's perspective can lead to undesirable overall outcomes. In the case of
bank runs, the IMF can enhance coordination among investors by granting a loan.
However, whether or not this is bene¯cial crucially depends on the IMF's budget for
loans. I also show that the information structure should be taken into account when
analyzing bank runs. Due to its role in forming expectations, the availability of not
too costly additional information can lead to runs that otherwise might have been
avoided, or vice versa. Finally, I show that when voters can abstain in referenda,
a quorum can be used to guarantee representativeness of the referendum outcome.
However, this result is not very robust; in practice it might be better not to hold
the referendum or not to impose a quorum.
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The Mixed Blessing of IMF Intervention:
Signalling versus Liquidity Support
1
Abstract. Although IMF support is supposed to bene¯t a country,
it might be bad news that the IMF believes intervention is necessary.
This paper analyzes a bank run model in which both the liquidity e®ect
and the signalling e®ect of the intervention occur. The IMF strategically
provides liquidity support to facilitate market functioning. When the
IMF intervenes and has large resources, it uses the signalling to aim for
a \half run" and o®-sets the negative consequences with the liquidity
support. For small IMF resources, the negative signalling e®ect might
not be o®-set and the IMF presence can be distorting.
Keywords. Bank runs, catalytic ¯nance, coordination problems, strate-
gic signalling.
JEL Classification. C73, D82, F33, F34.
1Published in the Journal of Financial Stability (2007), 3(2), 149-174.
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1.1. Introduction
When the IMF decides to provide liquidity support to a country, this is good
news: the country has a larger budget to tackle any liquidity problems it might face.
However, it can also be bad news: the IMF makes it apparent that in its assessment
the country may not be su±ciently sound to deal with its own problems. The impact
of the IMF support on investors crucially depends on the relative importance of these
interpretations. This paper analyzes these two mechanisms through which the IMF
a®ects the behavior of the investors.
A core element of bank run models is the coordination problem among investors:
when an investor withdraws her money she (potentially) lowers the investment re-
turn of other investors. In bank runs models following the seminal paper of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), this coordination problem results in multiple equilibria. In one
equilibrium all investors run, in another all stay. Inspired by the two-player model
of Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998, 2001) eliminate this
multiplicity by introducing noisy private information about the determinants of the
investment return. This reduces the reliance on public information. When the
precision of the private information is su±ciently high, there is a unique hybrid
equilibrium in which some investors run and others stay. Although the unique equi-
librium seems to be convenient for policy evaluation, Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan
(2006) show that this can be misleading. The policy choice itself most probably
conveys information that a®ects the investors' decisions. As in their model, this can
again lead to multiple equilibria. In our paper, however, the information signalled
by the policy choice facilitates coordination and leads to a unique equilibrium.
By adding the IMF as a player, we extend the bank run model of Morris and
Shin (2001).2 Investors with noisy private information simultaneously have to decide
on rolling-over their investments in a country. This coordination problem can result
in the country being solvent but illiquid. When the IMF expects this to be the case,
it is willing to approve the country's request for liquidity support. It sets the size of
a loan for the country before the investors take their decisions. The loan size fully
or partially reveals the IMF's private information to investors. Since this e®ect is
2The paper is phrased in terms of international ¯nance like most papers using related tech-
niques; however, the main ¯ndings hold mutatis mutandis for a setting in which a large bank
considers providing liquidity support to a private company ¯nanced by investors.
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understood by the IMF, it uses the signalling strategically. In choosing the loan size,
the IMF can be constrained by the resources available for supporting the country.
This constraint in°uences the extent of the signalling and in turn the e®ectiveness
of the intervention.
The main ¯ndings of this paper are the following. Firstly, when the IMF re-
sources are su±ciently large, the signalling e®ect is a useful tool for coordinating
investors. When a loan is granted, the IMF not only conveys the message that the
country is not su±ciently sound to deal with its problems, but also that the IMF
is con¯dent that its involvement will be e®ective. The IMF succeeds in reducing
the probability of the country being solvent but illiquid. Secondly, when the IMF
resources are small, the IMF presence can be distorting. The IMF can no longer
intervene convincingly. Although the liquidity e®ect of the loan is positive, the main
e®ect of the loan is signalling that the private information of the IMF indicates the
country to be solvent but illiquid. Despite its good intentions, the IMF might thus
aggravate the country's problems. This is in sharp contrast with the simultaneous
model in which the signalling e®ect is absent and the IMF is necessarily success-
ful, even for small resources. Thirdly, explicit expressions for the main equilibrium
variables are derived. Very few models built around global games allow for explicit
solutions when private information is not arbitrarily precise. For large resources any
non-zero loan is associated with a unique assessment. In other words, a non-zero loan
fully reveals the IMF's private information. In contrast, when the IMF has small
resources, the maximum loan is granted for various values of the private information.
The maximum loan now only partially reveals the IMF's private information.
Interestingly, when the IMF grants a non-zero loan smaller than its resources,
its equilibrium behavior coincides with making the \median" investor indi®erent
between running and staying. To see why this is the case, ¯rst note that the IMF
sets the loan size such that the expected return of staying investors is zero. Due to
the noisy information, it expects that half of the investors have lower expectations
about the return than it has itself. These investors withdraw their money and run.
So, the IMF chooses the loan that neutralizes the country's condition: whenever a
loan is granted, a \half run" is expected. Without the IMF the expected run would
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have been larger. The model thus exhibits catalytic ¯nance: the IMF provides
liquidity and the smaller run lowers the need for it.3
Empirical evidence of how IMF crises lending a®ects investors is in general not
conclusive, see the overview of Cottarelli and Giannini (2006). The results of our
paper suggest that the e®ect of the IMF intervention depends on the total available
resources. Empirical evidence discussed by Mody and Saravia (2006) and Eichen-
green, Kletzer and Mody (2006) supports these theoretical ¯ndings. In their analysis
of how IMF programmes a®ect investors, Mody and Saravia (2006) include pro-
grammes that \turned precautionary", i.e. programmes of which the country makes
initial drawings, but then voluntarily halts disbursements.4 For these programs it
is clear that the IMF resources are not critical. They conclude that \Precautionary
programmes are catalytic. ... In contrast, the amount of Fund lending does not
appear to robustly catalyse capital °ows." Both ¯ndings are predicted by the model
of this paper. When the IMF resources are not binding, catalytic ¯nance occurs
because the signalling tool can be e®ectively used. Since the IMF loan is tailored to
neutralize the country's fundamentals, conditional on granting a loan the IMF ex-
pects the same reaction of the investors. The size of the IMF loan is thus redundant
in explaining any catalytic e®ect.
The ¯ndings of Eichengreen et al. (2006) provide a way to analyze how the
IMF's e®ectiveness depends on the available resources for the country. In general
this point is di±cult to address since there is not a clear upper bound for the
resources, as recent exceedings of the 300% quota limit by e.g., Brazil and Turkey
show. However, external debt/GDP ratios can be interpreted as indications of how
large available IMF resources are relative to the debt. Eichengreen, Kletzer and
3Cottarelli and Giannini (2006) give the following de¯nition of catalysis: \the IMF's involve-
ment in a country has a catalytic e®ect to the extent that the announcement of an economic pro-
gram backed up by a limited amount of IMF resources (compared with the size of the potential cap-
ital out°ow) increases the propensity of private investors to lend to the country concerned, thereby
reducing the adjustment burden falling on the debtor country with respect to the no-catalysis
scenario". They identify 5 channels through which the IMF can (theoretically) catalyze private
capital °ows, namely policy design, information, commitment, screening and insurance/liquidity.
This paper focusses on the information and liquidity channels.
4Although in this case it is the country that chooses a loan below its maximum to signal its
credibility, the e®ects are similar to the model of this paper where the IMF decides on the loan
size and thereby gives a signal about the fundamentals of the country.
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Mody (2006) ¯nd that for countries with external debt/GDP ratios below 60%,
the IMF presence matters for spreads but the size of the loan does not, while for
higher ratios the e®ect of the IMF disappears. This suggests that for large resources
there is a positive e®ect which is reduced for smaller resources. Since the IMF does
have a positive a®ect for countries with high external debt/GDP ratios that turn
precautionary, this reduction might be due to a lower signalling ability.
In our model it is possible to analyze the e®ectiveness of the IMF since there is
a unique equilibrium. Angeletos et al. (2006) also discuss signalling in global games
and show how the endogenous information provision can lead to multiple equilibria.
The di®erent results stem from the way the institutional player is modelled. In their
model it maximizes its utility, which depends on the investors' behavior. There is
thus scope for large feedback e®ects which invite multiplicity. In our model instead,
the IMF aims for a smooth market functioning closely in line with the IMF's Articles
of Agreement (1990). The freedom of choosing its actions in pursuit of a single
overall objective is restricted by principles that should be followed. This limitation
of possible actions reduces the scope for feedback e®ects to such extent that there
is a unique equilibrium.
The IMF provides liquidity support when it expects the country to be solvent but
illiquid without intervention. In this case the coordination problem among investors
turns their (net) return of staying from a pro¯t into a loss. Since for investors a
zero return in expectation is the dividing line between investing and not investing,
the IMF wants to raise the expected return by granting a loan. Concerns about its
monetary balances lead the IMF to grant the smallest loan su±cient for reaching
its objective. When its resources are not su±cient, the IMF provides the maximum
loan. As in the real world, the IMF does not possess perfect information about
the fundamentals of the country. It has to base its decision about the loan size on
noisy private information. Numerical analysis suggests that when the IMF has large
resources an increase in the precision of its private information has minor impact on
its e®ectiveness. This is the result of two opposite e®ects: the IMF intervenes less
often but upon intervening its loan is larger. Since it knows better when loans are
appropriate, the main consequence of an increased precision is lowering the expected
loan size without substantially a®ecting its e®ectiveness. However, for an observer
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who only considers the cases where the IMF is involved with granting a loan, the
IMF is perceived as becoming less e®ective.
The e®ect of an institutional player on bank runs is analyzed in a similar set-
ting by Morris and Shin (2006) and Corsetti, Guimar~ aes and Roubini (2006). Both
papers focus on the behavior of the country's government and particularly on the
role of moral hazard. Absence of private information for the institutional player
in the former and simultaneous actions in the latter rule out signalling. Compared
to these two models, however, we abstract from the conditionality of loans on a
change in government behavior. This is a considerable simpli¯cation. Although ex-
plicitly modelling the country would a®ect the information structure of the model,
the main mechanisms would be qualitatively identical. The bene¯t of not includ-
ing the country is that many of the other involved issues can be analyzed more
clearly due to the higher tractability. The model thus provides an interesting and
relevant starting point for analysis. By abstaining from country policy that a®ects
the fundamentals, there is no potential con°ict of interest between the IMF and the
country. This situation describes the renewal of short to intermediate term debt,
which, although partially in°uenced by long-term expectations about the country,
will be more dependent on expectations of short-term returns. Interestingly, the role
of moral hazard is downplayed by recent literature suggesting that governments will
be punished by national lenders via a bank run. Together with the fact that recent
IMF loans to Brazil and Turkey did not demand policy adjustments, this suggests
that the model might also be relevant for the renewal of long-term debt.
Several features of the model also appear in related models. Rochet and Vives
(2004) add a central bank to the bank run model of Morris and Shin (1998) to
cope with the coordination problem, but simultaneous actions rule out signalling.
Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin (2004) discuss the presence of a large trader
in a currency attack model. Compared to the static model, they ¯nd a signi¯cant
magni¯ed in°uence when the large trader moves ¯rst. They also ¯nd that the size of
the large trader (for a ¯xed market size) is not important if he is arbitrarily better
informed. Since the big trader will also invest when the fundamental is very strong,
the investors will follow him blindly, which is a key di®erence from our model.
How a large trader a®ects market sentiment is also analyzed by Bannier (2005).
Atkeson (2001) has argued that equilibrium prices would restore perfect information
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in global games. Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006) make this concern precise.
However, the unique equilibrium result is preserved in other papers. For example,
Tarashev (2007) discusses a currency crisis model in which the interest rate informs
the investors about the actions (and thus about the information) of other investors
without leading to common perfect information and multiple equilibria. Similarly,
Angeletos and Werning (2006) show for a crisis model that if asset prices imperfectly
aggregate private information in a secondary market, a unique equilibrium can also
exist. These ¯ndings suggest that including asset prices in our model would not
substantially alter the results.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the model; Section 1.3
discusses the signalling e®ect of IMF loans; the relation between the signalling e®ect,
the resources of the IMF and its e®ectiveness are discussed in Section 1.4; Section
1.5 analyzes the importance of timing by comparing the sequential and simultaneous
models and Section 1.6 concludes. Proofs are deferred to the appendix.
1.2. The Model
1.2.1. The Time Line. The model analyzes the interaction between investors
and the IMF when new information about a country's market becomes available.
The information revision can be the result of, for example, a shock to the funda-
mentals of the country, deteriorated forecasts or a sudden withdrawal of investors.
The model setting is taken from Morris and Shin (2001),5 which in turn builds on
the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and is extended by adding the IMF. The
time line of the model is as follows:
Period 0: investors have allocated money in a country.
Period 1: revised information about the return of the investment in the
country replaces all previous information. This new public knowledge also
accounts for the request of the country for IMF support. It causes the
investors to reconsider their presence in the country, a decision that can be
a®ected by IMF policy.
Period 1a: the IMF receives noisy private information about the
fundamentals of the country. It then decides on the loan size for the
country.
5The model is also discussed in Morris and Shin (2003).
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Period 1b: the investors receive noisy private information about the
fundamentals of the country. They then decide either to withdraw
their money and run, or to stay.
Period 2: the return of the investment is realized.
In the main model of this paper, period 1a takes place before period 1b and the IMF
decision is public information. This allows investors to condition their decisions on
the behavior of the IMF. In other words, it allows the IMF to give a signal about
its private information. In Section 1.5, the importance of timing is analyzed by as-
suming that period 1a and 1b take place simultaneously. Although there are other
plausible orders of moves to describe the real world, this model is an important
benchmark: it is the simplest model in which the signalling e®ect can be analyzed.
Following the reasoning of Corsetti et al. (2004), investors can receive their informa-
tion at the same time as the IMF when there are no costs associated with waiting
from period 1a to 1b. Since the IMF is known to choose the loan in period 1a,
investors will then wait until period 1b with making their decision in order to take
advantage of any information revealed by the IMF's actions.
1.2.2. The Investors. In period 1 there is a continuum of identical investors
with a total measure equal to 1. Investors only derive utility from monetary holdings
in the second period and money is mapped into utils by the logarithmic transfor-
mation. All investors have invested one unit in the country. When an investor
withdraws her money and runs in period 1, the investment will be fully refunded. A
risk-free investment alternative with a standardized net return of zero then implies
that the utility of running is log1 = 0.
When an investor stays until period 2, her gross return equals Re¡`+L, where
R is a random variable summarizing the fundamentals of the country, ` 2 [0;1] is
the fraction of investors who run in period 1 and L is the size of the IMF loan.
The idea is that if investors withdraw their money, investment projects have to
be downsized or even cancelled, which negatively a®ects the return for the staying
investors. Moreover, when the out°ow of investors causes a devaluation of the
exchange rate, the return will be lowered even further. The return function combines
the fundamental and these negative e®ects of premature withdrawals. By de¯ning
µ = logR, the rate of return can be written as eµ¡`+L. The utility of an investor
who stays is then given by µ¡`+L. To simplify the discussion, µ¡`+L is referred
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to as the return of the investment instead of the \return of the investment in utils".
The fundamental µ is normally distributed with mean ^ µ 2 R and precision ® > 0.
These parameters are public knowledge.
The decision of an investor in period 1 to run or to stay is based on noisy private
information about the true value of µ and, if the IMF acts before the investors, on
the size of the IMF loan. The private information of an investor is a noisy signal
about the fundamental. Investor i receives the signal xi = µ +"i, where the noise "i
is independent across investors and drawn from the normal distribution with mean
0 and precision ¯ > 0 (both the mean and the precision of the noise are public
knowledge). The private information re°ects the high degree of complexity of real-
world economies where even publicly known statistics need interpretation.
An investor stays if conditional on her signal she expects µ¡`+L to be positive,
while she runs if she expects it to be negative. Since the measure of indi®erent
investors is zero, it can be assumed that they run. Let `i be 1 if investor i runs, and
0 if she stays. The decision `i is a function of investor i's private information xi. If
the IMF chooses the loan size before the investors decide, investors observe the loan
size L without noise. The decision `i is then also a function of the loan size L. The
fraction of running investors is given by ` =
R 1
0 `idi.
As already noted, this paper extends the model of Morris and Shin (2001) by
including the IMF. In the absence of the IMF, conditional on her signal xi, in-
vestor i expects a return E[µ ¡ `jxi] when staying. To measure the informative-
ness of the public information relative to the private information de¯ne cMS =
(®2=¯)(®+¯)=(®+2¯). Morris and Shin (2001) then show that when cMS · 2¼, so
when the public information has a relatively low informativeness, there is a unique
equilibrium in which all investors have the same switching point strategy. More
precisely, investor i runs if and only if xi · xMS where xMS is the unique solution
to E[µ ¡ `jxMS] = 0. If the investors had been able to cooperate, they could have
derived the true value of the fundamental µ since this would have been the mean of
their signals. Cooperation would thus imply that all investors stay if µ is positive
and run if µ is negative. When the investors cannot cooperate, they face a coordi-
nation problem. Uncertainty about the true value of the fundamental implies that
there are always some investors who run while others stay. Since ` is strictly greater
than 0 in all cases, the return of the investment is strictly lower than the true value
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of the fundamental. Hence, there are positive values of the true fundamental for
which the return nevertheless will be negative. This coordination problem is at the
heart of the model.
1.2.3. The IMF. The IMF has to decide on the size of the loan L. Let ¹ L be
the resources of the IMF, or alternatively, the maximum loan that the IMF can
grant (¹ L is public knowledge). The IMF then chooses a loan L 2 [0; ¹ L], where a
loan of size zero indicates that the IMF does not grant a loan. A loan of size L is
equal to the investments of a measure L of investors. When the IMF grants a loan
of size L it will thus ceteris paribus raise the return of staying investors by L.
The IMF bases its decision whether or not to grant a loan on noisy private infor-
mation about the true fundamental µ. This information is a signal xI = µ+"I, where
the noise "I is independent of the investors' noises and drawn from the normal dis-
tribution with mean 0 and precision ° > 0 (both the mean and the precision of the
noise are public knowledge). Whether the real-world IMF has private information
and if so whether its information is more or less precise than investors' information
is controversial. Although it can be argued that some investors are so well informed
that no action of the IMF reveals new information about the fundamental to them,
it can also be argued that when making their decision, the majority of investors will
take into account any information that can be derived from the IMF's behavior.
Moreover, the IMF has internal and published forecasts which suggests that the
IMF is not completely revealing its information. For example, Artis (1996) and the
United States General Accounting O±ce (2003) evaluate the economic forecasts the
IMF publishes in the World Economic Outlook and ¯nd that for developing coun-
tries GDP growth forecasts are generally upwards biased, while in°ation forecasts
are downwards biased. Also, the IMF's internal current account forecasts do have
explanatory power, while the published current account forecasts do not improve
on a random walk model. Similarly, on the national level Romer and Romer (2000)
show that the Federal Reserve has considerable information about in°ation beyond
what is known to commercial forecasters. Here, we only assume that the IMF infor-
mation is di®erent from the information investors have, and its quality (measured
by the precision °) is left as a parameter.
Since investors have noisy private information, the IMF's behavior, regardless
of the quality of the information it is based on, contains information for investors.
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Given the sequentiality of the moves, this immediately implies a role for signalling.
Note that, like in the real world, reliance on noisy private information can cause the
IMF to make an ex post non-optimal decision.
The objective of the IMF's behavior is inspired by the Articles of Agreement of
the IMF (1990), especially by Article 1 (v), which says that it is a purpose of the
IMF:
\To give con¯dence to members by making the general resources of
the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards,
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments
in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destruc-
tive of national or international prosperity."
In the model, the maladjustment in the balance of payments is a run when the
country is solvent but illiquid. In this case, the coordination problem leads to a run
caused by self-ful¯lling prophecies. To avoid these runs, the IMF should thus address
the coordination problem among the investors. The noisy private information of the
investors, however, ensures that there will always exist a coordination problem in
the sense that some investors run while they should have stayed or vice-versa. When
the remaining investors make a positive pro¯t, the coordination problem, although
present, is not very serious (the risk free rate of return is zero). However, when
the remaining investors make a loss while the fundamental has a strictly positive
value, the coordination problem is more detrimental. The IMF, being aware that it
cannot succeed in solving the coordination problem entirely, wants to eliminate the
cases where remaining investors make a loss due to the coordination problem. This
is the paradigm of IMF intervention for solvent but illiquid countries translated to
the context of the model. It shows that the IMF is concerned about the functioning
of the market, since it aims at providing an investment environment that re°ects
the underlying fundamentals.
The IMF is also concerned about its monetary balances. It wants to grant the
smallest loan that will lead to a zero expected return for the staying investors.
When its resources are not su±ciently large to accomplish this, it is obliged for
public or political reasons to provide assistance in the best possible way by granting
the maximum loan. The IMF's utility when it grants loan L for signal xI is then
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given by
U(L;xI) = ¡ L ¡ Á1 1fE[µ¡`(0)jxI]·0·E[µjxI]g1 1fE[µ¡`(L)jxI]+L<0g1 1fL<¹ Lg;
where Á > ¹ L. Note that since the investors observe the size of the IMF loan, the
IMF needs to take into account that di®erent loan sizes might ceteris paribus lead
to di®erent expected values of `. The ¯rst term represents the IMF's concerns about
its monetary reserves: the utility is decreasing in the granted loan. The second term
is a punishment if the IMF does not act according to its principles. The IMF can
only be punished if it expects the country to be solvent, E[µjxI] ¸ 0, but illiquid,
E[µ ¡ `(0)jxI] · 0.6 In this case it is punished if the granted loan L does not lead
to an expected return of at least zero, unless the IMF grants the maximum possible
loan ¹ L.
Since the IMF maximizes its utility and the maximum loan ¹ L is smaller than
the punishment Á, it always prefers to grant a loan to avoid the punishment. But
when the IMF is never punished, the utility is just the negative of the granted loan.
By maximizing its utility, the IMF thus minimizes the granted loan while being
constrained by its principles.
Suppose the IMF expects the country to be solvent but illiquid. When it can
grant a loan that makes the expected return non-negative, it will do so because this
implies a higher utility than avoiding the punishment by granting the maximum
loan. The three principles de¯ning the IMF's behavior are thus: i) only grant a loan
when the country is expected to be solvent; ii) only grant a loan when the country
is expected to be illiquid; iii) grant the smallest admissible loan that will make the
expected return for staying investors zero, and grant the maximum loan only in the
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Granting the loan L(xI) maximizes the IMF's utility when it receives signal xI.7
6The weak inequalities are for notational convenience only and are not driving the results.
7Since the IMF chooses the size of the loan before or at the same time as the investors decide
whether or not to stay, it is possible that the IMF loan more than o®sets the negative e®ect of the
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It is interesting to compare the decision rule of the IMF with the utility function
of the institutional player in Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006). In their paper,
a policy maker can a®ect the investors' decision whether to run or to stay by setting
the opportunity cost of attacking. Higher opportunity costs are more expensive for
the policy maker. The policy maker thus faces a trade-o® between the cost of policy
intervention and the net bene¯t of maintaining the status quo. Due to the sequential
setting, the interest of the policy maker in maintaining the status quo is partially
re°ected by its choice of the investors' opportunity cost. The IMF maximizes its
utility, which depends on the behavior of the investors, which in turn depends on the
IMF's choice of the opportunity cost. Hence, there is scope for large feedback e®ects
which lead to multiple equilibria. In our model, the utility maximization gives back
the principles that de¯ne the IMF's behavior. These principles reduce the scope
for feedback e®ects. For example, there is no inactive equilibrium since the IMF is
bound to undertake action when it expects the country to be solvent but illiquid.
Similarly, explicit concerns about its monetary balances restrict the loan choice of
the IMF more directly than utility maximization. In other words, the IMF cannot
freely choose its loan in order to pursue a single overall objective, but is restricted
by principles. Basing the behavior of the IMF on its Articles of Agreement through
principles thus limits its actions and therefore considerably reduces the scope for
multiple equilibria.
A few more words are in order on what the IMF tries to achieve by granting a
loan. In the real world, three parties with di®erent interests are involved: the IMF,
the investors and the country. The IMF is expected to balance the interests of all
these parties. In the model, the IMF only cares about the coordination problem.
However, this indirectly a®ects the interests of all parties. The IMF cares about the
consequences for its own monetary reserves or its net worth when granting a loan.
Nevertheless, by not completely ruling out problems regarding the future repayment
of the loan, it is taking a risk. An adequate safeguard as demanded in the Articles
is provided for. Since E[µ ¡ ` + LjxI] ¸ 0 implies E[eµ¡`+LjxI] > 1 by Jensen's
inequality, the IMF expects the investment to generate a positive net return when
running investors. This results in a return that is higher than the fundamental. To avoid this, the
return could be modelled as µ ¡ ` + maxf`;Lg. However, this is in fact an ex post adjustment of
the loan and allowing for this in particular cases while not in others would be inconsistent.
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the loan is expected to ¯x the coordination problem. This implies that it expects
the country to be able to repay the loan without any problems in the majority of
the cases.8 Concerning the payo® of the investors, it would be perverse to let the
IMF only maximize the return of the investors. However, the investors' interests are
taken care of since the very aim of the IMF is to reduce the coordination problem.
This increases the fraction of investors making the right decision, which in turn
increases the expected return of staying investors. Finally, the country's payo®s are
not explicitly de¯ned in this model. It could be argued that it is in the country's
interest to have the projects succeed. In this case µ¡`+L could be seen as a proxy
of the success. Again, this is exactly what the IMF is concerned about.
1.3. The Signalling E®ect
1.3.1. Strategies. Before deciding whether to run or to stay, the investors
observe the loan size chosen by the IMF. This loan size will a®ect their decisions
in two ways. Firstly, there is the direct e®ect of the liquidity support. Secondly,
there is the indirect signalling e®ect. This e®ect occurs since the IMF uses its
private information when choosing the loan size. The size of the loan thus provides
a signal about the private information of the IMF. The IMF uses these two e®ects
to strategically in°uence the behavior of the investors. The analysis is con¯ned to
interval strategies for the IMF and conditional switching point strategies for the
investors. We will show that in equilibrium only these strategies can occur.
Suppose that the investors observe an IMF loan of size L 2 [0; ¹ L]. An investor
conditions her expectations and decisions on both her private information and the
observed loan size. A strategy for the investors is then characterized by a conditional
switching point x(L) such that investors with information below the switching point
run and the others stay. Let `(x(L)) denote the fraction of running investors under
this strategy. An investor who receives the switching point as her private information
is indi®erent between running and staying. The conditional switching point x(L) is










+ L = 0: (1)
8Repayment is not discussed by Corsetti et al. (2006) and only brie°y Morris and Shin (2006)
in the case of in¯nitely precise information. The guaranteed repayment rate of our model is broadly
in line with empirical evidence described in Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2001).
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From the discussion of the IMF's behavior it is clear that the IMF will only grant
a non-zero loan for intermediate private information: for very high signals the IMF
expects the country to be liquid, while for very low signals it expects the country to
be insolvent. Let [xI;xI] denote the interval of signals for which the IMF will grant
a non-zero loan.
1.3.2. Conditional Expectations. Both the investors and the IMF base their
decisions on the expected value of the return. When forming their expectations, they
will use their information. In other words, the investors and the IMF condition their
expectations on their information. In this subsection, mathematical expressions are
derived ¯rst for the conditional expectation of the fundamental and then for the
conditional expectation of the fraction of running investors. These expressions are
used in the next subsections when discussing the behavior of the investors and the
IMF.
1.3.2.1. Fundamental. Suppose that investor i forms her expectation of the fun-
damental using both the public information and her private information. The public
information has precision ® and her private information precision ¯. Bayesian up-
dating can be used to show that her expected value of the fundamental is just a
weighted average of the public information ^ µ and the private information xi, with
the precisions as weights. So, investor i's expected value of the fundamental condi-
tional on her signal is
E[µjxi] =
®^ µ + ¯xi
® + ¯
: (2)
If the private information is very precise, so if ¯ is high, xi has a large impact
on the conditional expectation, which is in line with intuition. In fact, µjxi, the
fundamental conditional on xi, has a normal distribution with the stated mean and
precision ® + ¯.
The IMF's expectation of the fundamental given its information can be found
in the same way. Replacing ¯ by ° and xi by xI in Equation (2) directly gives the
expressions.
When investor i would also know the private information of the IMF, she can
condition on both xi and xI. Repeated application of the above expression then
gives that µj(xi;xI), the fundamental conditional on both xi and xI, has a normal
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distribution with mean (®^ µ+¯xi+°xI)=(®+¯+°) and precision ®+¯+°. Again,
the conditional expectation is a weighted average of all the information.
1.3.2.2. Fraction of Running Investors. Now suppose that investor i uses the
public information about µ and her private information to form expectations about
the fraction of running investors. Suppose that investors use a switching point
strategy that is characterized by x. To ¯nd an expression for the expected fraction
of running investors conditional on xi, the law of large numbers can be applied (see
Judd (1985)). The fraction of running investors is equal to the probability that
investor j receives a signal that is below the switching point x. Investor i thus
needs the probability distribution of investor j's signal conditional on her signal
xi. Since the noises are independent, the conditional signal of investor j equals
(µjxi)+"j. The conditional signal of investor j thus has a normal distribution with
mean (®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯) and precision (1=(® + ¯) + 1=¯)¡1 = ¯(® + ¯)=(® + 2¯).
Conditional on her private information and the IMF's private information, investor




















where © denotes the standard normal distribution function.
The IMF's conditional expected fraction of running investors is obtained in the
same way by using the mean and precision of µjxI which are derived above. Similarly,
if investor i would also know the private signal of the IMF, the expected fraction of
running investors conditional on xi and xI is found in the same way by using the
mean and precision of µj(xi;xI).
1.3.3. A Fully-Revealing Loan. The IMF does not grant a loan when its
signal is very low or very high: in the former case it expects the country to be
insolvent so that it does not qualify for liquidity support, in the latter case it expects
the country to be liquid so that it does not need a loan. Only when its signal is
contained in the intervention interval, the IMF will grant a loan. Intuitively, on this
intervention interval the loan size will be weakly decreasing in the signal: for higher
signals the IMF expects the fundamental to be higher so that a smaller loan su±ces.
The only reason the loan size is not necessarily strictly decreasing is that the IMF
resources impose an upper limit on the loan size. The IMF can thus be constrained
by its resources for signals on the lower part of its intervention interval. In the next
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section we will show that this intuition is correct and that there can exist a value ^ xI
such that on [xI; ^ xI] the maximum loan ¹ L is granted, while on [^ xI;xI] the loan size
is strictly decreasing. The direct consequence of a strictly decreasing loan size as
function of the private information is that each interior loan L 2 (0; ¹ L) is associated
with, at most, a single IMF signal. This in turn implies that by granting an interior
loan, the IMF fully reveals its private information xI. When investors observe an
interior loan, they thus know the IMF signal. Investors can thus condition their
expectations and decisions on both their own private information and the IMF's
private information.
The insight that interior loans reveal the IMF's private information simpli¯es
the de¯nition of the investors' best-reply switching point given in Equation (1). In
the previous subsection it was found that conditional on her private information and








®^ µ + ¯xi + °xI
® + ¯ + °
: (3)
Without knowing the private signal of the IMF, the conditional expectation of the
fundamental would have been (®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯). Now, an investor with a very
low private signal will have a low expected value of the fundamental. When the
observed loan size reveals a high private signal of the IMF, her expected value of
the fundamental is increased. This happens when (®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯) < xI. When
the reverse inequality holds, the low IMF signal decreases her expected value of the
fundamental. In this case the IMF loan is a mixed blessing: although the liquidity
e®ect of the loan increases her expected return, the signalling e®ect decreases it.
Let L 2 (0; ¹ L) be the (interior) loan associated with the IMF signal xI. The
fraction of running investors is equal to the probability that investor j receives a
signal that is below the switching point x(L). Conditional on her private information













¯(® + ¯ + °)
® + 2¯ + °
³
x(L) ¡
®^ µ + ¯xi + °xI
® + ¯ + °
´¶
: (4)
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When the switching point x(L) is ¯xed, a higher IMF signal reduces the expected
fraction of running investors. Compared to not knowing the IMF signal, this knowl-
edge decreases the expected fraction of running investors when (®^ µ+¯xi)=(®+¯) <
xI and increases it otherwise.
Abstaining from the liquidity e®ect, the IMF thus has opposite e®ects on the
expected return of investors with (®^ µ+¯xi)=(®+¯) above or below xI. In equilibrium
the e®ectiveness of the IMF depends on whether an investor who would be indi®erent
in the absence of the IMF, will now stay or run.
1.3.4. A Partially-Revealing Loan. The IMF reveals its private information
only partially when the same loan is granted for various signals. Instead of knowing
the value of the IMF's private information, investors now have a probability density
over the IMF signals. The only non-zero loan that can be granted for various signals
is the maximum loan ¹ L. This loan is granted on the interval [xI; ^ xI] when the IMF
resources are small. When investors observe the loan size ¹ L they cannot infer the
value of the IMF signal, but only that it is contained in the interval [xI; ^ xI].
Since investors are aware that the IMF received revised private information,
signalling also occurs when no loan is granted. When investors observe that the
IMF is not granting a loan, they know that the private information of the IMF is
not contained in the intervention interval. The only loan sizes that can partially
reveal the IMF's private information are thus 0 and ¹ L.
Using Equation (3), the expectation of the fundamental conditional on the pri-

























® + ¯ + °
: (5)
Comparing this equation with Equation (3) shows that the di®erence between the
fully- and partially-revealing loan cases is that xI is replaced by its conditional




















® + ¯ + °
:
The mean of µ conditional on xi and L is thus a weighted average of the mean
conditional on xi and the expectation of xI conditional on xi and L. To analyze the
latter conditional expectation the conditional density of xI is needed.
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In a similar way as the distribution of investor j's signal conditional on investor
i's signal was found in Subsection 1.3.2, it follows that the IMF's private signal
conditional on the signal of investor i has a normal distribution with mean (®^ µ +
¯xi)=(®+¯) and precision °(®+¯)=(®+¯+°). When an investor observes that the
IMF grants a loan of size ¹ L, she knows that the IMF signal is contained in [xI; ^ xI].
The density f¹ L(¢jxi) of the IMF signal conditional on both the private information















xI 2 [xI; ^ xI];
0 xI = 2 [xI; ^ xI];
(6)
where C¹ L(xi) makes the density function integrate to 1. Since the conditional density
is only positive for signals contained in [xI; ^ xI], the conditional expectation of xI is
also contained in [xI; ^ xI].
In Figure 1 the conditional expectation of the IMF signal as a function of xi
is depicted when the observed loan equals ¹ L. For higher private signals xi, higher
IMF signals xI have a higher relative density. The conditional expectation is thus
increasing in xi, but the slope is very small since the range is limited to [xI; ^ xI].
Let xc be the signal for which (®^ µ + ¯xc)=(® + ¯) = 1
2(xI + ^ xI). The density
function f¹ L(¢jxc) is symmetrical around 1
2(xI + ^ xI), see Equation (6). When an
investor receives the signal xc, both the expected value of the IMF signal and the
expected value of the fundamental equal 1
2(xI + ^ xI). Now suppose an investor
receives a signal below xc. When she observes that the IMF grants a loan, apparently
the fundamental is not that bad after all, and her expectation of the fundamental
increases. Conversely, suppose an investor receives a signal above xc. When she now
observes the IMF granting a loan, this is bad news that lowers the expected value
of the fundamental. Similarly to the fully-revealing loans, in this case the IMF loan
is a mixed blessing.
Since the investors know about the country's request for IMF support, signalling
also occurs when no loan is granted. The density f0(¢jxi) of xI given xi and no
IMF loan can be derived in a similar way as f¹ L(¢jxi). The signalling e®ects of no
loan and a loan of size ¹ L are opposite; see Figure 1. Let xd be the signal for which
(®^ µ + ¯xd)=(® + ¯) = 1
2(xI + xI). When an investor receives a signal xi < xd, she
expects a low fundamental and her pessimism is strengthened when the IMF does not
grant a loan. For higher signals instead her optimistic expectations are strengthened.
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Figure 1. Investors base their expectations on their private informa-
tion xi and the observed loan size. When investors observe the max-
imum loan size ¹ L, the expected value of the IMF signal is moderate,
which will °atten the investors' expectations about the fundamental.
When no loan is observed, the investors' optimism or pessimism is
strengthened.
Note, however, that E[xIjxi;0] ! E[µjxi] when xi ! §1 and equality holds when
xi = xd. This shows that the signalling is most informative for an investor who has
a low but not very low signal or a high but not very high signal. The former is more
likely to run, the latter is more likely to stay.
Obtaining clear expressions for the expected fraction of running investors con-
ditional on xi and an observed loan size L 2 f0; ¹ Lg is more complicated. In the
same way as for the expectation of the fundamental it follows that E[`jxi;L] =
E[E[`jxi;xI]jxi;L]. An expression for the inner expectation is already given in Equa-
tion (4). The conditional densities of xI, f0(¢jxi) and f¹ L(¢jxi), are also discussed
above. It is not possible to simplify this expression for the conditional expected
fraction of running investors. However, it is intuitively clear that investors with
low signals who observe a non-zero loan, raise their expectation of the fundamental,
which decreases the expected fraction of running investors. When investors with
high signals observe that the IMF grants a loan, they expect a lower fundamental
and thus more running investors. This is again the mixed blessing of IMF loans.
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When the IMF does not grant a loan, investors are strengthened in their opinions.
To summarize, the signalling e®ect on the expected return is larger than on the
expected fundamental alone.
1.3.5. The Strategic IMF. The IMF realizes that the loan size in°uences the
investors' behavior both via the liquidity channel and the signalling channel. By
taking account of this, the IMF thus chooses the loan size to strategically a®ect the
investors' behavior.
The IMF only grants a loan when it expects the country to be solvent but
illiquid. Based on its information, the IMF's expected value of the fundamental
equals (®^ µ+°xI)=(®+°). The country is solvent when the fundamental is expected
to be non-negative. Since the expected fundamental is strictly increasing in the
IMF signal, the country is expected to be solvent for su±ciently high signals. Let xI
denote the signal for which the country is expected to be just solvent, so E[µjxI] = 0.
It follows that xI = ¡®^ µ=°. For signals below xI the IMF expects the country to
be insolvent and does not grant a loan.
The loan size a®ects the investors' behavior, so the liquidity of the country
depends on the IMF's decision. Suppose that the conditional switching point x(0)
when the IMF does not grant a loan is given. The IMF expects the country to
be illiquid if E[µ ¡ `(x(0))jxI] < 0. An expression for the conditional expectation
of the fundamental is already derived; the expected fraction of running investors
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This expression shows that E[`(x(0))jxI] is strictly positive and strictly decreasing in
xI. Since E[µjxI] = (®^ µ+°xI)=(®+°) is strictly increasing in xI, the expected return
of the staying investors is strictly increasing in xI as well. This shows that when the
IMF does not intervene, there is a unique IMF signal xI for which the country is
expected to be just liquid. Since the expected fraction of running investors is always
positive, it immediately follows that the expected fundamental should be strictly
positive. This implies that xI < xI. Only for signals contained in [xI;xI] the IMF
expects the country to be solvent but illiquid. Note that the upper bound of the
intervention interval depends on the investors' conditional switching point x(0), but
not on x(L) for L > 0.
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When the IMF grants an interior loan L 2 (0; ¹ L), the staying investors are
expected to make a zero pro¯t. Suppose that the investors use switching point x(L)
when they observe a loan of size L. Let L(xI) denote the best-reply of the IMF when













+ L(xI) = 0: (7)
If the maximum loan size ¹ L is never granted, this equality holds for all non-zero
loans of the IMF. When the IMF is constrained by its resources, the equality cannot
be satis¯ed for low signals in the intervention interval. In this case, let ^ xI denote
the highest signal in the intervention interval for which the IMF is constrained. The
IMF then grants the maximum loan ¹ L for all signals in [xI; ^ xI].
A closer look at Equation (7) gives a key insight: in equilibrium every interior
loan size is only chosen for a unique value of the IMF signal. To see this, suppose
that there are two distinct signals xI1 < xI2 such that L(xI1) = L(xI2) = L 2
(0; ¹ L). Then E[µ¡`(x(L))jxI1] < E[µ¡`(x(L))jxI2], since for xI1 both the expected
value of the fundamental is lower and the fraction of running investors is higher
(a lower expected fundamental and the same switching point). This implies that
E[µ ¡ `(x(L))jxI1] + L < E[µ ¡ `(x(L))jxI2] + L so that Equation (7) cannot hold
for both xI1 and xI2. In equilibrium every interior loan size is thus associated with
a unique value of the IMF signal. This formalizes the claim that interior loan sizes
fully reveal the IMF's private information.
1.4. Signalling and the IMF Funds
1.4.1. Equilibrium. The model has a unique equilibrium for a subset of pa-
rameters. It is characterized by conditional switching points of the investors and
a loan scheme of the IMF. Upon observing a loan of size L, investors stay if and
only if their private signal is above the conditional switching point x(L). The IMF
only grants a loan when its private signal xI is contained in the intervention interval
[xI;xI]. In this case, the IMF grants a loan L(xI) that is dependent on its private
signal. Conditions on the precisions ®, ¯ and ° are needed to ensure that the private
information of investors is su±ciently informative to avoid multiple equilibria. A
condition on ^ µ is needed to ensure that the IMF loan as de¯ned in Equation (7) is
positive (this condition is needed for the formal proofs, numerical analysis though
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suggests that this condition is not very restrictive in practice). The following propo-
sition states the conditions for a unique equilibrium and the related strategies of the
IMF and the investors.9
Proposition 1.
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if xI 2 (^ xI;xI] and ^ xI 2 (xI;xI);
or if xI 2 [xI;xI] and ^ xI · xI;
v) x(L) = 1
2 ¡ L
if L 2 (0; ¹ L) and ^ xI 2 (xI;xI);
or if L 2 (0; 1
2] and ^ xI · xI;
vi) x(¹ L) is the unique solution of E[µ ¡ `(x(¹ L))jx(¹ L); ¹ L] = 0 if ^ xI > xI.
The proposition gives an explicit expression for the equilibrium loan scheme,
except for the upper bound xI of the intervention interval. It also gives explicit
expressions for the investors' conditional switching points when an interior loan is
observed. In i) the lower bound of the intervention interval is established. Given this
lower bound, in ii) it is stated that the upper bound of the intervention interval and
the investors' conditional switching point when no loan is observed, are best-replies
to each other. In iii) the highest IMF signal ^ xI is stated for which the maximum
loan ¹ L can be granted. The loan scheme on the intervention interval is summarized
in iv). When ^ xI ¸ xI, the IMF resources are always constraining and the maximum
loan is granted for all signals in the intervention interval. When ^ xI 2 (xI;xI), the
maximum loan is only granted on the lower part of the intervention interval. Not
surprisingly, on the upper part the IMF loan is decreasing in xI: when the IMF
9The equilibrium is unique up to the value of x(L) for loan sizes L that are never chosen by
the IMF. Any value of x(L) above 1
2 su±ces.
Zwart, Sanne (2007), Coordination, Expectations and Crises
European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/1234230 1. THE MIXED BLESSING OF IMF INTERVENTION
receives a higher signal, it expects the fundamental to be higher, so a smaller loan
size su±ces to set the expected return equal to zero. When ^ xI · xI, the IMF
resources are so large that they are never fully used. In this case, the IMF loan is
decreasing on the entire intervention interval. Note that the IMF loan is at most
1
2. In v) the conditional switching points are summarized for interior loans. When
^ xI > xI, the IMF resources are so small that they are constraining on the lower
part of the intervention interval and loans up to ¹ L can occur. If ^ xI · xI the IMF
is not constrained and loans larger than 1
2 cannot occur. In vi) it is stated that
when ^ xI > xI, so that the IMF is constrained by its resources, the conditional
switching point upon observing the maximum loan is simply the best-reply to the
IMF granting the maximum loan for xI 2 [xI; ^ xI].
When the IMF grants an interior loan, it provides a loan that ¯lls the gap
between the expected fundamental and 1
2. It thus provides an ex ante insurance
that \neutralizes" the bad fundamental in such a way that E[µjxI] + L = 1
2. Since
the IMF only intervenes when E[µjxI] ¸ 0, this shows that the IMF resources are
never constraining when ¹ L ¸ 1
2. In this case the IMF loan always fully reveals the
IMF's private information. When ¹ L is below 1
2, the loans for signals on the lower
part of the interval are truncated at ¹ L.
In the case of an interior loan, the fundamental is not only neutralized from
the IMF's point of view, but also from the investors' point of view. The expected
fraction of running investors turns out to be equal for all interior loan sizes. Both
the switching point and the expected value of the fundamental conditional on the
switching point equal (®^ µ+°xI)=(®+°). A closer look at Equation (4) then shows
that whenever an interior loan is granted, the expected fraction of running investors
equals 1
2. The IMF thus strategically uses the signalling e®ect to neutralize the
investors' behavior. The liquidity e®ect of the loan then makes the IMF e®ective in
setting the expected return to zero.
The IMF's strategy is in fact aimed at neutralizing the investors in such a way
that there will be a \half run". This is a direct result of the IMF's aim to make the
expected return of the staying investors equal to zero. The IMF expects the funda-
mental to be (®^ µ +°xI)=(®+°). Since the investors' signals are unbiased, the IMF
expects the median investor to receive the signal (®^ µ+°xI)=(®+°). In the case of a
fully revealing loan, this median investor uses the IMF signal to form expectations.
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From Equation (3) it then follows that her expectation of the fundamental equals
the IMF's expectation. When the IMF aims for an expected return of zero, the
median investor thus also expects a zero return. Half of the investors have lower
signals than the median investor and will run. The IMF thus implicitly aims for a
\half run". This discussion shows that there is an appealing alternative modelling
of the IMF behavior that nevertheless leads to identical equilibrium strategies. If
the IMF expects the country to be solvent but illiquid, instead of caring about the
return of all staying investors it can also exclusively focus on the expected return of
the median investor.
The IMF has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy. For signals
such that the IMF grants no loan this is clear: there is no reason why the IMF
should grant a loan. Either the country is expected to be insolvent and does not
qualify for it, or the country is expected to be illiquid so that it does not need a loan.
When the equilibrium scheme prescribes a positive loan, there is also no incentive
to deviate. On the one hand, for an interior loan a deviation to a larger loan than
prescribed is not attractive. The IMF is concerned about its monetary balances
and already reaches its aim of a zero expected return with the prescribed smaller
loan. On the other hand, it is also not optimal for the IMF to grant a smaller loan.
This would increase the switching point of the investors and hence would result in
a larger fraction of running investors. Together with a smaller loan size this would
imply a negative expected return.
When a loan is granted, the investors' reactions and the extent of the signalling
e®ect depend on whether it is smaller than the maximum loan size or not. Knowledge
of the maximum loan size ¹ L is thus crucial. When it would not have been public
knowledge, investors would need a prior distribution for ¹ L. Since the IMF in turn
would need to base its strategy on this prior distribution as well, the analysis would
be considerably more complicated. The important exception is that if the IMF is
known to have large monetary balances of at least 1
2, the exact size does not matter.
At this point it is interesting to analyze the model in which the IMF is obliged
to truthfully reveal its signal, or equivalently the model in which the investors are
so well informed that they know the IMF signal. This model is formally identical
to the model where the IMF grants loans based on publicly available information
provided by a rating agency as in Carlson and Hale (2006). When the IMF does not
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grant a loan, the switching point of the investors will decrease in the now known
IMF signal. This shows that the upper bound of the intervention interval will be
di®erent. However, on the intervention interval the loan size as function of the IMF
signal is still as speci¯ed in Proposition 1.
1.4.2. E®ectiveness of IMF intervention. The IMF aims to prevent the
country from being solvent but illiquid. In these cases, although the fundamental
is positive, remaining investors would make a loss due to the coordination problem.






























The probability term inside the integral is a probability statement about the IMF's
behavior. Since its signal is a random variable, the loan size L(xI) and hence the
investors' conditional switching points x(L(xI)) are random variables as well. In the
Morris-Shin model where the IMF is not present this probability is either zero or
one; in our model it can also take intermediate values. The following proposition
relates the e®ectiveness of the IMF intervention to the IMF resources.
Proposition 2.
Suppose the conditions of Proposition 1 hold and that ^ µ < 1
2.
For large IMF resources the probability of the country being solvent but illiquid is
decreased; however, for small resources it can be increased.
In the proposition the Morris-Shin model without the IMF is compared with the
model of this paper where the IMF is present. The proposition is about countries
where problems are likely, ^ µ < 1
2, which are exactly the countries where IMF involve-
ment may be expected. When the IMF has large resources it succeeds in reducing
the probability that the country will be solvent but illiquid. In contrast, when the
IMF has small resources, its presence can make this outcome more likely.
Key to understand these opposite e®ects are the principles de¯ning the IMF's
behavior. IMF intervention only occurs when the country is expected to be solvent
but illiquid. This makes the intervention interval independent of the maximum loan
size, as can be seen from the equilibrium expressions in Proposition 1. Suppose
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¯rst that the IMF has large resources that are not constraining, so ¹ L ¸ 1
2. When
the IMF grants a loan, it fully reveals its private information. This allows the
IMF to neutralize the investors' behavior. The IMF loan then provides the needed
liquidity for a zero expected return. Since the loan size fully reveals the IMF's
private information, the signalling is used to coordinate the investors and its e®ect
is always positive. Interestingly, this positive e®ect is not exclusively coming from
the liquidity e®ect. As shown in the previous subsection, the expected fraction of
running investors is a half. In the model without the IMF the expected fraction
of running investors is larger.10 The liquidity provision of the IMF thus leads to
catalytic ¯nance.
Now suppose that the IMF has small resources that are constraining on a large
part of the intervention interval. The main e®ect of the IMF intervention then stems
from the cases where the IMF grants the maximum loan. When doing so, it reveals
that its resources are too small to make the expected return of staying investors
non-negative. Hence, the signalling e®ect of the IMF loan tends to scare investors
away. The IMF loan is a mixed blessing. Since the maximum loan is rather small,
the signalling e®ect can be more important than the liquidity e®ect. In this case
it is bad news that the IMF grants the maximum loan and the probability of the
country being solvent but illiquid is increased. Note that this happens although the
IMF has good intentions and does the best it can given its information. The ex ante
e®ect of the IMF trying to help in an unconvincing way thus magni¯es the country's
problems.
In Figure 2 the e®ect of the IMF resources on the probability of the country
being solvent but illiquid is depicted. This probability is strictly decreasing in the
resources when ¹ L < 1
2. For ¹ L ¸ 1
2 the e®ect of the IMF is independent of its
resources, since the IMF resources are never constraining. The probability of the
country being solvent but illiquid in the Morris-Shin model without the IMF is also
depicted in the ¯gure, as well as the expected loan size. Clearly, for small resources
the IMF presence is distorting, while for large resources it is bene¯cial. Note that
an increase in the resources only leads to a relatively small increase in the expected
loan size. This re°ects the fact that the increased resources allow for higher loans on
10In the model without the IMF, ^ µ < 1
2 implies that the investors' switching point is above 1
2,
so that the expected fraction of running investors is larger than 1
2.
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Figure 2. The probability of the country being solvent but illiquid
is decreasing in the IMF resources ¹ L. Compared to the benchmark
model without the IMF, the IMF is e®ective for large resources; how-
ever, for small resources the IMF presence increases the probability of
the country being solvent but illiquid. (^ µ = 0:4, ® = ¯ = ° = 1)
a decreasing part of the intervention interval which leads to a diminishing decrease
in the probability of the country being solvent but illiquid.
Since the focus of the paper is the impact of the IMF presence, we will vary
the precision of the IMF signal ° (see Metz (2002) for the e®ect of changes in the
precision of the investors' private information ¯). In Figure 3 the probability of
the country being solvent but illiquid is depicted as a function of ° when the IMF
resources are large enough to be never binding (¹ L ¸ 1
2). The ¯gure also shows
the probability of the country being solvent but illiquid even though the IMF has
granted a loan P[SBI;L > 0], the expected probability of IMF intervention P[L > 0]
and the expected loan size E[L]. The probability of the country being solvent but
illiquid in the Morris-Shin model without the IMF is depicted by the grey horizontal
line.
For a very small precision °, the probability of the country being solvent but
illiquid is increasing in the precision of the IMF signal. This is caused by a sharp
decline in the probability of IMF intervention. For larger °, there is a small decrease
in the probability when the precision of the IMF signal increases. The small decrease
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Figure 3. An increase in the precision of the IMF's information °
only slightly a®ects the probability of the country being solvent but
illiquid. This is the result of two opposite e®ects: the IMF grants fewer
loans, but upon intervening the loans are larger. The main e®ect of
an increased precision is a lower expected loan. (^ µ = 0:4, ® = ¯ =
° = 1)
is the result of two opposite e®ects. Firstly, more precise information allows the IMF
to make better assessments so that fewer loans are granted. Secondly, although the
IMF intervenes less often, the expected loan size decreases less than proportionally.
When intervening, the IMF thus grants larger loans. Although the intervention
interval shrinks when the precision increases, better assessments make signals close
to the lower bound of the intervention interval more likely and it is exactly these
signals for which the largest loans are granted. When the precision increases, there
will thus be fewer but larger loans. Although an increased IMF precision slightly
lowers the probability of the country being solvent but illiquid, it thus mainly reduces
the expected IMF loan.
From the ¯gure it is clear that in general the IMF becomes slightly more e®ective
when the precision of its signal increases. However, it is interesting to look at how the
success of the IMF is perceived if one only considers the IMF interventions. Consider
for example the probability of the country being solvent but illiquid when the IMF
intervenes, so P[SBI;L > 0]=P[L > 0]. From the ¯gure it can be seen that P[SBI;L >
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0] is increasing for not too small precisions and P[L > 0] is decreasing. When the
IMF grants a loan, it thus becomes less successful and the perceived e®ectiveness
decreases. The reason is that when the precision of the IMF signal increases, the
IMF knows better when loans are really needed, but it is exactly for these cases
that the IMF is less successful. Similarly, consider the probability that the IMF
is involved if the country is solvent but illiquid, so P[SBI;L > 0]=P[SBI]. Apart
from small IMF precisions, this measure increases. Again, the IMF becomes more
associated with failed interventions when the precision of its information increases.
1.5. The Importance of Timing
The signalling e®ect cannot occur when the IMF and the investors make their
decisions simultaneously. Moreover, when investors do not observe the loan size, they
have to form expectations about it. In this section the sequential model discussed so
far is compared to its simultaneous counterpart. The model in which the IMF can
choose any loan in [0; ¹ L] is unfortunately too complicated to analyze. We therefore
analyze the simultaneous model in which the IMF has to decide whether or not to
grant a loan of a pre-speci¯ed size ¹ L.11 To allow for comparison, we will con¯ne
the analysis to interval strategies for the IMF and switching point strategies for the
investors. Given a weak assumption, this restriction is without loss of generality for
the equilibrium analysis.
Investors make their decision without knowing the granted loan size L. They
can only condition on their own information. The investors' strategy is thus an
unconditional switching point x satisfying
E
h






For the conditional expectation of µ¡`, expressions are derived in Subsection 1.3.2.
When a loan is granted its size is ¯xed; the expected loan size thus equals the
probability that a loan is granted times the size ¹ L. The probability that a loan is
granted equals the probability that the IMF signal is contained in the intervention
interval [xI;xI]. The IMF signal conditional on investor i's signal can be analyzed
in a way close to the analysis of Subsection 1.3.2. It is normally distributed with
11Numerical results suggests that these two models lead to similar e®ects if the ex ante expected
loan sizes are equal.
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mean (®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯) and precision °(® + ¯)=(® + ¯ + °). The expected loan

























From this expression it follows that the expected loan size is positive, increasing in xi
for signals below the critical signal xd that satis¯es (®^ µ+¯xd)=(®+¯) = 1
2(xI +xI)
and then decreasing. Investors with intermediate signals expect the country to be
solvent but illiquid and thus qualifying for an IMF loan, while investors with high
or low signals expect the country to be liquid or insolvent respectively and not
qualifying for IMF support.
The best-reply of the IMF to the investors' switching point x is an intervention
interval [xI;xI]. The lower bound of this interval is the signal for which the IMF
expects the country to be just solvent. Hence, xI satis¯es E[µjxI] = 0. As in
the sequential model, it follows that xI = ¡®^ µ=°. The upper bound of the IMF
intervention interval is the signal for which the IMF expects the country to be just
liquid. So, xI is de¯ned by E[µ ¡ `(x)jxI] = 0. For reasons already mentioned in
Subsection 1.3.5 the upper bound xI is uniquely de¯ned and xI < xI.
In the following proposition a su±cient condition for a unique equilibrium is
stated and the e®ect of the IMF on the probability of the country being solvent but
illiquid is characterized.
Proposition 3.
In the simultaneous model there exists an ¹ L¤ > 0 such that if cMS < 2¼ and ¹ L 2
(0; ¹ L¤] there is a unique equilibrium in interval/switching point strategies.
The presence of the IMF lowers the probability of the country being solvent but
illiquid.
The proposition states that when the Morris-Shin model without the IMF has
a unique equilibrium, the model with the IMF also has a unique equilibrium in
interval/switching point strategies when the loan size is not too large. The possibility
of equilibria where the IMF and the inventors do not have interval or switching
point strategies cannot be excluded. However, it has already been proved that the
best-reply of the investors to an interval strategy of the IMF is a switching point
strategy and vice versa. When the IMF is restricted to interval strategies, or the
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investors to switching point strategies, the equilibrium of the proposition is the
unique equilibrium.12
The proposition also states that the IMF succeeds in lowering the probability
of the country being solvent but illiquid. A comparison of the investors' switching
points for the Morris-Shin model and this model shows why this is the case. Since
E[µ ¡ `(x) + Ljx] > E[µ ¡ `(x)jx] and as functions of x both are increasing, x <
xMS. By sometimes granting a loan the IMF thus lowers the switching point of the
investors. Fewer investors run which implies a decrease in the probability of the
country being solvent but illiquid.
The main di®erence between the sequential and the simultaneous model is that
even for small resources ¹ L, the presence of the IMF reduces the probability of the
country being solvent but illiquid. This is especially striking since also in the sequen-
tial model with small resources the IMF grants the maximum loan for a large part of
the intervention interval. Since there is no signalling in the simultaneous model, the
only e®ect of the IMF is an expected positive liquidity e®ect which makes investors
less likely to run. By shutting o® the signalling channel in the simultaneous model,
IMF loans are bound to have a positive e®ect.
1.6. Conclusion
This paper analyzes how the news of an IMF intervention a®ects the investors'
behavior and their coordination problem. When the IMF has su±ciently large re-
sources, the intervention is aimed at establishing a \half run" and o®-setting the
negative consequences. The IMF presence reduces the probability of the country
being solvent but illiquid. On the other hand, the signalling e®ect of the loan can
increase this probability when the IMF has small resources. Despite its good inten-
tions, the IMF can thus aggravate the country's problems if its resources are small.
Timing is key: when the IMF and investors act simultaneously, the liquidity e®ect
12The restriction on the allowed strategies is needed since the usual technique of iterated
deletion of strictly interim dominated strategies cannot be applied. In contrast with the model of
Corsetti et al. (2004) in which the large player is congruent to the small players, in our model it
aims to counterbalance them. Any change in the behavior of the investors is thus partially o®set
by the IMF, which makes it impossible to establish equilibrium uniqueness without restricting the
set of allowed strategies.
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makes the IMF always successful since the negative signalling e®ect of the loan is
necessarily absent.
An important direction for future research would be to combine the e®ect of the
IMF on investors and the e®ect on the country. In a realistic setting the country
chooses its e®ort in the ¯rst period, in the second period a fraction of the investors
has the opportunity to withdraw their investments which could lead to the outset
of a bank run, in the third period the IMF could decide to grant a loan, and in
the fourth period all investors have to decide on rolling-over the investments. This
model makes it possible to analyze conditional loans abstained from in this paper.
The moral hazard problem of the country arises since the IMF loan is a strategic
substitute to its own e®ort as in Morris and Shin (2006) and Corsetti et al. (2006).
It would also allow for a more elaborated behavior of the investors and the IMF
since the sequential setting allows them to react to each other in turn. Although
analytical results might not be obtained, numerical analysis could provide additional
intuition.
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Appendix 1.A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
i) This follows directly from E[µjxI] = 0.
ii) Given a switching point x(0), the upper bound of the intervention interval
xI is de¯ned by E[µ ¡ `(x(0))jxI] = 0. In the main text it has already been proved
that xI is unique and that xI > xI. For a given x(0) denote the upper bound as
xI(x(0)). In equilibrium the investors' switching point x(0) is a best-reply when the
IMF does not grant a loan for signals outside [¡®^ µ=°;xI(x(0))]. So, x(0) should
satisfy E[µ ¡ `(x(0))jx(0);0] = 0 given this intervention interval. Using Equation
(5) gives E[µjx(0);0] = (®^ µ+¯x(0)+°E[xIjx(0);0])=(®+¯+°). Since E[xIjxi;0] is
increasing in xi, standard arguments of global game theory show that in equilibrium
the investors have a switching point strategy (see Morris and Shin (2003) for a
proof based on iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies). The conditional


















































Since the expected fraction of running investors is strictly below 1, (®^ µ+°xI(x(0)))=
(®+°) < 1 and xI(x(0)) is bounded. This implies that P[xI 2 [xI;xI(x(0))]jx(0)] !
0 when x(0) ! §1. Since the term E[E[¢]j¢] is contained in [xI;xI(x(0))], it is
bounded as well. It follows that E[xIjx(0);0] ! (®^ µ +¯x(0))=(®+¯) when x(0) !
§1. Since E[`(x(0))jx(0);0] 2 [0;1] this shows that E[µ ¡ `(x(0))jx(0);0] ! ¡1
when x(0) ! ¡1 and similarly that E[µ ¡ `(x(0))jx(0);0] ! 1 when x(0) ! 1.
Hence, continuity implies that there exists an x(0) that satis¯es E[µ¡`(x(0))jx(0);0]
= 0.
Uniqueness of x(0) follows when for the best-reply xI(x(0)) the return E[µ ¡
`(x(0))jx(0);0] is strictly increasing in x(0). The expression for E[µjx(0);0] can be
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® + ¯ + °
:
The derivative in the second term captures the e®ect in the expectation of the
IMF signal when x(0) is changed and is bounded. For ° ! 0 the second term
becomes arbitrarily small. From E[`jx(0);0] = E[E[`jx(0);xI]jx(0);0], the analogue


























® + ¯ + °
s
¯(® + ¯ + °)
® + 2¯ + °
:
This shows that there exists a °¤ such that ° < °¤ and ((®+°)2=¯)(®+¯+°)=(®+
2¯ + °) · 2¼ guarantee uniqueness.
iii), iv) and v) In the text it was proved that the IMF grants a loan with an
interior size L 2 (0; ¹ L) for at most one signal xI. Standard arguments show that
when a positive loan is granted, the investors' best-reply is a switching point strategy.
Since cMS · 2¼ is implied by ((®+°)2=¯)(®+¯+°)=(®+2¯+°) · 2¼, the investors'
switching point is unique for every interior loan size.
The next step is to derive the loan size for signals in the intervention interval
and the best-reply of investors to interior loans. Substitution of Equation (4) and
E[µjx(L);xI] into Equation (1) and comparing this expression to Equation (7) shows
that x(L) = (®^ µ + °xI)=(® + °) is indeed a solution. It directly follows that L =
1
2 ¡ (®^ µ + °xI)=(® + °). This loan scheme is strictly decreasing so an interior loan
indeed reveals the private information of the IMF. It is straightforward to check
that for ^ xI de¯ned in iii) the loan scheme prescribes the maximum loan. When
^ xI > xI the IMF resources are constraining and the maximum loan ¹ L is granted on
[xI;minf^ xI;xIg].
In order to prove uniqueness, note that for every loan L 2 (0; ¹ L) the investors'
best-reply x(L) makes E[µ¡`(x(L))jxI]¡E[µ¡`(x(L))jx(L);L] equal to zero. Taking
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When this is strictly negative for all x(L) there is a unique solution. The ¯rst term
can be discarded, using the fact that for the third term the exponent part is smaller
than one; it follows that ((® + °)2=¯)(® + ¯ + °)=(® + 2¯ + °) · 2¼ is a su±cient
condition for uniqueness.
It remains to be proved that for xI the granted loan is positive. It is straightfor-
ward to show that for ^ µ = 1
2 the midpoint of the interval is below 1
2. This implies
that an investor receiving 1
2 as a signal and observing the IMF not granting a loan,
expects the fundamental to be above 1
2. This shows that the investors' switching
point is below 1
2. When the IMF receives 1
2 as signal, it expects the fundamental to
be 1
2 and the fraction of running investors to be less than 1
2. This shows that xI < 1
2,
which implies that the loan for xI is strictly positive. Due to continuity this is the
case for ^ µ in a neighborhood of 1
2.
vi) As before, the investors' best-reply is a switching point strategy. Existence of
x(L) follows by noting that E[xIjx(L);L] 2 [xI; ^ xI]. Equation (5) then implies that
E[µ¡`+¹ Ljx(¹ L); ¹ L] increases continuously from ¡1 to +1 when x(¹ L) increases from
¡1 to +1. Straightforward computations show that (@=@x(L))E[xIjx(L);L] > 0,
so the expectation of the IMF signal is increasing in the private information of an
investor. Hence, (@=@x(L))E[µjx(L);L] > ¯=(® + ¯ + °). In the same way as for
x(0) it follows that ((® + °)2=¯)(® + ¯ + °)=(® + 2¯ + °) · 2¼ implies uniqueness
of x(L). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose that the IMF resources are su±ciently large so that they are never binding.
When ^ µ < 1
2, the investors' switching point in the Morris-Shin model is above 1
2.
When the IMF is present, it reduces the probability that the country is solvent but
illiquid when the conditional switching points are below 1
2. If the IMF grants an
interior loan, the conditional switching point 1
2 ¡ L is indeed below 1
2. In the proof
of Proposition 1 iv) it was shown that for ^ µ < 1
2 the midpoint of the intervention
interval is below 1
2. Suppose that the switching point x(0) equals 1
2. An investor
with signal 1
2 who observes that the IMF does not grant a loan, thus expects the
fundamental to be above 1
2 and the fraction of running investors below 1
2. This
contradicts that 1
2 is a switching point. Since the equilibrium is unique, x(0) is
below 1
2.
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When the IMF resources are small, the claim follows when parameters are found
for which the probability of the country being solvent but illiquid is higher than in
the Morris-Shin model without the IMF. Numerical analysis shows that this is the
case for parameters ^ µ = 0:4 and ® = ¯ = ° = 1, see Figure 2. Mathematical analysis
fails since there are opposite e®ects. Manually weighting these e®ects according to
their probability of occurrence is too complicated. To get a °avor, suppose that
¹ L is so small that it is granted on the entire intervention interval. On the one
hand, since the midpoint of this interval is below ^ µ, the investors' switching point
is higher than in the Morris-Shin model and there are more running investors. On
the other hand, when the loan is not granted, the investors' switching point is lower
than in the Morris-Shin model and there are fewer running investors. The combined
e®ect follows from weighting these e®ects according to the simultaneous probability
density of the fundamental and the IMF signal. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose that the investors act according to a candidate switching point x. In equi-
librium x should satisfy E[µ¡`(x)+Ljx] = 0. The upper bound xI of the intervention
interval is then de¯ned by E[µ ¡ `(x)jxI] = 0. In the main text it is already proved
that xI is uniquely de¯ned. Let xI(x) denote xI as function of x. Since xI is contin-
uous in x, also E[Ljx] is continuous in x. But then it is clear that E[µ¡`(x)+Ljx] is
continuous in x. Since E[µjx] maps onto (¡1;1) while E[¡`(x)+Ljx] is contained
in [¡1; ¹ L], there exists a value x such that E[µ ¡ `(x) + Ljx] = 0.
This switching point x is unique if (@=@x)E[µ ¡ `(x) + Ljx] > 0 for all x. The
derivative of the expected fundamental minus the expected fraction of running in-























Equation (8) gives an expression for the expected loan size conditional on the
signal of an investor. When x increases, `(x) increases and hence xI has to increase
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When cMS < 2¼, there exists an ¹ L¤ such that the inequality is satis¯ed for ¹ L < ¹ L¤.
The proof is ¯nished if it is shown that when all investors act according to the
switching point strategy x and when the IMF reacts optimally, it is indeed optimal
for an investor to use the switching point strategy x. To prove this, it is su±cient
to establish that (@=@xi)E[µ ¡ `(x) + Ljxi] > 0, since an investor who receives the
switching point as signal is indi®erent between running and staying. Since for a given
switching point the expected fraction of running investors is decreasing in xi, it is
clear that (@=@xi)E[µ¡`(x)jxi] > ¯=(®+¯). In the same way as before it then follows




°(® + ¯)=(® + ¯ + °). The switching
point strategy is thus the optimal strategy if ¹ L
p
°(® + ¯)=(® + ¯ + °) <
p
2¼. But
this is implied by the condition of the proposition.
In the main text it is proved that the presence of the IMF decreases the proba-
bility of the country being solvent but illiquid. ¤
Zwart, Sanne (2007), Coordination, Expectations and Crises
European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/12342Zwart, Sanne (2007), Coordination, Expectations and Crises
European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/12342CHAPTER 2
Liquidity Runs with Endogenous Information Acquisition
Abstract. This paper analyzes a liquidity run model in which investors
strategically acquire private information. Hence, equilibria can di®er
both in information structure and extent of the run. A two-dimensional
equilibrium partitioning depending on expected fundamentals and the
cost of information is presented. The dichotomy \no private informa-
tion/private information" represents the equilibrium information struc-
tures for high and low costs respectively. Endogenous information ac-
quisition thus embeds liquidity run models based on Diamond & Dybvig
(1983) and Morris & Shin (2001) in a uni¯ed analytical framework. For
intermediate costs these models slide into each other. As a result, intu-
itively less appealing equilibria are eliminated.
Keywords. Bank runs, information acquisition, coordination games,
option pricing.
JEL Classification. C73, D82, F34, G14.
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2.1. Introduction
Investors want to be well-informed when they choose their portfolios. However,
the amount and precision of the information they acquire in equilibrium will depend
on the cost. Liquidity run models after Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Morris
and Shin (2001) take the information structure as given.1 In the former there is
only common information, while in the latter agents have noisy private information.
This paper presents a liquidity run model where private information acquisition is
endogenous: investors optimally decide whether to acquire a signal about the fun-
damentals taking its cost as given. While models with a ¯xed information structure
focus on fundamentals and self-ful¯lling prophecies as causes of liquidity runs, the
model of this paper also analyzes how the availability, quality and cost of private
information a®ect the occurrence and extent of runs.
The main results of this paper are as follows. First, the dichotomy \private in-
formation/no private information" only describes the information structure for ex-
tremely low and high costs of information. For intermediate costs, the equilibrium
information structure crucially depends on the prior of the fundamentals. Second,
the equilibrium multiplicity that occurs in Diamond-Dybvig models for intermediate
priors is eliminated for a range of cost-prior pairs. Of the two symmetric equilibria
in Diamond-Dybvig models the intuitively more appealing one survives: all investors
run for relatively bad priors, while for relatively good priors all stay. Third, there al-
ways exists at least one equilibrium for all costs and priors due to complementarities
in information acquisition. When investors base their decisions on private informa-
tion, their less predictable behavior increases the uncertainty about the investment
return, which makes private information more valuable. Fourth, an increase in the
precision of private information or a decrease in its cost favor information acquisi-
tion. For bad priors of the fundamentals this increase in the quality/price ratio of
information helps to deter a run, for good priors, however, more investors will run.
Endogenous information acquisition alters the equilibrium structure compared
to models with a ¯xed information structure. It is the di®erence between the cost
1These models are here interpreted in a setting where investors have to decide whether or not
to withdraw their money from a certain investment. Alternatively, this paper could have been
phrased in terms of investors that have to decide on rolling-over the debt of a country. More
general interpretations of the underlying coordination problem are also possible.
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of information and its expected added value in terms of the investment return that
determines whether or not an investor acquires information. The exogenous cost
can be seen as monetary costs when the investors hire an investment agency or
as a cost in terms of e®ort and time when they search for information themselves.
Either way, it re°ects that the investor has to incur a cost in order to obtain more
precise information, so that the quality of the information is a strategic decision.
The value of information depends on the uncertainty about the investment return,
which itself depends on the investors' prior. Information acquisition is thus related
to the fundamentals of the investment project - a point raised by Rey (2001) in
her comments on Morris-Shin models. The value of information as function of the
prior can be understood in the light of option pricing results. The more likely that
the information will be used, in the sense that it will change an investor's behavior
relative to not having information, the higher its value.
This paper presents a two dimensional equilibrium partitioning of priors and
costs. Two equilibrium candidates are of the Diamond-Dybvig type: no private in-
formation and either a full run or no run. The other possible equilibrium is of the
Morris-Shin type: investors have private information and run when it is bad. The
prior of the fundamentals together with the cost of information determines whether
in equilibrium investors acquire private information, which in turn determines the
occurrence and extent of the liquidity run. In Diamond-Dybvig models equilibrium
multiplicity occurs for an intermediate range of priors. The private information in-
troduced in Morris-Shin models eliminates this multiplicity by allowing for a unique
hybrid equilibrium in which some investors stay and others run. In the model of
this paper, even for intermediate priors an equilibrium without private information
can be unique when the cost of information is intermediate. Interestingly, the mul-
tiplicity is not eliminated by endowing investors with private information, but by
giving them the opportunity to acquire it.
When the cost of private information is very high or very low, the one dimensional
equilibrium partitions of the original models arise. For high costs the prior parti-
tion consists of three regions as in Diamond-Dybvig type models, see Sbracia and
Zaghini (2001) and Metz (2002). When the cost is low, investors acquire noisy pri-
vate information, which lead to the information structure underlying global games,
see Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003). For a relatively
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high precision of the private information, this heterogeneity replaces the multiplic-
ity that can occur in the absence of private information by a hybrid equilibrium.
The prediction of a unique equilibrium for su±ciently precise private information is
con¯rmed in an experimental study discussed by Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels
(2004). In response to criticism on the original model, e.g. by Atkeson (2001) and
Rey (2001), more realistic models with noisy private information have been devel-
oped. Several preserve this uniqueness result; others, however, lead to multiplicity,
see e.g. Tarashev (2007), Hellwig et al. (2006) and Angeletos and Werning (2006).
This suggests that the dichotomy \private information/no private information" in
relation to \uniqueness/multiplicity" gives an overly simpli¯ed picture.
Several papers focus on information acquisition in settings with strategic comple-
mentarities. In the model of Nikitin (2004), investors can acquire complete informa-
tion about the return of all investment opportunities. Although the three equilibria
resemble the equilibria occurring in this paper, the model is rather complex and the
equilibrium analysis is limited to showing that the three equilibria can occur instead
of elaborating on how the interaction of fundamentals and prices a®ects the exis-
tence of these equilibria. Hellwig and Veldkamp (2006) analyze the e®ect of costly
private information on beauty contest models. Although the structure of the model
is similar to the structure of this paper's model, only the squared distance to a real-
ized random variable matters for the payo®s. This is a key di®erence since it makes
the ex ante expected value of the random variable irrelevant for the equilibrium
analysis, while it is precisely this that is at the heart of this paper's analysis.
In Section 2.2 the liquidity model is analyzed when the information structure
is ¯xed. Endogenous information acquisition is introduced in Section 2.3. After
deriving detailed expressions for the value of information in Section 2.4, its relation
with the underlying fundamentals is explored in Section 2.5. The main results of this
paper are discussed in Section 2.6, where the implications of endogenous information
acquisition for the equilibria are analyzed. In Section 2.7 the model is extended so
that investors can choose the precision of their information. Section 2.8 concludes.
The analysis of non-symmetrical equilibria is deferred to Appendix 2.A and proofs
to Appendix 2.B.
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2.2. The Liquidity Run Model with Fixed Information Structures
Consider the coordination problem at the heart of the Diamond-Dybvig model
and the Morris-Shin model. There is a continuum of identical investors with a to-
tal measure equal to 1. The utility function of the investors is a linear function
of their money holdings. In period 0, all investors put one unit in the same in-
vestment project. In period 1, investors receive new common information about
the investment return that replaces all previous information. This new information
causes investors to reconsider their investment. In this period they then simulta-
neously decide whether to stay and remain invested or to run and withdraw the
money. Investors who run are fully refunded. They can then use the money for
a risk-free investment alternative with a normalized (net) return of 0 in the next
period. Investors who stay until period 2 receive a (net) return of µ ¡ `, where µ is
a random variable summarizing the fundamentals of the project and ` 2 [0;1] is the
fraction of investors who ran in period 1.2 The idea is that if investors withdraw
their money, the project has to be downsized, which negatively a®ects the return of
the remaining investors. Hence, the return function combines the fundamentals and
the cost of premature liquidation. The fundamental µ is normally distributed with
ex ante expectation ^ µ 2 R and precision ® > 0. These parameters are provided to
the public at the beginning of period 1.3
In the Diamond-Dybvig world, investors have only common information about
the project. Based on this common information, an investor decides whether to
stay or to run. Denote the two symmetric (pure) strategy pro¯les \all-stay" and
\all-run" by S and R respectively. The expected return in the S pro¯le where all
investors stay equals the ex ante expectation of the fundamental ^ µ. The S pro¯le
is then an equilibrium if staying gives a (weakly) higher return than running, so if
and only if ^ µ ¸ 0. Likewise, the R pro¯le where all investors run is an equilibrium
only for ^ µ · 1 since the expected return equals ^ µ ¡ 1. Note especially that when
the ex ante expectation of the fundamental is contained in the interval [0;1] both
2For the sake of clarity the return in case µ¡` < ¡1 is not truncated. This is not essential for
the results. Note that this can also be interpreted as representing a logarithmic utility function
when the return of the investment equals eµ¡`.
3The fundamental can alternatively be thought of as having an improper uniform distribution
on the real line. For a realized fundamental µ and normally distributed noise " with zero mean
and precision ®, ^ µ = µ + " then represents imperfect public information about the fundamental.
Zwart, Sanne (2007), Coordination, Expectations and Crises
European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/1234252 2. LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION
pro¯les are equilibria. Since there is only common information, investors have no
means of coordination which invites multiple equilibria. The model thus captures
sudden big jumps in investments observed in the real world. However, for ^ µ close to
the borders of the interval, one of the equilibria is intuitively much more appealing
than the other: for relatively bad ex ante expectations of the fundamentals investors
are more likely to run, while for relatively good ex ante expectations they are more
likely to stay. Hence, for ^ µ close to 0 or 1 the equilibria of Diamond-Dybvig models
are not closely in line with intuition.
In the Morris-Shin world, investors are endowed with noisy private information
about the realized fundamental µ of the project. Next to the common information
^ µ and ®, investor i has a signal xi = µ + "i. The noise "i is drawn from a normal
distribution with zero mean and precision ¯ > 0 and is independent across investors.
The focus on noisy private information instead of complete information, re°ects the
idea that di®erent investors combine information from various noisy sources which
leads to di®erent private information. Whether an investor stays or runs depends on
her private information. Intuitively, she runs when her private information is bad.
A symmetric equilibrium candidate is then characterized by a common switching
point x¤ such that investor i runs if and only if xi < x¤. An investor who receives the
switching point as private information is indi®erent between running and staying.
The expected return of running is 0, so the switching point is de¯ned by E[µ ¡
`jx¤] = 0. To measure the informativeness of the public information relative to the
private information de¯ne ° = (®2=¯)(® + ¯)=(® + 2¯). Morris and Shin (2001)
then show that when ° · 2¼, so when the public information has a relatively
low informativeness, there is a unique equilibrium in which all investors have the
same switching point strategy characterized by x¤. Hellwig (2002) shows that if this
condition does not hold, there exists an ex ante expectation of the fundamental ^ µ for
which there are multiple equilibria. The condition can thus be seen as a necessary
condition for a unique equilibrium when no assumptions about ^ µ are made. It
is assumed here that the private information is su±ciently precise to satisfy this
condition with strict inequality. To stress the reliance on private information, the
equilibrium \all-use-switching-point-x¤" is denoted by I. Since there is a unique
equilibrium, the economic outcomes are fully determined by the parameters. The
model has the intuitively appealing property that for better fundamentals fewer
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investors run. However, the smooth response to changes in the ex ante expectation of
the fundamental in Morris-Shin models bars sharp declines in investments, i.e. sharp
rises in collective withdrawals, which is one of the appealing results of Diamond-
Dybvig models.
2.3. The Liquidity Run Model with Endogenous Information
Acquisition
The Diamond-Dybvig model and the Morris-Shin model show that the outcome
of the coordination problem crucially depends on the information structure. Con-
versely, imposing a particular information structure determines the nature of the
outcome. Endogenizing the information structure clearly avoids this exogenous se-
lection of equilibria.
With endogenous information acquisition, it is not up to the modeler to de-
cide whether or not investors are endowed with private information. In the model,
investors decide themselves whether or not to acquire private information. More
precisely, before making the investment decision in period 1, but after learning ^ µ
and ®, investors simultaneously decide upon acquiring private noisy information
about the realization µ of the fundamental. Hence, investors consider acquiring in-
formation for the same reason that they consider running. When investor i acquires
information, she receives a signal xi = µ+"i, where, as before, the noise "i is drawn
from a normal distribution with zero mean and precision ¯. In this section ¯ is
¯xed, identical for all investors and public knowledge. In Section 2.7 investors can
choose the precision of the information they acquire. An investor acquires informa-
tion when the added value in terms of the investment return is higher than the cost
of the information. The cost is assumed to be exogenously determined. It can be
seen as a purely monetary cost of information, but it may also re°ect the e®orts
needed to collect the information. The exogenous cost captures the fact that the
investor should spend time or resources in order to obtain more precise information
about the return, so that she strategically chooses the quality of her information.
An investor does not know the decisions of other investors about the information
acquisition when she makes her investment decision.
Throughout the paper the focus is on symmetric equilibria; non-symmetric equi-
libria are discussed in Appendix 2.A. For explanatory convenience the following rule
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is used when there is a mass zero of indi®erent investors: an investor stays if she
is indi®erent between staying and running and she acquires information if she is
indi®erent between acquiring and not acquiring. This assumption is not essential
for the results.
When investors do not acquire information, the Diamond-Dybvig world arises.
Let the pro¯les S and R now refer to \no-information/all-stay" and \no-information/
all-run" respectively. Similarly, let the pro¯le I now refer to \information/all-use-
switching-point-x¤", which represents the Morris-Shin world that arises when in-
vestors acquire information. In the previous section it was shown for a ¯xed infor-
mation structure when these pro¯les are equilibria. When the information structure
is endogenous, there is an additional decision node at which pro¯table deviations
may occur. Hence, equilibria for a ¯xed information structure are not necessarily
equilibria when information is endogenously acquired. In order to determine whether
a pro¯le is an equilibrium, the value of information needs to be contrasted with its
cost.
2.4. The Value of Information
Loosely speaking, the value of information is the di®erence of the expected return
with and without information, or, in other words, the maximum amount an investor
is willing to pay for that information. In order to get a more precise de¯nition,
let for given private information and candidate equilibrium the function r : ; [
R£fI;R;Sg ! R denote the expected return for an investor who reacts optimally
to the strategies of the other investors. The pro¯les I, R and S are thus loosely
interpreted as prescribing the strategies of all investors but one. For Q 2 fI;R;Sg
the expected return is then de¯ned as
r(;;Q) = maxf0; E[µ ¡ `jQ]g;
r(xi;Q) = maxf0; E[µ ¡ `jxi;Q]g:
Information that is not yet known is denoted with a capital letter, so the random
variable Xi denotes the unrevealed information of investor i. Since an investor does
not know the realization of the fundamental, she perceives the information Xi as
having a normal distribution with mean ^ µ and precision (1=®+1=¯)¡1 = ®¯=(®+¯).
The value of private information vQ is now the di®erence of the expected return with
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and without private information, so
v
Q = E[r(Xi;Q)] ¡ r(;;Q):
In the remainder of this section detailed expressions for the value of information are
derived for the three candidate equilibria.
First consider the S pro¯le where all investors stay. The analysis can be re-
stricted to non-negative ex ante expectations of the fundamental, ^ µ ¸ 0, since
the discussion of the model without private information already showed that this
condition is necessary for the pro¯le to be an equilibrium. Because it is neces-
sarily (weakly) optimal for an investor without information to stay, this directly
implies r(;;S) = ^ µ. Suppose investor i deviates by acquiring private information
and that she receives information xi. Bayesian updating shows that µjxi, the ex-
pected fundamental conditional on information xi, has a normal distribution with
mean (®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯) and precision ® + ¯. Hence, the expected return equals
r(xi;S) = maxf0; (®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯)g. This shows that the investor will invest if
and only if it leads to a positive expected return, so if xi ¸ ¡®^ µ=¯. The value of in-
formation in the S pro¯le as function of the ex ante expectation of the fundamental









































where © denotes the normal cumulative density function.
The value of information in the R pro¯le where all investors run follows in a
similar way. The analysis can be restricted to ^ µ · 1. Since without private in-
formation an investor should withdraw her money, this implies r(;;R) = 0. Sup-
pose that investor i has acquired information xi so that the expected return equals
r(xi;R) = maxf0; (®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯) ¡ 1g. The negative externality of the with-
drawing investors makes her invest if and only if xi ¸ (®+¯)=¯ ¡®^ µ=¯. The value
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Additional intuition about the value of information can be obtained by letting
Yi = (®^ µ+¯Xi)=(®+¯)¡1 denote the conditional expected return of staying in the R
pro¯le. The value of information is then simply vR(^ µ) = E[maxf0; Yig]. This shows
that the value of information re°ects the value of a (European) call option with strike
price 0. Intuitively, without information an investor will withdraw her money, so
when she acquires information she has acquired an option to remain invested, which
she will only exercise if her information is good. For the S pro¯le where everyone
stays, the conditional expected return equals Zi = (®^ µ+¯Xi)=(®+¯). The value of
information is given by vS(^ µ) = E[maxf0; Zig] ¡ ^ µ. By writing ^ µ = E[Zi] it follows
that vS(^ µ) = E[maxf¡Zi; 0g]. Hence in the S pro¯le the value of information
re°ects the value of a put option with strike price 0. Intuitively, although it seems
that upon acquiring information an investor gets a call option, which re°ects that she
will only stay in case of good information, she will also lose a share, which re°ects
that without information she stays. The information makes a di®erence only for
bad information, hence the put option structure. In fact, this resembles the put-call
parity, which states that the value of a call option (plus the strike price which is
here 0) equals the value of a put option plus a share.
Now consider the Morris-Shin type I pro¯le where all investors acquire informa-
tion and take the investment decision according to a switching point strategy. In
contrast with the S and R pro¯les, the value of information in the I pro¯le does not
only come from the ability to better discriminate between good and bad realizations
of the fundamental. In the I pro¯le investors base their decision whether to run or
not on their information. Since private information makes predictions about the pri-
vate information of other investors more precise, it is thus also useful for predicting
the fraction of withdrawing investors.
When investor i has no information, her expectation of the fundamental is ^ µ. The
law of large numbers (see Judd (1985)) can be applied to show that the fraction of
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withdrawing investors is equal to the probability that investor j receives information
that is worse than the switching point. The expected return is thus
r(;;I) = max
½






¤ ¡ ^ µ
´¶¾
: (3)
Now suppose that investor i decides to acquire information and receives xi.
Above it was shown that µjxi has a normal distribution with mean (®^ µ+¯xi)=(®+¯)
and precision ® + ¯. Since Xjjxi = (µ + "j)jxi = µjxi + "j, it is clear that Xjjxi has
a normal distribution with the same mean but with precision (1=(®+¯)+1=¯)¡1 =
¯(® + ¯)=(® + 2¯). The expected return of staying conditional on xi is then given
by
E[µ ¡ `jxi;I] =













Note that the expected return of staying is strictly increasing in xi. Intuitively,
when investor i receives better information she expects a better realization of the
fundamental and a smaller fraction of withdrawing investors. The de¯nition of the
switching point gives that E[µ ¡ `jx¤;I] = 0. Hence, investors only stay if their
information is weakly better than x¤. The expected return when an investor has yet
















Equations (3)-(4) give a detailed expression for the value of information in the I
pro¯le.
2.5. The Value of Information and the Fundamentals
The value of information in each pro¯le depends on the ex ante expectation of the
fundamental. Understanding this relation is key in understanding how the ex ante
expectation of the fundamental ^ µ a®ects the behavior of the investors. Intuitively,
whether a higher ex ante expectation of the fundamental implies a higher or a
lower value of information depends on whether the uncertainty about the sign of
the return is increased or decreased. The following proposition quanti¯es this claim.
Apart from relating the values of information in the three pro¯les to ^ µ, their mutual
relations are clari¯ed. To guarantee that the I pro¯le is well de¯ned, it is assumed
that ® and ¯ are such that ° < 2¼.
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Proposition 1.
Assume that ° < 2¼.
i) In pro¯le Q 2 fI;R;Sg the value of information vQ is positive.
ii) The value of information as function of the ex ante expectation of the fun-
damental ^ µ in the I pro¯le is strictly increasing for ^ µ < 1
2 and strictly decreasing
for ^ µ > 1
2, in the R pro¯le it is strictly increasing and in the S pro¯le it is strictly
decreasing.
iii) There exists a threshold ¹ µ 2 (0; 1
2) such that if ^ µ · ¹ µ the value of information
is highest in the S pro¯le, if ^ µ 2 [¹ µ;1¡¹ µ] it is highest in the I pro¯le and if ^ µ ¸ 1¡¹ µ
it is highest in the R pro¯le.
iv) For bad ex ante expectations of the fundamental, ^ µ · 1
2, the value of informa-
tion is lowest in the R pro¯le, while for good ex ante expectations of the fundamental,
^ µ ¸ 1
2, it is lowest in the S pro¯le.
v) The values of information in the R and S pro¯les are symmetrical images
around ^ µ = 1
2 in the sense that vR(1
2 ¡ ±) = vS(1
2 + ±), ± ¸ ¡1
2. The value of
information in the I pro¯le is symmetrical around ^ µ = 1
2 in the sense that vI(1
2¡±) =
vI(1
2 + ±), ± ¸ 0.
From the proposition it follows that the main properties of the values of infor-
mation vI(^ µ), vR(^ µ) and vS(^ µ) are as depicted in Figure 1.
Statement i) claims that information always has a positive value. This implies
that there always exist strictly positive costs for which the value of information is
higher than its cost.
When the ex ante expectation of the fundamental increases, according to state-
ment ii) the value of information in the S pro¯le decreases. Intuitively this follows
from the fact that when ^ µ increases, the probability of making a loss in the S pro¯le
decreases; hence the maximum cost an investor is willing to pay for receiving infor-
mation decreases. A symmetric argument shows that the foregone positive return
in the R pro¯le increases when ^ µ increases and that the value of information thus
also increases. Statement ii) also shows that vI behaves similarly to vR for ^ µ < 1
2
and similarly to vS for ^ µ > 1
2. When ^ µ < 1
2 an investor in the I pro¯le would run
when she has no information (this is proved in Lemma 6 in Appendix 2.B). The
foregone positive return increases when ^ µ becomes larger, so the maximum cost that
an investor is willing to pay for information increases. When ^ µ > 1
2 an investor
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would stay when she has no information. The expected return is increasing in ^ µ
and does so faster than the expected return if she had had information. Hence, the
maximum cost an investor is willing to pay for information decreases.
Statement ii) shows again the close link with option pricing. In the R pro¯le
the value of information re°ects a call option with strike price 0. Clearly, when ^ µ
increases, the option will be exercised more often and the value of the information
increases. Similarly, an increase in ^ µ makes a put option with strike price 0 less
valuable, which shows why the value of information decreases in the S pro¯le. Since
without private information an investor should run in the I pro¯le for ^ µ < 1
2 and
stay for ^ µ > 1
2, the value of information re°ects a call option in the ¯rst case and a
put option in the latter.
When ^ µ is relatively low, according to statement iii) information in the S pro¯le
is most valuable. Intuitively, although the expected return is positive, it is not
unlikely that the realized return will be negative. Investors want to be able to
run in these cases, which makes the information valuable. Similarly, when the
fundamental is likely to be good, the expected return of the investment in the R
pro¯le is negative but there are many realizations of the fundamental for which it is
positive. Investors want to be able to distinguish these cases, which gives information
a high value. Finally, when ^ µ is intermediate in the I pro¯le, the expected fraction
of withdrawing investors is also intermediate. Information has a high value since it
enables investors to predict which of the two is largest.
The value of information in the I pro¯le is never the lowest of the three, as
claimed in statement iv). The intuition of why for ^ µ · 1
2 the value of information in
the R pro¯le is lower than in the I pro¯le is straightforward. Since in the latter there
is always a positive fraction of investors who stay, the expected return of staying
will always be higher than in the R pro¯le.
Finally, statement v) shows that the R and S pro¯les are not only symmetrical in
the sense that in the one all investors stay and in the other all investors run, but that
this symmetry goes further: vR(1
2 ¡ ±) = vS(1
2 + ±). The intuition is as follows. In
the S pro¯le an investor without information stays, while with information she can
run for very bad information. The value of information is thus minus the expected
return in case of bad information. In the R pro¯le the value of information is the
expected return in the case of good information. For fundamentals that are 1
2 + ±
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and 1
2 ¡ ± respectively, these values are the same. Statement v) also shows that
vI(1
2 ¡±) = vI(1
2 +±). Although somewhat more involved, the intuition is as before:
for ^ µ = 1
2¡± information allows investors to stay when positive returns are expected,
while for 1
2 + ± it allows investors to run when negative returns are expected.
2.6. Equilibrium Implications of Endogenous Information Acquisition
Compared to a ¯xed information structure, endogenous information acquisition
imposes an additional equilibrium condition. The R pro¯le where all investors run
without acquiring information can only be an equilibrium if the value of information
is lower than its price. This should also be the case for the S pro¯le where all
investors stay without acquiring information to be an equilibrium. However, the I
pro¯le, where all investors acquire information and use a switching point strategy,
is an equilibrium if the value of information is higher than its price.
The existence of an equilibrium for all expected values of the fundamental now
follows from the fact that vI(^ µ) > minfvR(^ µ); vS(^ µ)g (statement iv) of Proposition
1). The intuition for ^ µ · 1
2 is as follows. In this case an investor without information
in the I pro¯le should withdraw her money. The di®erence between vI(^ µ) and vR(^ µ)
is thus only caused by di®erent returns when information is acquired. In the I
pro¯le there are always some investors who stay. Conditional on the same private
information, the expected return in the I pro¯le is higher than in the R pro¯le.
An investor with private information is more willing to stay in the I pro¯le than
in the R pro¯le (her switching point is lower). The conclusion is that strategic
complementarities in information acquisition ensure the existence of an equilibrium.
Let c denote the cost of information. The following corollary follows directly
from Proposition 1 and reconciles the Diamond-Dybvig and the Morris-Shin world
in a formal way. Figure 1 provides a generic graphical example.
Corollary 2.
Assume that ° < 2¼.
i) The I pro¯le is the unique equilibrium if and only if c < minfvR(^ µ); vS(^ µ)g.
The R and S pro¯les are the only equilibria candidates if and only if c > vI(^ µ).
ii) The R pro¯le is the unique equilibrium if and only if both c > vI(^ µ) and in
addition ^ µ ¸ 0 implies c < vS(^ µ)).
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Figure 1. The value of information as function of the ex ante ex-
pectation of the fundamental and the implied equilibrium regions.
4
(® = 1, ¯ = 1)
The S pro¯le is the unique equilibrium if and only if both c > vI(^ µ) and in addition
^ µ · 1 implies c < vR(^ µ).
iii) The sets f(^ µ;c) 2 [0;1]£(0;1)jQ is the unique equilibriumg, Q 2 fI;R;Sg,
are non-empty.
In Appendix 2.A it is proved that if the I, R or S pro¯le is the unique equilibrium
among symmetric pro¯les, it is also the unique equilibrium if non-symmetric pro¯les
are allowed for.
Statement i) relates the Diamond-Dybvig and the Morris-Shin world. If the cost
of information is su±ciently high, investors do not acquire private information and
the Diamond-Dybvig world arises. Only the R equilibrium and the S equilibrium
can exist. If the cost is su±ciently low, the Morris-Shin world arises where investors
have private information and the I pro¯le is the unique equilibrium. From statement
i) of Proposition 1 it follows that vR(^ µ) and vS(^ µ) are strictly positive for every ^ µ.
This implies that for every ^ µ there are positive costs for which the I equilibrium is
unique. However, although there are ¯nite costs which lead to the Diamond-Dybvig
world regardless of the ex ante expectation of the fundamental - in fact any cost
4The vertical lines starting at (0;vS(0)) and (1;vR(1)) are included to indicate that for costs
higher than vS(0) = vR(1) the S and R equilibrium cannot exist for ^ µ < 0 and ^ µ > 1 respectively.
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higher than vI(1
2) achieves this - only freely available private information leads to
the Morris-Shin world for sure.
The model with endogenous information acquisition is accomplishing more than
embedding the two models. While in the original Diamond-Dybvig the R equilibrium
exists for ^ µ · 1 and the S equilibrium for ^ µ ¸ 0, statement ii) shows that the
possibility of acquiring information reduces the equilibrium regions.
Statement iii) emphasizes the implications of the ¯rst two statements for in-
termediate ex ante expectations of the fundamentals. For ^ µ 2 [0;1] the R and S
pro¯les are both equilibria if private information is not available. If information can
be acquired, however, the I pro¯le is the unique equilibrium for su±ciently low (but
still positive) costs. Also, statements iii) and iv) of Proposition 1 show that there
exists a threshold ¹ µ 2 (0; 1
2) such that ^ µ 2 (1 ¡ ^ µ;1] implies vR(^ µ) > vI(^ µ) > vS(^ µ).
Hence, for ^ µ 2 (1¡¹ µ;1] and c 2 (vI(^ µ);vR(^ µ)) the S pro¯le is the unique equilibrium.
Similarly, the R pro¯le is the unique equilibrium for ^ µ 2 [0; ¹ µ) and c 2 (vI(^ µ);vS(^ µ)).
Compared to the model without private information the R equilibrium is eliminated
for ^ µ close to 1, while the S equilibrium is eliminated when ^ µ is close to 0. It is the in-
tuitively more appealing equilibrium that survives: R when the ex ante expectation
of the fundamental is bad, S when it is good.
It is interesting to look more carefully at the two ways the multiplicity of the
original Diamond-Dybvig model with ^ µ 2 [0;1] disappears for some combinations of
^ µ and c. First, for low costs of information investors have private information, which
replaces the multiple equilibria with a unique hybrid switching point equilibrium.
Ruling out multiplicity was in fact the very reason that private information was
introduced in Morris and Shin (2001). Second, for low but not very low costs and ^ µ
close to 0 or 1, the original multiplicity disappears since investors can have private
information. It is the sheer possibility of being able to acquire information that
eliminates one of the equilibria.
For all ^ µ there are intermediate costs such that the Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-
Shin worlds are blended. For example, when ^ µ · 1
2 both the I and the R equilibrium
occur when the cost is between vR(^ µ) and vI(^ µ). For ^ µ close to 1
2 even the S
equilibrium joins and the multiplicity increases. Hence, sunspots are not ruled out
when the cost is not convincingly low or high. But the jump is not necessarily
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extreme in the sense that all investors suddenly change behavior. The hybrid I
equilibrium where some investors stay and others run can smooth a jump.
The model with endogenous information acquisition presents a partitioning of
the ex ante expectation of the fundamental in two dimensions. Liquidity run models
without private information typically have a one dimensional partitioning where a
run occurs when ^ µ is bad, no run occurs when ^ µ is good, and both a run or no run can
occur for intermediate ^ µ. Liquidity run models with private information typically
have the trivial partitioning of a unique hybrid equilibrium where a fraction of the
investors runs for all ^ µ. The extent of the run is then decreasing in ^ µ. In the model
of this paper these one-dimensional partitionings arise for high costs (c > vI(1
2)) or
for free private information (c = 0). In general, the partitioning of ^ µ depends on the
cost of information and concerns three di®erent equilibria. The ex ante expectation
of the fundamental and the cost together determine whether or not a run occurs
and its extent.
At this point, it should be noted that even if the investors initially have imprecise
private information about the realization of the fundamental, the same intuition
applies. When the precision of the initial private information is su±ciently low
and no additional information can be acquired, the Diamond-Dybvig pro¯les are
replaced by two Morris-Shin pro¯les. These pro¯les are the unique stable equilibria
candidates in switching point strategies. One pro¯le is close to the R pro¯le and
has a very large fraction of investors running; the other pro¯le resembles the S
pro¯le and has a very large fraction of investors staying. When the precision of
the initial information is very low, only a small fraction of investors will acquire
additional private information, which shows that these equilibrium candidates are
very close to the equilibrium candidates of the model without initial information.
The original Morris-Shin I pro¯le is replaced by a pro¯le where some investors
with very bad or very good initial private information do not acquire additional
information. The same reasoning as in the model without initial private information
applies to determine which of these pro¯les are equilibria.
In the original Diamond-Dybvig model with ^ µ 2 [0;1], neither the ex ante expec-
tation of the fundamental nor its precision plays a role in the equilibrium selection.
However, in the model of this paper, besides ¯ also ® has an e®ect on the maximum
costs due to the availability of private information. Since for identical costs a higher
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precision makes acquiring private information more attractive, an increase in ¯ can
be expected to have the same e®ect as a decrease in the cost, which suggests that
the value of information increases. When ® decreases, the relative importance of
the private information increases, so intuitively the e®ects are similar to an increase
in ¯. The following proposition makes this precise.
Proposition 3.
Assume that ° < 2¼. The value of information in the I, R and S pro¯les is decreas-
ing in ® and increasing in ¯.
When the precision of the fundamental decreases or the precision of private
information increases, an investor with information is better able to distinguish the
cases where the return will be positive from the cases where it will be negative.
This ensures that in the R and the S pro¯les she will expect a higher return which
increases the value of information. Also in the I pro¯le an increase in the precision
of private information or a decrease in the precision of the fundamental has the
same e®ect. For ex ante bad fundamentals (^ µ < 1
2) the intuition is straightforward:
better information is positive since it allows investors to better distinguish good ex
post fundamentals, which makes investors more willing to stay. The expected return
when acquiring information thus increases while without information the investor
will still withdraw her money. This shows that the value of information increases.
For ex ante good fundamentals (^ µ > 1
2) the intuition is not so clear: investors can also
better distinguish the cases of good and bad realizations of the fundamentals. Since
without private information it is optimal to stay, investors are now more inclined
to run. This reduces the expected return when acquiring information, but it also
reduces the expected return when not acquiring information. The symmetry of vI
around ^ µ = 1
2 shows that the second e®ect is stronger.
Combining Corollary 2 and Proposition 3 gives insight into how the equilibria
depend on the precisions of the private information and the fundamental. When
the project is likely to have a bad fundamental, ^ µ < 1
2, relatively cheap information
with a high precision will help to attract investors. The reason is straightforward.
Information with a high precision has a high value. When its cost is low, investors
are inclined to acquire information. This is bene¯cial for the existence of the I
equilibrium but not for the existence of the R equilibrium. A low volatility of the
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fundamental has an opposite e®ect. When a bad fundamental is likely, a low volatil-
ity of the fundamental makes a bad realization very likely. Information is not very
useful in the R pro¯le so the R equilibrium will probably exist. A very volatile fun-
damental makes private information very useful so that the I pro¯le can be expected
to be an equilibrium. A decrease in ® and an increase in ¯ thus favor information
acquisition. When the cost is not too high, the information acquisition favors the I
equilibrium at the expense of the R equilibrium. Since in the I equilibrium some in-
vestors stay, the run is less severe than in the R equilibrium. This re°ects the e®ect
of a decrease in ® or an increase in ¯ in the I equilibrium itself, where investors are
more willing to stay when private information becomes relatively more important
(see the proof of the proposition).
When the ex ante expectation of the fundamental is relatively good, ^ µ > 1
2,
a decrease in ® and an increase in ¯ favor information acquisition for the same
reason. However, the e®ect on the run is opposite. When the cost is not too
high, the information acquisition favors the I equilibrium at the expense of the
S equilibrium. More investors withdraw their money and the run is more severe.
Again this re°ects the e®ects inside the I equilibrium. That an increase in the
relative precision of private information has opposite e®ects for good and bad ex
ante expectations of the fundamentals is a common feature in the global games
literature; see, for example, Metz (2002) and Sbracia and Zaghini (2001). Prati and
Sbracia (2002) provide empirical evidence for this prediction.
For global game models where agents have private information, it is common
practice to discuss the limiting case where the private information becomes arbitrar-
ily precise. Combining Corollary 2 and Proposition 3 shows that when ¯ increases
towards in¯nity, the cost range for which the I pro¯le is unique expands. For this
limiting case the constraint on the cost of information becomes less severe, and for
not too high costs the agents will indeed acquire private information.5
2.7. Information with Endogenous Precision
In this section the restriction that investors can only acquire information with an
exogenously given precision ¯ is loosened. The precision is endogenized by letting
5The limiting case where ® ! 0 does not provide additional insights. When the fundamental
has almost the improper uniform distribution on the real line, the potential pro¯t goes to in¯nity,
and so does the value of information.
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investors choose their preferred precision. The cost of information is a linear function
of its precision, so information with precision ¯ costs ¯^ c, where ^ c > 0 denotes the cost
of information per unit precision. Modelling the information acquisition in this way
re°ects the possibility of investors buying ¯ 2 [0;1) units of information with unit
precision and cost ^ c each. Note that the cost of information is a convex function
of the variance: information with half the variance costs double. Qualitatively
similar results will be obtained for other convex pricing schemes that increase in the
precision.
Given the behavior of the other investors, investor i chooses the precision ¯
that maximizes the expected return minus the cost of the acquired information.
The expected return conditional on information xi with precision ¯ is denoted by
r(xi;Q;¯), where the pro¯le Q 2 fI;R;Sg captures the behavior of the other in-
vestors. Since not having private information is identical to having unrelated in-
formation, which is information with zero precision, notation is slightly abused by
letting ¯ = 0 refer to this case (i.e. E[r(Xi;Q;0)] = E[r(;;Q)]). The problem
investor i faces is then6
max
¯¸0
E[r(Xi;Q;¯)] ¡ ¯^ c:
First, consider for ^ µ ¸ 0 the S pro¯le where all investors stay. The expected
return if no information is acquired is simply ^ µ, while for ¯ > 0 an expression follows
from Equation (1) by adding ^ µ. The S pro¯le is an equilibrium if investor i prefers
not to acquire information. Instead of analyzing the new investors' problem to ¯nd
the maximum cost per unit precision ^ c for which investor i acquires information,
the relation with the baseline model is exploited. In Section 2.4 the maximum cost
an investor is willing to pay for information with precision ¯ is derived. To explic-
itly indicate the dependence on ¯ this maximum cost is denoted here by vS(^ µ;¯).
Hence, when the cost per unit precision equals vS(^ µ;¯)=¯ investor i acquires in-
formation. The standardized value of information for which an investor wants to
acquire information is then given by ^ vS(^ µ) = max¯>0 vS(^ µ;¯)=¯. When the cost of
information per unit precision is higher than the standardized value of information,
an investor will not acquire information and hence the S pro¯le is an equilibrium.
6Technical details are deferred to the proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix.
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Since Proposition 1 states that all vS(^ µ;¯)=¯ decrease in ^ µ, their upper envelope ^ vS
is decreasing in ^ µ as well.
Now consider for ^ µ · 1 the R pro¯le where all investors run. In the same way
as for the S pro¯le it follows that the standardized value of information is given by
^ vR(^ µ) = max¯>0 vR(^ µ;¯)=¯. The R pro¯le is only an equilibrium when investor i
does not acquire information, i.e. when the cost of information per unit precision
is higher than the standardized value of information. From Proposition 1 it follows
that ^ vR is increasing in ^ µ and that ^ vS and ^ vR are symmetric images around ^ µ = 1
2.
In the I pro¯le all investors acquire information. Assume that all investors
di®erent from i choose precision ¯j > 0 and act according to a switching point
strategy where the switching point x¤
j satis¯es E[µ ¡ `jx¤
j] = 0. The uniqueness
condition is not satis¯ed for very small values of ¯j. For these precisions the set
of allowed strategies is restricted to switching point strategies.7 In a symmetric
equilibrium, the ¯ that maximizes investor i's problem should be equal to ¯j. An
expression for the expected return can be obtained in a similar way as for the baseline
model. Unfortunately, the maximization problem cannot be analytically solved. As
a consequence, also the maximum cost per unit precision for which the I pro¯le is
an equilibrium can only be obtained numerically. This maximum cost is denoted by
^ vI and referred to as the standardized value of information.
In Figure 2 the standardized value of information for all three pro¯les is shown
as function of the ex ante expectation of the fundamental. The following proposition
states that for all ® and ¯ the standardized value of information as function of ^ µ in
the R and the S pro¯les behave as depicted in the ¯gure, and that the standardized
value of information in the I pro¯le is symmetrical.
Proposition 4.
i) The standardized values of information as function of the ex ante expectation
of the fundamental ^ µ in the R and the S pro¯le, ^ vR and ^ vS, are strictly increasing
respectively decreasing.
ii) The standardized value of information is lower in the R pro¯le than in the S
pro¯le if ^ µ < 1
2 and higher if ^ µ > 1
2.
7Alternatively, for a given precision of the fundamental ® the set of allowed private precisions
could have been restricted to f0g[(¯(®);1), where ¯(®) = (®=8¼)(®¡2¼+
p
(® + 2¼)2 + 8¼®) > 0
is the unique precision of private information such that ° =
p
2¼.
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Figure 2. The standardized value of information as function of the
ex ante expectation of the fundamental. (® = 1, the thin lines show
the value of information for ¯ = 1)
iii) The standardized values of information in the R and S pro¯les are symmet-
rical images around ^ µ = 1
2 in the sense that ^ vR(1
2 ¡ ±) = ^ vS(1
2 + ±), ± ¸ ¡1
2. The
standardized value of information in the I pro¯le is symmetrical around ^ µ = 1
2 in
the sense that ^ vI(1
2 ¡ ±) = ^ vI(1
2 + ±), ± ¸ 0.
Comparing this proposition to Proposition 1 shows that the standardized values
of information in the R and S pro¯les behave similarly to their non-standardized
counterparts. The strategic complementarities in information acquisition again im-
ply that the standardized value of information in the I pro¯le is higher than in one
of the other pro¯les. Hence, equilibrium existence is guaranteed. Since for all ¯ it
is clear that ^ vR(^ µ) ¸ vR(^ µ;¯)=¯ and ^ vS(^ µ) ¸ vS(^ µ;¯)=¯, the regions where the R
and the S equilibria are eliminated are expanded. Loosely speaking, the statements
made in Corollary 2 are strengthened if the precision is free to choose. Figure 2
suggests that the statements for the I pro¯le are qualitatively the same. Numerical
analysis shows that it depends on ® and ¯ whether or not ^ vI is higher than vI=¯
at the tails and/or the peak. However, the form of ^ vI remains roughly similar. The
reason that ^ vI increases for ^ µ < 1
2 and decreases for ^ µ > 1
2 is the same as before: the
closer the ex ante expectation of the fundamental to 1
2, i.e. the more uncertainty
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there is about the sign of the return, the more valuable the information is. The con-
clusion is that the statements of Corollary 2 are robust, if not strengthened, when
the investors can choose the precision of their information.
2.8. Conclusion
The occurrence and the extent of liquidity runs is a®ected by endogenous infor-
mation acquisition. Only when the cost of private information is high or very low,
can the information structure be taken as ¯xed without a®ecting the results. For
intermediate costs the arti¯cial dichotomy \private information/no private informa-
tion" is too simplistic. This is most clear when priors are intermediate. In this case,
regardless of whether the prior is relatively good or bad, both a full run or no run
can occur when private information is not available, while a partial run occurs if
the ¯xed information structure contains private information. However, in the model
with endogenous information acquisition, no run occurs when the prior is relatively
good, whereas a full run occurs when the prior is relatively bad.
Interestingly, the strategic complementarities in the run/stay decision lead to
strategic complementarities in the acquire-information/not-acquire-information de-
cision. When investors acquire private information, their behavior becomes less
predictable, which increases the uncertainty about the return. This raises the value
of information, which in turn justi¯es the information acquisition. This mechanism
ensures the existence of an equilibrium for all parameters. It also implies that the
equilibrium areas overlap, so that for some parameters multiple equilibria exist.
A promising direction for future research would be to embed the model in a
dynamic context. The unique equilibria for some cost-prior combinations together
with the multiple equilibria that occur for other combinations suggest a role for
hysteresis. Speci¯cally, for countries with improving fundamentals this implies a
lock-in e®ect since the fundamental has to improve considerably before investors
become su±ciently interested to acquire information and consider investing.
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Figure 3. The non-symmetrical equilibria regions. (® = 1;¯ = 1)
Appendix 2.A. Non-Symmetrical Equilibria
In the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) there exists a non-symmetrical equi-
librium (a mixed strategy equilibrium). In the original paper this is not analyzed
since \it is not economically meaningful". Below it is shown that all non-symmetrical
equilibria of the model with endogenous information acquisition have similar char-
acteristics. It is still assumed that the private information is su±ciently precise to
guarantee ° < 2¼. If an investor acquires information, the existence of dominant
regions then implies that in equilibrium investors with information act according to
a switching point strategy.
The discussion of non-symmetrical equilibria below is re°ected in Figure 3. Com-
paring this ¯gure with Figure 1 gives the following proposition.
Proposition 5.
Assume that ° < 2¼. If there is a unique equilibrium among the symmetrical pro¯les,
then a non-symmetrical equilibrium does not exist.
The intuition is straightforward: a non-symmetrical equilibrium can only arise
if there are at least two equilibria that can be mixed.
In the non-symmetrical equilibrium of the original model with ^ µ 2 [0;1] some
investors run and others stay. In the model with endogenous information acqui-
sition, a fraction ^ µ of the investors runs and a fraction 1 ¡ ^ µ stays. Denote this
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non-symmetrical equilibrium by RS. Since E[µ ¡`jRS] = 0 investors are indeed in-
di®erent between running and staying. This equilibrium is not economically mean-
ingful because the extent of the run is increasing in the ex ante expectation of the
fundamental. The RS pro¯le is not an equilibrium for all costs. Since E[µ ¡ `jRS]
has a normal distribution with zero mean and precision ®, it follows that for all ^ µ
the value of information is given by vS(0) = vR(1). For costs of at least this value
the RS equilibrium exists.
Denote by IR a pro¯le where a fraction ¸ 2 (0;1) of the investors acquires
information and has a switching point strategy while the remaining fraction 1 ¡ ¸
runs without acquiring information. Denote by r(xi;IR) the expected return given
information xi. In equilibrium an investor without information should weakly prefer
to withdraw her money, so E[µ ¡¸`jIR]¡(1¡¸) · 0, and the value of information
should equal the cost c, so E[r(Xi;IR)] = c. The switching point x¤ is determined
by E[µ ¡ ¸`jx¤;IR] ¡ (1 ¡ ¸) = 0. An investor who acquires information stays with
positive probability while without information she runs for sure. Hence, the fraction
of remaining investors is increasing in ¸, which implies that the switching point x¤
is decreasing in ¸. The expected return given information xi in this equilibrium
is given by r(xi;IR) = maxf0; E[µ ¡ ¸`jxi;IR] ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)g. When x¤ decreases,
r(xi;IR) is positive for a larger range of private information and for every xi in this
range the expected fraction of withdrawing investors is smaller. Hence E[r(Xi;IR)]
is decreasing in x¤ and thus increasing in ¸. In the proof of Lemma 6 in Appendix
2.B it is shown that x¤ is decreasing in ^ µ which implies that E[r(Xi;IR)] is increasing
in ^ µ. This shows that for a ¯xed cost, ¸ should decrease in ^ µ. So, when the ex ante
expectation of the fundamental improves, more investors run. Similarly, when c
increases, ¸ also increases. Hence, for higher costs more investors want information.
For ^ µ · 1
2, the IR equilibrium only exists in the interior of the region where both
the I and the R equilibrium exist. Consider ^ µ < 1
2. In the last paragraph it was
argued that ¸ is increasing in c. There is only one cost for which ¸ = 0, and this
cost is given by vR(^ µ). Similarly, vI(^ µ) is the unique cost for which ¸ = 1 and the
expected return equals its cost. It follows that only for c 2 (vR(^ µ);vI(^ µ)) does the
IR pro¯le exist with ¸ 2 (0;1). When ¸ increases, the expected fraction of staying
investors increases as well, hence the expected return of an investor who does not
acquire information and stays is increasing in ¸. But Lemma 6 of Appendix 2.B
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shows that when c = vI(^ µ) an investor without information should run. Thus, also
for c 2 (vR(^ µ);vI(^ µ)) an investor without information should run. The conclusion is
that for these costs the IR pro¯le is a non-symmetrical equilibrium.
For ^ µ > 1
2 the region where the IR equilibrium exists is more complex. In the
I equilibrium the expected return given unknown information is E[r(Xi;I)]. For
^ µ · 1
2 this value equals vI(^ µ). Similar reasoning to above now gives that the IR
pro¯le only exists with ¸ 2 (0;1) if c 2 (vR(^ µ);E[r(Xi;I)]). The expected return of
an investor who stays without acquiring information is strictly increasing in ¸. For
costs close to vR(^ µ) it is negative. Similar to the proof that vI(^ µ) is increasing in ^ µ
for ^ µ < 1
2, it can be proved that E[r(Xi;I)] is increasing in ^ µ. Since this implies that
E[r(Xi;I)] > vI(^ µ) an investor who stays without acquiring information expects
a positive return when the cost is close to E[r(Xi;I)]. There thus exist a unique
¹ cIR(^ µ) 2 (vR(^ µ);E[r(Xi;I)]) such that for this cost the expected return of staying
without information equals zero. It is clear that ¹ cIR(1
2) = vI(1
2) and that ¹ cIR(1) =
vR(1) (note that vI(1
2) > vR(1) = vS(0) since the uncertainty about the behavior
of the other investors increases the value of information in the I equilibrium). The
dash-dotted line in Figure 3 for ^ µ > 1
2 representing ¹ c is found by numerical methods.
For c 2 (vR(^ µ);¹ cIR(^ µ)) the IR equilibrium exists with ¸ 2 (0;1).
Denote by IS a pro¯le where a fraction ¸ 2 (0;1) of the investors acquires
information and has a switching point strategy while the remaining fraction 1 ¡ ¸
stays without acquiring information. The switching point is then determined by
E[µ ¡ ¸`jx¤] = 0. Arguments similar to above show that the switching point x¤ is
now increasing in ¸. This pro¯le can only be an equilibrium if the cost of information
satis¯es E[r(Xi;IS)] ¡ r(;;IS) = c. Due to symmetry with the IR case, the left-
hand side is increasing in ¸. Also due to symmetry, the left-hand side is decreasing
in ^ µ. An increase in ^ µ or an increase in c thus leads to an increase in ¸. So, when
the ex ante expectation of the fundamental improves less investors stay and when
the cost of information increases more investors acquire information.
From the symmetry with respect to the IR pro¯le, it is clear that for ^ µ ¸ 1
2
the IS equilibrium only exists in the interior of the region where both the I and
S equilibrium exist. For ^ µ < 1
2, there exists a ¹ cIS(^ µ) such that for this cost the
expected return of an investor who stays without acquiring information is zero. It
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follows that ¹ cIS(0) = vR(0), ¹ cIS(1
2) = vI(1
2). The IS equilibrium with ¸ 2 (0;1)
only exists for c 2 (vS(^ µ);¹ cIS(^ µ)).
Denote by IRS a pro¯le where a fraction of the investors stays without acquir-
ing information, a fraction runs without acquiring information and the remaining
investors acquire information. This equilibrium only exists in the interior of the
region where the IR, the IS and the RS equilibria exist. So, for ^ µ · 1
2 only if
c 2 (vS(0);¹ cIS(^ µ)) and for ^ µ ¸ 0 only if c 2 (vR(1);¹ cIR(^ µ)). For lower costs more
investors want to acquire information, which increases the uncertainty and thus
makes information more valuable. For higher costs investors do not want to acquire
information. For a worse ex ante expectation of the fundamental investors prefer to
run, for a better one they prefer to stay. For reasons explained above, the expected
fraction of running investors is increasing in the ex ante expectation of the funda-
mental, while the fraction of investors who acquire information is increasing in the
cost.
Appendix 2.B. Proofs
First the following lemma is proved where x¤(^ µ) denotes the switching point as
a function of the ex ante expectation of the fundamental.
Lemma 6.
i) r(;;I) = 0 if ^ µ · 1
2 and r(;;I) = E[µ ¡ `jI] if ^ µ ¸ 1
2
ii) x¤(1
2 + ±) = 1 ¡ x¤(1
2 ¡ ±), ± ¸ 0
Note that i) states that an investor without information in the I equilibrium
should run if ^ µ < 1
2 and stay if ^ µ > 1
2.
Proof of Lemma 6.
i) De¯ne A(^ µ;®;xi;¯) = (®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯) ¡ ©(
p
°((®^ µ + ¯xi)=(® + ¯) ¡ ^ µ)).








































where the inequality in the last line is implied by the condition ° < 2¼. Now the
implicit function theorem gives (@=@^ µ)x¤(^ µ) = ¡(@A=@^ µ)=(@A=@x¤) < 0. Using the
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¤(^ µ) ¡ 1
¶
< 0:
But then E[µ ¡ `jI] is increasing in ^ µ. Note that x¤(1
2) = 1
2 and thus E[µ ¡ `jI] = 0
if ^ µ = 1
2. This implies that E[µ ¡ `jI] · 0 if and only if ^ µ · 1
2, with equality if and
only if ^ µ = 1
2.
ii) The de¯nition of x¤(^ µ) gives for 1
2 ¡ ±
®(1



















Now subtract both sides from 1 to arrive at
®(1



















This last line is exactly the de¯nition of x¤(1
2 + ±). ¤
Proof of Proposition 1.
v) The statement about vR and vS follows directly from Equations (1) and (2).
The proof of the statement about vI is more involved. The variables for ^ µ = 1
2 ¡ ±
need to be related to the variables for ^ µ = 1
2 + ±. The value of ^ µ is added as a
subscript to E and P in order to explicitly denote the dependence of expectations
and probabilities on ^ µ.
In the same way as Equation (1) it follows that
E^ µ[µjXi ¸ x
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Lemma 6 implies that x¤(1
2 + ±) ¡ (1
2 + ±) = ¡(x¤(1
2 ¡ ±) ¡ (1
2 ¡ ±)). Now use

















































Now note that E 1
2¡±[`jXi ¸ x¤(1
2 ¡ ±);I]P 1
2¡±[Xi ¸ x¤(1
2 ¡ ±)] = P 1
2¡±[Xj <
x¤(1
2 ¡ ±) ^ Xi > x¤(1







































+ ±)jµ = ~ µ]
i
:
where it is used that Xjjµ and Xijµ are independent, that the involved precisions
do not change, that the normal distribution is symmetrical and that µ ¡ (1
2 ¡ ±) =
¡((1 ¡ µ) ¡ (1
2 + ±)). When i and j are interchanged, the expression in the last





shows that the expected contribution of ` to the return of an investor is the same
for ^ µ = 1
2 ¡ ± and ^ µ = 1
2 + ±.
Combine this ¯nding with Equation (6) to obtain
E 1














Lemma 6 showed that r(;;I) = 0 for ^ µ · 1
2 and r(;;I) = E[µ ¡ `jI] for ^ µ ¸ 1
2.
Recognizing that the last term of Equation (8) is exactly the expected return of
an investor without information who stays in the I equilibrium, gives vI(1
2 ¡ ±) =
vI(1
2 + ±).
ii) Due to the symmetry of vR and vS, which was proved in v), it su±ces to prove










¡ 1 < 0:
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Due to symmetry it su±ces to prove the statement about vI for ^ µ · 1
2. From the
lemma it follows that vI(^ µ) = E[r(Xi;I)] for ^ µ · 1
2. The de¯nition of vI(^ µ) shows
that a change in ^ µ has an e®ect via the expected return if the information is better
than the switching point, and via the expected return due to a di®erent investment

































where it was used that (@=@^ µ)x¤(^ µ) < 0 as was found in the proof of Lemma 6.
Hence, (@=@^ µ)r(xi;I) > 0 for ^ µ < 1
2, so for the values of the information for which
the investor would already have stayed, her expected return will be higher. The proof
is ¯nished when noting that (@=@^ µ)x¤(^ µ) < 0 implies that the range of information
for which an investor expects a positive return increases.
iv) Due to symmetry it su±ces to prove the statement only for ^ µ < 1
2. The
symmetry of vS and vR and ii) imply that vS(^ µ) > vR(^ µ). It remains to be proved
that vI(^ µ) > vR(^ µ). From the lemma it is clear that vI(^ µ) = E[r(Xi;I)] for ^ µ <
1
2. Since there is always a strictly positive fraction of investors who stay in the I
equilibrium, clearly E[µ ¡ `jxi;I] > E[µ ¡ `jxi;R] and thus x¤ < (® + ¯)=¯ ¡ ®^ µ=¯.
Hence, r(xi;I) ¸ r(xi;R) for all xi while a strict inequality holds for xi > x¤.
Since these values have a positive probability mass, it follows that E[r(Xi;I)] >
E[r(Xi;R)], which implies that vI(^ µ) > vR(^ µ) for ^ µ < 1
2.
i) Due to iv) and v) it su±ces to prove that vR(^ µ) > 0 for ^ µ · 1
2. Since
r(xi;R) ¸ 0 for all xi while a strict inequality holds for xi > (® + ¯)=¯ ¡ ®^ µ=¯,
which happens with positive probability, it follows that vR(^ µ) = E[r(Xi;R)] > 0.
iii) Due to symmetry it su±ces to prove the statement only for ^ µ · 1
2. The
symmetry of vS and vR and ii) imply that vS(^ µ) > vR(^ µ) for ^ µ < 1
2. Given ii) and
iv) it needs to be proved that vS(0) > vI(0). But this holds since from arguments
similar to the ones used in iv) it follows that E[r(Xi;S)] > E[r(Xi;I)]. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.
Due to symmetry of vR and vS it su±ces to prove the statement for vS. Equation
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Due to the symmetry of vI in ^ µ = 1
2 it su±ces to give the proof for ^ µ · 1
2, and due
to continuity it even su±ces to only consider ^ µ < 1
2. From the lemma it follows that
an investor without information withdraws her money. The value of information is
then given by E[r(Xi;I)]. For reasons explained in the proof of Proposition 1 i) this
value is decreasing in the switching point x¤. To compute the derivative of x¤ to
® and ¯ the function A as de¯ned in the proof of Lemma 6 is used. There it was















































Since ° < 2¼ and x¤ > ^ µ when ^ µ < 1
2 (see the proof of the lemma), it follows
that (@=@®)A < 0 and (@=@¯)A > 0. The implicit function theorem gives that
(@=@®)x¤ > 0 and (@=@¯)x¤ < 0, which ¯nishes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.
i) When it is proved that ^ vS exists the statements follow directly from the main
text and the symmetry between ^ vS and ^ vR. First it is proved that the investor's
problem is well-de¯ned. Since an investor will stay when her information is better
than ¡®^ µ=¯, she will always stay if the precision goes to zero when ^ µ > 0. For
^ µ = 0, Equation (1) shows that E[r(Xi;S;¯)] goes to 0 when ¯ becomes arbitrarily
small. Hence, lim¯!0 E[r(Xi;S;¯)] ¡ ¯^ c = E[r(Xi;S;0)] and the objective function
is continuous in ¯. Note that r is bounded, since E[jY j] is bounded when Y has a
normal distribution. Hence, the total return for very high ¯ becomes negative. This
shows that max¯¸0 E[r(Xi;S;¯)] ¡ ¯^ c is well-de¯ned.
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Since the expected return is always ¯nite the maximum cost per unit precision goes
to zero for ¯ ! 1. The non-negativity of the expected return now implies that
the maximum is well-de¯ned for ^ µ > 0. Note that for ^ µ = 0 this maximum cost is
in¯nity.
ii) This follows from the symmetry of ^ vR and ^ vS and the fact that ^ vS is decreasing
in ^ µ.
iii) The ¯rst statement is proved in the text. The statement about ^ vI is more
complicated. A proof of the equilibrium existence for low unit costs is sketched for
^ µ < 1
2 (below it is proved that ^ vI is symmetric around ^ µ = 1
2). Similar to the S pro¯le
it can be proved that the maximization problem is well de¯ned. This maximization
problem can then be seen as a mapping from ¯j to ¯. For ¯j close to 0, there is an
equilibrium where almost all the investors run. Comparison with the R pro¯le shows
that for low enough unit costs investor i wants precision ¯ > ¯j. Since the expected
return is bounded, for very large ¯j investor i wants precision ¯ < ¯j. When the
mapping is continuous a ¯xed point is guaranteed, which shows the existence of an
equilibrium for low unit costs.
To prove the symmetry of ^ vI in 1
2, take ¯j as given. It now su±ces to show that
the maximization problems for ^ µ = 1
2 + ± and for ^ µ = 1
2 ¡ ± are identical up to a
constant. From Lemma 6 it follows that x¤
j(1
2 +±;¯j) = 1¡x¤
j(1
2 ¡±;¯j), where the
dependence on ^ µ and either ¯j is explicitly denoted. Investor i stays if her private
information is higher than x¤(^ µ;¯), which is determined by E[µ¡`jx¤(^ µ;¯)] = 0. In
the same way as the proof of Lemma 6 it now follows that x¤(1
2 +±;¯) = 1¡x¤(1
2 ¡
±;¯).
The derivation in Equation (6) still holds when the dependence of x¤ on ¯ is





2 ¡±;¯)] = P 1
2+±[Xj ¸ x¤
j(1
2 +±;¯j)^Xi < x¤(1
2 +±;¯)]. Using
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This shows that
E 1

































This expression is independent of ¯, which ¯nishes the proof. ¤
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Fixing the Quorum:
Representation versus Abstention
Abstract. The majority of the participating voters in referenda does
not necessarily re°ect the majority of the whole population since voters
can abstain. This paper shows that a quorum exists for which the out-
come of the referendum coincides with the population preference. How-
ever, a second equilibrium can exist in which the proposal is always
rejected. When insu±cient information makes the optimal quorum un-
known, it is in general more harmful to set the quorum too high than too
low. Robustness of the results is analyzed by allowing pressure groups
to encourage or discourage participation after the quorum is set.
Keywords. Electoral engineering, quorum, referendum, voting/not-
voting decision, voting rules.
JEL Classification. D72.
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3.1. Introduction
In June 2005 a referendum was held in Italy to block a fertility law. The law
banned research using stem cells from embryos and imposed stringent requirements
on test-tube pregnancies. Adversaries of the law initiated the referendum to aim
for its abrogation. To succeed, a quorum of 50% was to be met and a majority of
the participating voters had to support the abrogation. This gave advocates of the
law two di®erent possibilities to avoid abrogation: i) encouraging no-voters to take
the e®ort to vote so that they would form the majority; ii) discouraging no-voters
from voting so that the quorum would not be met and the referendum would be
invalid. In Italy, the advocates of the law chose for the second option, for example
the speakers of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies as well as the Roman
Church discouraged people from voting. The New York Times (2005) writes that
\Italian prelates have told parishioners to head to the beach instead of the polling
places on Sunday and Monday, so that the quorum will not be met." The strategy
succeeded, the turnout was too low and the referendum was invalid. Since 26% of
the population voted, while almost 90% of the participating voters were in favor,
23.4% of the population was in favor and voted. When a handful of people in favor
was discouraged by the forecasts of an invalid referendum, encouraging no-voters to
cast their ballot could indeed have led to a valid referendum in which the abrogation
would have been approved.
Referenda are becoming increasingly widespread in democratic countries (Wa-
ters (2003) and Matsusaka (2005) discuss recent trends, see also the web sites of
The Initiative & Referendum Institute). One of the main reasons is the wish to give
voters a direct say in the issues at stake. An additional reason might be that direct
democracy would contribute to voters' involvement with and trust in the political
system. However, referenda are known to be imperfect decision making tools in the
sense that a counter-intuitive relationship between the voters' preferences and the
outcome can occur. Nurmi (1998) lists various voting paradoxes, including problems
stemming from multiple proposals or multiple alternatives and the possibility of con-
°icting opinions between the majorities of the voters and their representatives. As
the referendum in Italy shows, a quorum gives rise to an additional potential prob-
lem by giving opponents of change an additional tool to reach their aim. Fishburn
and Brahms (1983) call this the \no-show" paradox.
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The objective of this paper is twofold. In the ¯rst part we address the question
whether there is any theoretical support for imposing a quorum in a referendum.
The focus of the second part is on the robustness of the results. More speci¯cally,
we ¯rst look at the magnitude of the distortion when the quorum is set either too
low or too high and then at the impact of pressure groups which can a®ect the voter
turnout after the quorum is set.
The role of the quorum is analyzed in a stylized referendum model with heteroge-
nous voters. The existence of a quorum makes the turnout a decisive variable for
determining the outcome. But even for referenda without a quorum, the voting/not-
voting decision is an important aspect of explaining the outcome. Analyzing this
decision usually leads to the conclusion that people who vote do not form a rep-
resentative subset of the population. For example, Fort and Bunn (1998) ¯nd for
referenda concerning nuclear power that actual participation has more explanatory
power for the yes/no decision than both economic and preference variables. Success-
fully navigating the hurdles of registering, going to the booth etc. made a no-vote
more likely. In the model, this asymmetry between opponents and proponents is
re°ected by their possibly di®erent probabilities of voting.
In the ¯rst part of the paper we show that with the appropriate choice of the
quorum and the default outcome that occurs if the quorum is not met, the population
majority outcome can be attained. To see how the referendum should be designed,
suppose that proponents are more likely to cast their ballots then opponents. In
order to o®set the bias towards accepting, the default outcome needs to be rejection.
A higher quorum needs more participating voters. To be precise, it needs a higher
fraction of yes-voters in the population since they are more likely to vote. A higher
quorum thus reduces the cases where the majority of participating voters is in favor
while the majority of the population is not. The population majority outcome is
attained for the quorum for which they equal.
Interestingly, when voters care more about the outcome when they are partic-
ipating, the optimal quorum does not necessarily lead to the population majority
outcome. A second equilibrium can exist in which the default outcome always oc-
curs. In this case, the referendum clearly is an imperfect tool for decision making.
The second part of the paper analyzes the robustness of the results in two ways.
When the social planner has insu±cient knowledge about the population parameters
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or insu±cient political power to set the quorum at its optimal level, a non-optimal
quorum can arise. When the default outcome is set correctly, we show that setting
the quorum too low is less harmful than setting it too high. The reason is that the
default outcome will always occur when the quorum is too high, while when the
quorum is too low both outcomes might still occur. Since in most real-life applica-
tions there is not much °exibility in setting the quorum, this ¯nding implicates that
only topics for which both sides have a high expected turnout should be subjected to
referenda. A non-optimal quorum can also arise when pressure groups have the pos-
sibility to a®ect the turnout after the quorum is set, like in the Italian referendum
discussed above. When the default outcome is rejecting the proposal, yes-pressure
groups should always encourage people to vote. For no-pressure groups it is optimal
to encourage voters to participate only if it is likely that there are relatively many
no-voters, otherwise they should be discouraged from voting.
Since the basis of democracy is that all people are equally important, we con-
sider the preference of the population majority as the benchmark outcome. We thus
abstain from social welfare considerations that balance an \optimal outcome" with
the cost of representation. The model can easily be adapted to address di®erent
intensities of voters' preferences. In case a quorum is exogenously imposed to guar-
antee a certain level of representativeness, the second part of the paper can be read
as analyzing the di®erence between the referendum outcome and the population
majority outcome. We assume that participation is voluntary, as compulsory voting
would trivially result in the population majority outcome (however, Franklin (1999)
and Jakee and Sun (2006) raise arguments against compulsory voting).
Theoretical support for the importance of the population majority outcome fol-
lows from the axiomatization of May (1952) as the only voting rule that is decisive,
anonymous, not-favoring any of the outcomes and positively responding (i.e. when
one voter changes opinion then the group decision becomes more favorable towards
that opinion). However, when voters can abstain from participating, C^ orte-Real
and Pereira (2004) ¯nd that in general no voting rule that is independent of the
abstainers' preferences can achieve the population majority outcome. They show
that this outcome can be achieved if in the case of a turnout below the quorum,
the underlying reasons determine the outcome. In the equilibrium setting of this
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paper's model, this interpretation of an insu±cient turnout is done ex ante when
the referendum is designed.
The model is based on the decision-theoretic approach initiated by Downs (1957).
Voters participate in the referendum when they receive a positive net utility from
voting. Following Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and in line with empirical evidence
discussed extensively by Blais (2000), the net utility of voting depends on the out-
come of the referendum, the cost of casting the ballot and a \consumption bene¯t"
that represents the ful¯llment of a voter's \civic duty". The main di®erence between
their and our model is how a voter derives utility from the outcome of the referendum
and from participating. In their model, they consider the benchmark of a utility
function that is linear in the outcome of the referendum. However, there might be
nonlinearities involved with respect to the outcome and participation. More specif-
ically, the utility of the referendum outcome might depend on whether a voter has
participated or not. On top of this, when there are many potential voters, the prob-
ability that a particular voter's action is decisive is almost zero. Myerson (2000)
derives estimates of the order 10¡9. Hence, unless the utility di®erence between the
outcomes is extremely large relative to the cost of voting, the nonlinear e®ect might
be far more important. It is not clear what the direction of this nonlinear e®ect
should be: there are convincing arguments for all possibilities. When it is zero the
outcome of the referendum does not a®ect a voter's participation decision. When
it is negative, a voter exhibits an underdog-mentality: the less likely her preferred
outcome, the more likely she will vote. When the nonlinear e®ect is positive, a voter
likes to be part of the winning side. In this paper we consider all types. Moreover, we
show that if all types can occur simultaneously, the average type drives the results.
Although the literature on voting is vast, there are few papers on referenda.
Herrera and Mattozzi (2007) discuss a group-based referendum model. As in this
paper, the turnout of each group is endogenous. However, instead of having the
referendum outcome directly a®ecting the voters' utility, their groups weigh the
cost of increasing the turnout with its e®ect on the referendum outcome. They
¯nd a \quorum paradox": the equilibrium turnout might only exceed the quorum
if the quorum is not imposed. Myatt (2007) discusses a model in which a ¯nite
number of privately informed voters have to chose between two alternatives that
are preferred to the status quo. In contrast with the model of this paper, strategic
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voting can occur when a voter fears that her most preferred alternative will not
receive su±cient support. Marquette and Hinckley (1988) and Kanazawa (1998)
suggest that a voter's recall of previous elections is also relevant for current turnout.
Closely related to the model of this paper, Kanazawa (1998) proposes to substitute
the Riker-Ordeshook probability regarding the current election with the probability
that the voter's preferred outcome occurred when she participated in past elections.
Hence, instead of computing the probability that her preferred candidate wins as in
this paper's model, a voter uses an estimation based on past experience.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3
shows that there is a quorum for which the population majority outcome can occur
and analyzes its properties, Section 4 addresses the robustness of the results by con-
sidering a not-optimally set quorum and allowing for pressures groups. Appendices
3.A and 3.B contain precise formulations of claims made in the main text. Proofs
are deferred to Appendix 3.C.
3.2. The Referendum Model
3.2.1. The Referendum. A referendum is held in order to decide whether a
proposal should be accepted or rejected. Each voter has three options: i) to vote in
favor of the proposal; ii) to vote against it; iii) not to vote. Voters who do indeed
vote are called participating voters. The referendum is only valid if a quorum is met,
that is if more than a certain fraction of the voters is indeed voting. The proposal
is accepted if the referendum is valid and if the majority of the participating voters
is in favor.1 When the quorum is met but a majority of the participating voters is
against, the proposal is rejected. In case the referendum is invalid, a preset default
outcome determines whether the proposal is accepted or not. Although in some real-
life referenda the default outcome is not explicitly set, in most cases it is rather clear
what will happen when the referendum is not valid. For example, in the referendum
about the European Constitution in the Netherlands there was no formal default
outcome. Though, all major political parties were in favor and it was clear that the
European Constitution would be accepted in case the quorum would not be met. In
this paper, designing a referendum is thus choosing the quorum and default option.
1When the intensities of the voters' preferences di®er, a quali¯ed majority can be used to
protect a minority from the majority, see Appendix 3.A for details.
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There is a continuum of voters with measure one. Each voter knows whether
she is in favor of the proposal or against it, but there is uncertainty about the
overall fraction of voters in favor of the topic.2 The assumption that the preferences
of voters are endogenously determined is rather standard. However, Rosema (2004)
discusses the psychology of voting and ¯nds that possible election outcomes are used
in the decision what to vote. Making voters' preferences endogenous though, justi¯es
research on its own and is outside the scope of this paper. Hence, denote by y the
proportion of voters in favor of the proposal. The very reason that a referendum is
needed, is that the value of y is unknown. Hence, y is a random variable which takes
its values in an interval [y;y] ½ [0;1]. The distribution of y is common knowledge.
This can be the case if for example forecasting agencies provide correct projections
when not everyone has made up her mind yet. The proportion of voters in favor has
full support on [y;y]. The model is not relevant when the majority is either always
in favor or always against, so it is assumed that y < 1
2 < y.
When the proportion of yes-voters y were observable, no referendum is needed to
have the proposal accepted or rejected according to the majority of the voters. This
benchmark case is referred to as the population majority outcome. To be precise,
denote by A the event that the proposal is accepted and by R = Ac the event that
it is rejected. The population majority outcome is then de¯ned as A when y > 1
2
and R when y < 1
2. When y = 1
2, the population majority outcome prescribes both
A and R with probability 1
2. However, for notational convenience A is prescribed
but we assume that this case does not occur, i.e. P[y = 1
2] = 0.
Since voters have the possibility to abstain from voting, the proportion of yes-
voters y is not directly observable. This paper analyzes whether a referendum can
be designed in such a way that the population majority outcome always occurs.
3.2.2. The Voters. A voter who is in favor of the proposal is referred to as a
yes-voter, a voter who is against the proposal as a no-voter. The typical yes-voter
will be indicated by index i and the typical no-voter by index j. Whether a voter
will indeed participate depends on her net bene¯t of doing so. A voter participates
in the referendum if her net utility of doing so is positive. In our model, this net
2It is possible to allow for voters who are indi®erent with respect to the proposal by assuming
that this group has a ¯xed size and that due to a lack of motivation these voters do never participate
in the referendum.
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utility of voting has the form proposed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). As in their
model, the net utility consists of three terms: i) a cost of voting; ii) a \consumption
bene¯t from the act of voting" and iii) a utility from the outcome of the referendum
depending on its probability of occurrence. The main di®erence between their model
and mine is how the utility depends on the outcome of the referendum.
A voter who decides to indeed cast her vote, incurs a cost c > 0 representing the
e®ort to go to the ballot box. Since there is a continuum of voters, the impact of a
single voter on the outcome is nil. If voters were only concerned about the strategic
bene¯t of voting and its cost, this would lead to the well-known paradox that none
of the voters would take the e®ort to cast a ballot. Cultural theories of voting
argue that the incorporation of \civic engagement" eliminates the paradox. In an
empirical study, Blais, Young and Lapp (2000) ¯nd support for this hypothesis. In
explaining voter turnout, the cost of voting and a return depending on the outcome
of the referendum matter, but only among the voters with a relatively weak civic
engagement.
In the model this civic engagement is a moral pressure to vote that di®ers across
voters. Let mi be the moral pressure of yes-voter i. The moral pressure of a yes-voter
has a uniform distribution on the interval [¹ my¡ ®
2; ¹ my+ ®
2] so that the average moral
pressure of yes-voters is given by ¹ my. Similarly, assume that the moral pressure of no-
voters has a uniform distribution on the interval [¹ mn¡®
2; ¹ mn+®
2]. The moral pressure
is felt as a disutility when a voter is not voting. Since there are no strong arguments
why yes- and no-voters should have di®erently shaped moral pressure distributions,
they are taken as identical. Hence, the scaling parameter ® that determines the
within-group heterogeneity is the same for both sides. The average moral pressures
though can be di®erent. This allows for the proposal to unequally a®ect the yes-
and no-voters, so that one side might be more inclined to vote. Di®erent average
moral pressures can thus cause a bias towards accepting or rejecting the proposal.
The dependence on the outcome is modeled in the following way. A yes-voter
wants the proposal to be accepted and derives utility in this case. The utility a
yes-voter derives from acceptance of the proposal can depend on whether the voter
indeed participates in the referendum or not. Let the utility of an accepted proposal
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for a participating yes-voter be °v, while it is °nv for a non-participating yes-voter.3
Similarly, when the proposal is rejected, a participating no-voter derives utility °v
while a non-participating no-voter derives utility °nv. For °v > °nv, voters derive
more utility from their preferred outcome when they have participated. When the
reversed inequality holds, a voter likes her preferred outcome best when it occurs
without costing her any e®ort. If °v 6= °nv, the additional bias towards accepting
or rejecting the proposal might either o®set or strengthen the bias stemming from
di®erent average moral pressures.
The outcome of the referendum is unknown when the voters have to make their
decisions. The ex ante expected utility thus depends on the probability of accep-
tance or rejection. Theoretically these probabilities can depend on whether a voter
participates or not, so denote the probability of acceptance by Pv[A] when a voter
participates and by Pnv[A] when she does not. For a yes-voter, the expected utility
derived from the outcome of the referendum is thus °vPv[A] or °nvPnv[A] depending
on whether she is participating or not.
The utilities of a yes-voter are summarized in Table 1, for a no-voter identical
expressions hold when the probability of acceptance is replaced by the probability
of rejection.4 The net utility of voting is shown in the third line. The ¯rst term
is a utility di®erence caused by voter i's impact on the outcome, the second term
is a utility di®erence due to di®erent valuations of the outcome when a voter par-
ticipates or not. Econometricians would call the latter an interaction e®ect. It
captures nonlinearities that arise from the participation and the outcome. Riker
and Ordeshook (1968) assume that the utility of the outcome does not depend on
the voter's decision, so °v = °nv. The outcome thus only a®ects voters' decisions
3This is equivalent to the more elaborate modelling where disutility is derived from rejection
of the proposal. For example, when participating yes-voters derive utility ¯vAP[A] in case of
acceptance and ¯vRP[R] in case of rejection, the total utility is (¯vA ¡ ¯vR)P[A] ¡ ¯vR. De¯ning
°v as ¯vA ¡¯vR and noting that the constant can be absorbed by rescaling of ¹ my, as will be made
clear below, gives the result.
4We implicitly assume that whenever a voter cast her ballot, she votes according to whether
she is in favor or against. In other words, all voters are sincere. It is necessary to assume this
since each voter is atomistic and her decision is not a®ecting the outcome. However, sincere voting
is guaranteed when the voter's morality leads to a large negative utility when she votes for the
non-preferred outcome.
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utility of yes-voter i
voting °vPv[A] ¡ c
not voting °nvPnv[A] ¡ mi
net utility of voting °v(Pv[A] ¡ Pnv[A]) + (°v ¡ °nv)Pnv[A] ¡c + mi
Riker-Ordeshook °v(Pv[A] ¡ Pnv[A]) + (°v ¡ °nv)Pnv[A] ¡c + mi
this model °v(Pv[A] ¡ Pnv[A]) + (°v ¡ °nv)P[A]nv ¡c + mi
Table 1. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) assume that the utility of the
outcome does not depend on participation, so °v = °nv. However,
when the impact of a single voter is nihil, the probability of acceptance
P[A] is independent of voter i's participation and the outcome only
a®ects the participation decision through di®erences between °v and
°nv.
through di®erent probabilities of acceptance. However, the probability that a par-
ticular voter is pivotal is extremely small when the population is large. For example,
consider a population of 5 million voters of which 50.1% is expected to be in favor.
Feddersen (2004) uses a formula derived by Myerson (2000) to ¯nd estimates for
the probability of a pivotal vote of the order 10¡9. This shows that even when °v
and °nv are close, di®erent valuations of the outcome may be far more important
than the utility di®erence caused by the voter's impact. Although voter's tend to
overestimate their impact, as for example found be Blais et al. (2000), their biases
should be of a very high order to outweigh the e®ects of di®erent valuations.
To focus on how di®erent valuations a®ect the referendum outcome, we abstain
from the small impact of a single voter by assuming a continuum of voters. Hence, no
strategic concerns are incorporated in the decision making process at the individual
level.5 The probability of acceptance does not depend on the voter's action and is
denoted by P[A]; the probability of rejection is then P[R] = 1¡P[A]. The expression
of the net utility shows that the levels of the utilities derived from acceptance or
rejection are not relevant for the behavior of the voters, only their di®erence matters.
5In Section 3.4 we will give interest groups the possibility to coordinate the individuals. This
allows individuals to indirectly strategically a®ect the outcome.
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De¯ne ° = °v ¡ °nv as the excess utility of the preferred outcome of voting relative
to not-voting.
It is not clear what the sign of ° should be, or even whether it should be non-
zero. We hence do not make any assumptions and discuss the model for all possible
values of °. When ° = 0, the outcome of the referendum is not relevant for the
decision of a voter whether to vote or not. For this reason we refer to these voters
as simple-hearted voters.
When ° < 0, the outcome of the referendum will give a higher utility when
the voter does not cast her vote. This captures the feeling of a voter who likes
her preferred outcome best if she does not have to do anything for it to occur.
A higher probability of her preferred outcome makes a voter less willing to vote.
This resembles the \underdog e®ect" reported by Levine and Palfrey (2007) in a
laboratorial experiment: voters supporting the less popular alternative have higher
participation rates. Another way of interpreting this behavior is suggested by Haan
and Kooreman (2003). For a ¯nite number of voters they show that the side with the
highest number of supporters can still be the most likely to lose due to free-riding
behavior. When ° < 0 voters balance their moral pressures with the outcome of the
referendum, and we therefore refer to them as calculating voters.
When ° > 0, the more likely it is that the preferred outcome will occur, the
more likely a voter will participate. This represents a voter who wants to be part
of the winning team: the higher the probability of winning, the more likely she
wants to take action to support it. This is in line with the expressive voting model
of Schuessler (2000) in which bene¯ts from attachment to a collective lead to a
preference for the winning party. For example, Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2006)
¯nd evidence that although in Belgian municipal elections turnout is highest when
the largest party obtains a small majority, turnout is again stimulated when there is
a clear winner with at least two thirds of the votes. Further support that some voters
want to be a winner is given by Bartels (1988) who shows that the public opinion
before US presidential elections tends towards the winner of the most recent primary
election. Remarkably, Clausen (1968) ¯nds that in post-election recall surveys the
winning candidate's support is overestimated and concludes that apparently too
many people \remember" to have contributed to the victory. Since voters cluster
together when ° > 0, we refer to them as a®ectionate voters.
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The above expressions show that the cost c of casting the ballot can be absorbed
in the mean moral pressures ¹ my and ¹ mn. Without loss of generality, the exposition of
the model can thus focus on the case c = 0. It also shows that there is an alternative
interpretation of the model in which all voters have the same moral pressures, but
di®er in their cost of voting.
3.2.3. Equilibrium. Since all voters have the same information, they make the
same inference about P[A] and P[R]. For notational convenience we assume that
when a voter is indi®erent between voting or abstaining will vote. An equilibrium
can then be characterized by two switching points ¡°p and ¡°r such that yes-voter
i only votes if mi ¸ ¡°p, no-voter j only votes if mj ¸ ¡°r, P[A] = p and P[R] = r.
Since p + r = P[A] + P[R] = 1, an equilibrium is fully characterized by p. To ¯nd
the equilibria, it thus su±ces to analyze for all p 2 [0;1], whether p¡P[A] = 0 when
the yes- and no-voter switching points are ¡°p and ¡°(1 ¡ p) respectively.
Let Y = P[mi ¸ ¡°p] denote the probability that yes-voter i will vote. Invoking
the law of large numbers, see Judd (1985), Y also denotes the proportion of yes-voters
who are voting. Hence, Y will be referred to as the propensity to vote of yes-voters.


















A similar expression holds for N. Note that Y and N are both functions of p.
When the proportion of yes-voters equals y, the measure of participating yes-
voters is given by yY and the measure of participating no-voters by (1 ¡ y)N.
The participation rate is thus given by yY + (1 ¡ y)N. When q 2 [0;1] denotes
the quorum, the referendum is valid if yY + (1 ¡ y)N ¸ q. This is the quorum
condition. When the referendum is valid, the proposal is accepted if the majority of
the participating voters is in favor, so if yY ¸ (1¡y)N (for notational convenience
the proposal is accepted when exactly half of the voters is in favor). This is the
majority condition. In case the referendum is not valid, the preset default outcome
D 2 fA;Rg determines the outcome.
Table 2 relates the probabilities of accepting the proposal with the propensities
to vote and the quorum. Suppose that the default outcome is rejecting the proposal,
D = R (the case D = A follows from symmetric arguments). First suppose that yes-
voters are more likely to participate than no-voters, so Y > N. A higher proportion
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condition constraint P[A]
Y > N and q · 2NY
Y +N majority P[y ¸ N
Y +N]
Y > N and q ¸ 2NY
Y +N quorum P[y ¸
q¡N
Y ¡N]
Y = N both P[y ¸ 1
2]1 1fY ¸qg
Y < N both P[
q¡N
Y ¡N ¸ y ¸ N
Y +N]
Table 2. Binding constraints and the probability of accepting the
proposal when the default outcome is rejection.
y of yes-voters makes a valid referendum more likely since more voters will actually
vote (a yes-voter is more likely to vote than a no-voter), and it makes it more likely
that the proposal is accepted (there are more participating yes-voters). When the
quorum is below 2NY=(Y +N), the quorum is relatively easily met and the majority
condition determines the probability of acceptance (note that for q = 2NY=(Y +N)
the majority and quorum constraint coincide). For a higher quorum instead it is
determined by the quorum constraint. Now suppose that Y < N. A higher fraction
of yes-voters y makes a valid referendum less likely since less voters will actually
vote (a yes-voter is less likely to vote than a no-voter), but if the referendum is
valid it is more likely that the proposal is accepted (there are more participating
yes-voters). Both constraints are binding, the quorum constraint from above, the
majority constraint from below. Note that when Y = N, the quorum can only be
met if q · Y = N. In this case the probability of accepting is determined by the
majority condition.
An equilibrium in case D = R is thus a solution of p ¡ P[A] = 0, where P[A],
Y and N are as discussed above. This equilibrium characterization is at the core of
the analysis.
3.3. The Quorum and the Population Majority Outcome
3.3.1. Simple-Hearted Voters. Suppose that the voters are simple-hearted,
so ° = 0. The expectations about the outcome of the referendum do not a®ect
the voter's decision whether to vote or not. This implies that the choice of the
quorum does not a®ect the propensities to vote. Any bias that stems from di®erent
average moral pressures can thus be directly addressed by a quorum. The following
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proposition states that with the right choice of the quorum and the default option,
the population majority outcome occurs.
Proposition 1. (Simple-Hearted Voters and the Population Majority Outcome)
Assume that ° = 0 and ¹ my; ¹ mn 2 (¡®
2; ®
2).
i) When ¹ my = ¹ mn, the population majority outcome is only achieved in the
unique equilibrium of the referendum with a quorum of at most q¤ = 1
2 + ¹ my+ ¹ mn
2® and
default outcome D 2 fA;Rg.
ii) When ¹ my 6= ¹ mn, the population majority outcome is only achieved in the
unique equilibrium of the referendum with quorum q¤ = 1
2 + ¹ my+ ¹ mn
2® and default
outcome D = R if ¹ my > ¹ mn and D = A otherwise.
In order to discuss the implications of the proposition, it is insightful to look
¯rst at the propensities to vote. The condition that ¹ my and ¹ mn are contained in
(¡®
2; ®
2) implies that they are given by Y ¤ = 1
2 + ¹ my=® and N¤ = 1
2 + ¹ mn=® and
that they are contained in (0;1), see Equation (1). This assures that on each side
some voters do abstain from voting while others cast their votes. It hence excludes
the less relevant cases where all voters of a side vote or all of them do not vote. The
¯rst statement of the proposition assumes that the propensities to vote are equal
for yes- and no-voters. Obviously, a majority of yes-voters in the whole population,
y ¸ 1
2, will then lead to a majority of yes-voters among the participating voters.
The participation rate is constant and equal to yY ¤+(1¡y)N¤ = Y ¤ = N¤. In this
case, any quorum below or equal to the propensity Y ¤ or N¤ is automatically met
and the default outcome is free to choose (in the proposition the average propensity
1
2(Y ¤ + N¤) is used to stress the similarity with the optimal quorum in the second
statement). Since the majority of the participating voters perfectly re°ects the
majority among the population, the population majority outcome is achieved. Note
especially that the quorum q = 0 is allowed, which is identical to the case of not
having a quorum. Intuitively, when the propensities to vote are equal, there is no
bias towards accepting or rejecting the proposal and no quorum is needed. However,
since the participation rate is constant, any su±ciently low quorum does no harm.
The second statement assumes that the propensities to vote are di®erent. With
the found expressions for Y ¤ and N¤, the optimal quorum can be expressed as
the average propensity to vote 1
2(Y ¤ + N¤). To see why this is the case, assume
that ¹ my > ¹ mn (symmetric arguments hold for the opposite case). This assumption
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implies that Y ¤ > N¤. Yes-voters are more likely to vote and without a quorum
there is a bias towards accepting the proposal. When a quorum is introduced, it
can only o®set this bias if the default outcome is rejecting the proposal, D = R.
The participation rate yY ¤ + (1 ¡ y)N¤ is strictly increasing in y. This shows that
a majority of the population is in favor of the proposal, y ¸ 1
2, if and only if the
participation rate is higher than 1
2(Y ¤+N¤). The population majority outcome can
thus be achieved by the quorum q¤ = 1
2(Y ¤+N¤). Note that the majority constraint
is redundant: whenever the referendum is valid, a majority of the participating
voters is in favor of the proposal. Instead of the fraction of participating voters in
favor, the participation rate is the decisive variable. The model thus has a strong
prediction: for a correctly set quorum the default outcome will never occur as the
outcome of a valid referendum.
At ¯rst sight it might seem counterintuitive that the optimal quorum is increasing
in the propensity to vote of both yes- and no-voters: the bias towards accepting is
increased when yes-voters become more likely to vote, but it is decreased when no-
voters become more likely to vote. An increased bias might need a higher quorum
and a decreased bias a lower quorum. This reasoning correctly assesses the e®ect
on the bias in the absence of a quorum. However, when the optimal quorum is
imposed, the previous paragraph showed that the majority constraint is redundant.
An increase in the propensity to vote of yes-voters has an identical e®ect on the
quorum constraint as an increase in the propensity to vote of no-voters. More
voters will indeed vote, so the quorum is more likely to be met and the probability
of accepting the proposal is increased. To achieve the population majority outcome,
an increase in the quorum is needed.
3.3.2. Calculating Voters. Now suppose that the voters are calculating, so
° < 0. The potential disutility of an unnecessary vote makes that less voters indeed
take the e®ort to cast their ballots compared to the simple-hearted voters. Ceteris
paribus, this leads to a lower optimal quorum. To construct a referendum that
achieves the population majority outcome, the probability of a majority of yes-
voters among the whole population is needed. Let » denote this probability, so
» = P[y ¸ 1
2]. From the assumptions on the distribution of y it follows that » 2 (0;1).
The following proposition states that with the right design of the referendum, the
population majority outcome occurs.
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Proposition 2. (Calculating Voters and the Population Majority Outcome)
Assume that ° < 0 and ¹ my; ¹ mn 2 (¡®
2 ¡ °; ®
2).
i) When ¹ my = ¹ mn+°(1¡2»), the population majority outcome is only achieved in
the unique equilibrium of the referendum with a quorum of at most q¤ = 1
2+
¹ my+ ¹ mn+°
2®
and default outcome D 2 fA;Rg.
ii) When ¹ my 6= ¹ mn+°(1¡2»), the population majority outcome is only achieved
in the unique equilibrium of the referendum with quorum q¤ = 1
2 +
¹ my+ ¹ mn+°
2® and the
default outcome D = R if ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and D = A otherwise.
The intuition for the proposition follows again from ¯rst looking to the propensi-
ties to vote. In the population majority outcome the probability that the proposal is
accepted is given by ». The probability that the proposal is rejected is then given by
1¡». This means that the propensities to vote of yes-voters and no-voters are given
by Y ¤ = 1
2 +(¹ my+°»)=® and N¤ = 1
2 +(¹ mn+°¡°»)=® respectively. The condition
that ¹ my and ¹ mn are contained in (¡®
2 ¡ °; ®
2) implies that for all » 2 (0;1) the
propensities to vote Y ¤ and N¤ are between 0 and 1. In other words, the condition
ensures that for a fraction °=® of the voters indeed their voting decisions depend on
their expectations (that ° < ® follows from the same condition). The ¯rst statement
of the proposition now claims that when the propensities to vote are equal for yes-
and no-voters, the referendum with a quota below or equal to 1
2(Y ¤ + N¤) achieves
the population majority outcome. The reason is the same as for the simple-hearted
voters: with equal propensities to vote the fractions of yes- and no-voters among the
participating voters are identical to the population fractions. No quorum is needed,
but a su±ciently small quorum does not a®ect the outcome of the referendum since
the participation rate is constant.
When the propensities are not equal, according to the second statement a quorum
is needed to achieve the population majority outcome. In fact, the optimal quorum is
again the average of the propensities to vote, but now evaluated at the equilibrium,
q¤ = 1
2(Y ¤ + N¤). To get more intuition, assume that ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»)
(symmetric arguments hold for the opposite case). This implies that Y ¤ > N¤.
Similar to the model with simple-hearted voters, a quorum with rejecting as default
outcome, D = R, is needed to o®set the bias towards accepting. The participation
rate yY ¤ + (1 ¡ y)N¤ is strictly increasing in y. The majority of the population is
in favor if and only if the participation rate is higher than 1
2(Y ¤+N¤). Since in this
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case the yes-voters constitute a majority, the quorum q¤ = 1
2(Y ¤ +N¤) achieves the
population majority outcome.
Compared to the model with simple-hearted voters, there are two important
di®erences. Firstly, ceteris paribus the optimal quorum is lower in case of calculating
voters. Comparing the expressions for q¤ in the second statements of Propositions
1 and 2 shows that in the model with calculating voters the quorum is ¡°=® lower.
Some of the voters who would have cast their ballot when they would have been
simple-hearted, prefer not to do so when they are calculating. A lower quorum is
needed to o®set a lower participation rate. This shows that when the referendum
is designed for a population of simple-hearted voters while instead the voters are
calculating, the quorum is set too high. In case ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»), the quorum
will only be met when the true proportion of yes-voters is at least y¤ for y¤ > 1
2. The
proposal is thus rejected for y 2 [1
2;y¤). When P[y 2 [1
2;y¤)] > 0, the referendum
with the incorrectly set quorum will not achieve the population majority outcome
and there is a tendency towards the default outcome R.
A second di®erence compared to the model with simple-hearted voters is that
the design of the optimal referendum requires knowledge of » = P[y ¸ 1
2]. Somewhat
surprisingly, this knowledge is not needed for setting the optimal quorum. Instead,
the knowledge of » is needed for setting the default outcome optimally. Intuitively,
for the optimal quorum only the sum of the reductions in voters matters, while for
the optimal default outcome the di®erence matters. When ° = 0 the propensity
to vote is independent of the expectations. However, when ° < 0 the propensities
to vote will in general depend on °. Only when a population majority of yes- and
no-voters is equally likely, so » = 1
2, the default outcomes coincide with those in
case of simple-hearted voters. When » 6= 1
2, there will be fewer participating yes-
and no-voters in equilibrium than in case of simple-hearted voters. When » > 1
2,
the decrease in yes-voters is larger than the decrease in no-voters. The choice of
the default outcome needs to take account of this e®ect. The term °(1 ¡ 2») in the
conditions accomplishes this. This e®ect is increasing in the extent to which voters
calculate, °. Note that the model with simple-hearted voters can be seen as the
limiting case of the model with calculating voters and ° ! 0.
3.3.3. A®ectionate Voters. Now consider the model with a®ectionate voters,
so ° > 0. The expectations about the outcome of the referendum again matter. But
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now the higher the probability that the preferred outcome occurs, the more likely
that a voter indeed casts her ballot. Ceteris paribus, this leads to more participating
voters and hence to a higher optimal quorum than in case of simple-hearted voters.
Compared to those voters, the a®ectionate voters have a tendency to behave in
a coordinated way. This gives raise to the possibility of multiple equilibria. The
following proposition states that although the referendum can be designed such that
the population majority outcome occurs, under a certain condition there is indeed
another equilibrium.
Proposition 3. (A®ectionate Voters and the Population Majority Outcome)
Assume that ° > 0 and ¹ my; ¹ mn 2 (¡®
2; ®
2 ¡ °).
i) The population majority outcome is achieved in an equilibrium of the referen-
dum designed as speci¯ed in Proposition 2.
ii) For the quorum q¤, the equilibrium mentioned in i) is the unique equilibrium
when j¹ my ¡ ¹ mnj ¸ °, otherwise there is a single alternative equilibrium which is
characterized by P[D] = 1.
The ¯rst statement shows that the expressions for the optimal quorum in case
of calculating voters also hold for a®ectionate voters. Compared to the model with
simple-hearted voters, the optimal quorum is higher with a®ectionate voters since
voters are more likely to participate. Comparing the expressions for the optimal
quorum of the three models shows that the quorum is increasing in the extent of
a®ection ° (or decreasing in the extent voters calculate ¡°).
The proposition states that multiple equilibria can indeed arise. The second
statement claims that when ¹ my and ¹ mn are su±ciently close to each other, the
optimal quorum does not necessarily lead to the population majority outcome.6 In
fact, this quorum can discourage the opponents of the default outcome from voting,
an e®ect that is aggravated by the tendency to coordinate. This might give raise to
an equilibrium where none of the voters expects the quorum to be met and because
the voters adapt their behavior to this expectation, the quorum will indeed never
be met. When j¹ my ¡ ¹ mnj < ° the fact that voters base their decisions to vote on
expectations together with their tendency to coordinate gives rise to self-ful¯lling
equilibria. When instead the di®erence between ¹ my and ¹ mn is su±ciently big, the
6In case ¹ my = ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and q < q¤ the equilibrium can be unique, but there can also
be two other equilibria, see Appendix 3.B for details.
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equilibrium with P[D] = 1 is not feasible anymore. To see why, suppose ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn+°.
Even when P[R] = 1 the propensity to vote of yes-voters is (weakly) higher as that
of no-voters. There will be a positive probability of accepting the proposal, which
is a contradiction.
A graphical representation provides additional insight in why the equilibrium is
necessarily unique for the calculating voters but not for the a®ectionate voter. In
Figures 1 and 2, p ¡ P[A] is shown as function of p for calculating and a®ectionate
voters respectively. Recall that in equilibrium p ¡ P[A] = 0. In case of calculating
voters, ° < 0, the propensity to vote Y = 1
2 + (¹ my + °p)=® is decreasing in p. The
propensity to vote N = 1
2 + (¹ mn + ° ¡ °p)=® is increasing in p at the same rate.
The participation rate for y = 1
2 is thus independent of p. But as discussed above,
for the optimal quorum only the quorum constraint is binding. This implies that
for all p the quorum constraint is also satis¯ed if and only if y ¸ 1
2. For small p the
probability of accepting the proposal is then » until the no-voters are more likely
to participate than yes-voters. In this case the quorum constraint and the majority
constraint cannot be simultaneously met and P[A] = 0. The function p ¡ P[A] is
thus strictly increasing and has a un upwards jump. Since it is increasing, is crosses
the x-axis at most once. The choice of the default outcome implies that the jump
is after », so that indeed an equilibrium exists.
In case of a®ectionate voters, ° > 0, Y is increasing in p and N decreasing.
Arguments opposite to the ones above show that P[A] is zero for small p, while
it jumps to » for larger p. This implies that p ¡ P[A] is not strictly increasing in
p. There can be two equilibria: one with P[A] = 0 and one with P[A] = ». The
choice of the default outcome guarantees that the latter equilibrium exists. When
j¹ my ¡ ¹ mnj < °, yes-voters have a lower propensity to vote than no-voters for p = 0.
This implies that the quorum constraint and the majority constraint cannot be
simultaneously. Since then P[A] = 0, there is a second equilibrium in which the
default outcome always occurs.
3.3.4. Heterogenous Voter Types. We now allow for heterogenous voters.
To be more speci¯c, the population can consist of simple-hearted, calculating and
a®ectionate voters. Moreover, the parameters ® and ° can di®er across voters. This
means that a voter k is de¯ned by her preference, i.e. in favor or against the proposal,
and the parameters (¹ mk;®k;°k). De¯ne the parameter set P = R£(0;1)£R. Now
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Figure 1. For calculat-
ing voters the optimal
quorum leads to a unique
equilibrium with the pop-
ulation majority outcome
(P[A] = »).
Figure 2. For a®ection-
ate voters the optimal
quorum can also lead to
a equilibrium in which the
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^ P =
½















Note that this restriction resembles the assumptions on ¹ my and ¹ mn in Proposition
1-3. In fact, for any parameters (¹ mk;®k;°k) 2 ^ P the assumption in the proposition
indicated by °k is satis¯ed for ¹ mk, ®k and °k. Denote the distribution function
of the parameters of yes-voter i by ©y and of no-voter j by ©n. By the law of
large numbers, ©y and ©n are also the population distributions. Denote the density
functions by Áy and Án respectively. The ¯rst condition on the density functions is
that Áy(¹ mk;®k;°k) = Án(¹ mk;®k;°k) = 0 if (¹ mk;®k;°k) = 2 ^ P. This assures that of all
the yes- or no-voters with a type (¹ mk;®k;°k) that can occur, some will indeed vote

























Denote the counterparts for the no-voters by ¹ mn and °n. The second condition on the
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density function is that °y = °n. Since this is equivalent to Ey[°i=®i] = En[°j=®j],
this condition is satis¯ed if for example ¹ mk and (®k;°k) are independently distributed
and the density function for (®k;°k) is independent of being in favor or against the
proposal. The common density function is the analogue of the assumption made in
the previous section that ° is a population parameter and that the scaling param-
eter ® of the moral pressure distribution is equal for both voter groups. Although
this assumption is mainly made to keep the model tractable, there are no reasons
to assume that °y and °n are very di®erent. When they are close to each other,
the outcomes will be similar to when they are identical. De¯ne ° = °y = °n. The
second condition implies that both the average type, i.e. simple-hearted, calculating
or a®ectionate, and the extent of the a®ection (or the extent to which voters are
calculating) scaled by ® are equal among yes- and no-voters. The following proposi-
tion claims that knowledge of these average parameters together with » = P[y ¸ 1
2]
is su±cient to design a referendum that achieves the population majority outcome.
Proposition 4. (Heterogenous Voters and the Population Majority Outcome)





Then, the quorum, default outcome and uniqueness of the population majority out-
come are as in the model with only the representative voter types de¯ned by (¹ my;1;°)
and (¹ mn;1;°).
The proposition states that when the population consists of simple-hearted, cal-
culating and a®ectionate voters and when the other parameters are allowed to vary
across the voters, the quorum and default options should be set as for the popu-
lation that only consists of the representative voter types (¹ my;1;°) and (¹ mn;1;°).
Hence, the analysis in the ¯rst three subsections is not a simpli¯cation but instead
describes models with heterogenous voter types as well. When the signs and sizes
of individual °k's can be di®erent, an increase in p has di®erent e®ects on voters
with di®erent °k's. In case of di®erent signs, it makes some voters more willing to
vote and others less. Only the average e®ect counts for setting the optimal quorum.
Note that the representative voter types also determine whether the optimal quorum
necessarily results in the population majority outcome or that the equilibrium with
P[D] = 1 can occur as well.
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3.4. A Non-Optimal Quorum
In this section we analyze the consequences of a non-optimal quorum. There are
two reasons why a non-optimal quorum can arise. Firstly, the quorum could have
been set non-optimally due to insu±cient knowledge about the relevant parameters
or for political reasons. Secondly, after the quorum is set, whether optimally or not,
pressure groups have incentives to a®ect the behavior of voters in order to make
their preferred outcome more likely.
Throughout it is assumed that the proportion of yes-voters y has a uniform
distribution on [y;y] with y < 1
2 < y. Let Á denote the density, so Á = (y ¡ y)¡1.
The probability of accepting the proposal according to the population majority is
then given by » = Á(y ¡ 1
2).
The analyses for the default outcomes A and R are symmetric. We assume
D = R so the proposal can only be accepted when the referendum is valid and when
a majority of the participating voters is in favor.
3.4.1. A Not-Optimally Set Quorum. First consider the simple-hearted
voters with ° = 0. The outcome of the referendum does not a®ect the behavior
of the voters so the propensities to vote Y and N are ¯xed. When it is known which
constraints are binding, the probability of accepting the proposal can be computed
in a straightforward manner using the three cases considered in Subsection 3.2.3.
Denote this probability by pm when only the majority constraint is binding, by pq
when only the quorum constraint is binding and by pb when both constraints are
binding. Let s denote the sum of the propensities to vote, so s = Y + N. The

















To analyze the e®ect of the quorum on the probability of accepting the proposal,
these equilibrium probabilities are related to the quorum in the following proposition.
Instead of framing the proposition in terms of the deep parameters ¹ my, ¹ mn, ® and
°, it is easier to use Y and N.
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Proposition 5. (Simple-Hearted Voters and a Not-Optimally Set Quorum)
Suppose ° = 0.
i) Suppose ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn and N





pm if q · 2Y N
s ;
pq if 2Y N
s < q · yY + (1 ¡ y)N;
0 if yY + (1 ¡ y)N < q:
ii) Suppose ¹ my < ¹ mn and N





pm if q · yY + (1 ¡ y)N;
pb if yY + (1 ¡ y)N · q · 2Y N
s ;
0 if 2Y N
s · q:
A ¯rst observation is that for every quorum an equilibrium exists. To see why
this is the case, the function p¡P[A] is key. Although for the optimal quorum q¤ this
function is discontinuous in p, it is continuous for a non-optimal quorum. Together
with the fact that P[A] 2 [0;1] this shows that there is at least one p 2 [0;1] for
which p ¡ P[A] = 0. There thus exists an equilibrium.
When the propensity to vote is higher for yes-voters than for no-voters, Y > N,
the default outcome is correctly set. This case is discussed in the ¯rst statement of
the proposition and depicted in Figure 3. The probability of acceptance is constant
for a low quorum. The quorum will always be met and the majority constraint is
binding. The de¯nition of pm shows that in this case pm > ». Intuitively, for a
quorum below the optimal quorum q¤, the referendum will be too often valid and
the probability of acceptance is above P[y ¸ 1
2]. Note that the condition N=s > y
implies that pm < 1. When q increases, more participating voters are needed to meet
the quorum. Since Y > N, the required proportion of yes-voters increases. When
q increases further, the quorum constraint takes over from the majority constraint.
The probability of acceptance decreases and crosses ». For higher q it can reach a
level such that even with the highest participation rate yY + (1 ¡ y)N the quorum
can not be met. From here on, the probability of acceptance equals zero.
When the propensities to vote for yes- and no-voters are equal, the participation
rate is constant. The quorum constraint is either always satis¯ed or never. Accord-
ing to the ¯rst statement, pq does not occur since the two borders are equal. The
probability of acceptance suddenly drops from pm = » to 0 if q raises above 1
2s.
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Figure 3. The e®ect of the quorum on the probability of acceptance
when the default outcome is correctly set.
7
The second statement assumes that the default outcome is incorrectly set. The
de¯nition of pm shows that even when the quorum is so low that it is not a®ecting
the referendum, the probability of acceptance is below the population majority
outcome ». The condition N=s < y implies that the probability of acceptance is
positive. When the quorum constraint becomes binding, it imposes an upper bound
on the proportion of yes-voters. Since the propensity to vote is lower for yes-voters
than for no-voters, the quorum will not be met when there are too many yes-voters.
When the quorum is higher than 2Y N=s more than half of the participating voters
should be no-voters, but then the majority constraint cannot be satis¯ed and the
probability of accepting the proposal is zero.
The proposition shows that when the quorum is lower than the optimal quorum
q¤, the probability of accepting the proposal is at most pm. It also shows that when
the quorum is set higher than the optimal quorum, it can be 0. Especially when
the di®erence between the average moral pressures ¹ my and ¹ mn is small, so that Y
and N are similar and pm is close to », it is less harmful when the quorum is set
7This ¯gure uses ® = 2, ° 2 f¡0:9;0;0:9g, y = 0:3, y = 0:8 and thus » = 0:6. Since the range
of admissible values of ¹ my and ¹ mn is determined by °, the average moral pressures need to be
adjusted for di®erent values of °. Using ¹ my = 0:2 and ¹ mn = ¡0:2 when ° = 0, the adjustment
¹ my = 0:2 ¡ 1
2° and ¹ mn = ¡0:2 ¡ 1
2° achieves that the optimal quorum is the same for all ° and
equal to 1
2.
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too low than too high. Moreover, suppose that the exact values of ¹ my and ¹ mn are
not known. When the quorum is based on their expected values, it will be as often
too low as too high. But to assess the e®ect on the outcome, it is important that a
too high quorum is more harmful. Hence, the uncertainty about the average moral
pressures causes the proposal to be rejected too often.
When ° 6= 0, the propensities to vote depend on the probability that the proposal
is accepted, which in turn depends on the propensities to vote. As in the case for the
simple-hearted voters, the equilibrium probabilities can be computed if it is known
which constraints are binding. We here discuss the results using Figure 3; Appendix
3.B contains the precise statements.
For the model with calculating voters, so ° < 0, an equilibrium exists for every
quorum when ° is not too negative. This ensures that changes in the probability of
accepting the proposal do not have too big impacts. Note that the interpretation of
° as the average across heterogenous voters suggest that the value of ° is not that
extreme. Since the calculating voters show some \balancing" behavior, changes in q
e®ect the equilibrium probability more gradually than for the simple-hearted voters.
The e®ects of a not-optimally set quorum are thus similar though less severe.
The model with a®ectionate voters, ° > 0, is more complicated. Here, an upper
bound on ° is needed to limit the e®ect of the equilibrium probability on the voters.
As was shown in the previous section, even for the optimal quorum two equilibria can
exist. When the quorum is not optimally set there can be up to three equilibria.8
As before, multiple equilibria can arise since the model resembles a coordination
game. Voters act according to what they expect and thereby make their expectations
happen, in other words, there are self-ful¯lling prophecies. Changes in q thus have
a larger impact than for the simple-hearted voters. Note especially that when the
quorum is set already slightly too high (in the ¯gure the optimal quorum is 0:5), a
sure rejection will result. Again, setting the quorum a bit too low is less harmful
than setting it a bit too high.
In case of three equilibria, the middle one only serves to separate the others.
This equilibrium is unstable in the sense that when a small fraction of voters changes
8Although it cannot be seen from the ¯gure, there is a hole in the graph when ° > 0: for
the optimal quorum q¤ = 1
2(Y (») + N(»)) the equilibrium in the middle does not exist conform
Proposition 3.
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behavior, this would trigger changes in the behavior of other voters that would ulti-
mately lead to one of the other equilibria. Although their instability makes them less
appealing, they cannot be completely ignored in the analysis. Clearly, the properties
of the stable and unstable equilibria are opposites. So, a higher quorum decreases
the probability of acceptance in the stable equilibria with a positive probability, but
increases it in the unstable equilibria.
3.4.2. Pressure Groups. After the quorum is set, pressure groups might want
to a®ect the turnout of the voters. For example, in the Italian referendum no-voters
were urged to go to the beach instead of the ballot box.9 In our model, we assume
that pressure groups cannot directly a®ect the behavior of voters of the other side:
a yes-pressure group can only a®ect the average moral pressure of the yes-voters
¹ my and a no-pressure group only the average moral pressure of no-voters ¹ mn. In
essence, the model has become a group-based voting model of mobilization.
We still assume that the preferences of the voters are given. Although before
this was already a simpli¯cation, in the face of pressure groups, it needs even more
justi¯cation. Apart from a®ecting the participation rate of their side, these pressure
groups have of course incentives to try to convert voters. For example, Neijens
and van Praag (2006) discuss the dynamics of opinion formation and show that a
large fraction of the voters changes their opinion in the period before the election.
The assumption that voters' preferences are given thus implies that the model deals
with the short period directly preceding the referendum day. Since a®ecting the
participation rate is just a part of the pressure group strategy, we will only analyze
its marginal e®ect. Its sign already indicates in which direction a pressure group
should a®ect the voters. Herrera and Mattozzi (2007) discuss a referendum model
where pressure groups setting the participation rates play against each other.
3.4.2.1. Yes-Pressure Groups. The equilibrium probabilities of accepting the pro-
posal follow from rewriting the conditions stated in Proposition 5. The analysis of
the not-optimally set quorum dealt separately with a correctly and an incorrectly
set default outcome. When the e®ect of the average moral pressures is analyzed,
it matters wether the moral propensity to vote of the other side is above or below
9Hana¯n (2006) discusses in detail the strategic lobbying that preceded the enacting of the
fertility law in 2004 and the failure of the referendum.
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the quorum. Remember that the propensities to vote Y and N should be between
0 and 1.
Proposition 6. (Simple-Hearted Voters and Yes-Pressure Groups)
Suppose ° = 0 and N >
y
1¡y.
i) Suppose N · q. Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 if Y <
q¡(1¡y)N
y ;




or if N > 1
2q and
q¡(1¡y)N
y · Y ·
qN
2N¡q;




















The ¯rst statement assumes that the propensity to vote of no-voters is so low
that the quorum is not met when everyone is against the proposal, when N < q,
or exactly met when N = q. This case is depicted in Figure 4. Even for low
values of the average moral pressure of yes-voters, the quorum will not be met.
The propensity to vote needs to be higher than q before the quorum can be met to
o®set the low propensity of the no-voters. In this case the quorum constraint will
be binding. Now suppose that N is not too low, so N > 1
2q. When ¹ my is increased
further, the quorum constraint is always met and it is the majority constraint that
determines the equilibrium probability. When N is below 1
2q, the majority constraint
is always satis¯ed if the quorum constraint is satis¯ed. In this case the equilibrium
probability remains pq. The condition that N > y=(1¡y) guarantees that P[A] < 1.
Comparison between this proposition and Proposition 5 shows that increasing Y is
similar to decreasing q.
The second statement assumes that when all voters are no-voters, the quorum
constraint is met. In this case, the quorum can already be met for Y < q. The
quorum constraint is then binding from above, so the equilibrium probability is
given by pb. When Y is increased further, the quorum constraint is always satis¯ed.
From here on pm determines the equilibrium probability. Again, increasing Y is
similar to decreasing q.
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Figure 4. The e®ect of the average moral pressure of yes-voters on
the probability of acceptance.
10
Figure 4 also shows the equilibria for calculating and a®ectionate voters. In both
cases the equilibrium lines are similar to the mirrored images of those in Figure 3.
This re°ects that increasing the propensity to vote of yes-voters is comparable to de-
creasing the quorum. For the calculating voters there is again a unique equilibrium.
The o®setting behavior leads to positive probabilities for lower values of Y and to
smoother e®ects of ¹ my in general. Changes in the propensity to vote of yes-voters
are partially undone by their own calculating attitude.
In case of a®ectionate voters multiple equilibria again exist for intermediate
values of ¹ my. The equilibria in the middle are unstable. Similar to the e®ect of a
quorum slightly higher than the optimal quorum, a propensity to vote slightly below
the value for which the quorum is optimal, which is 2q ¡N, immediately leads to a
sure rejection (in the ¯gure the quorum is optimal for ¹ my + 1
2° = 0:2).
For all voter types, an increase in Y leads ceteris paribus to more participating
yes-voters. The majority constraint is met for lower values of y. Since there are more
participating voters also the quorum constraint is met for lower y. This shows that
apart from the unstable equilibria when ° > 0 and the equilibria with P[A] = 0, an
increase in Y raises the equilibrium probability of accepting the proposal. Loosely
10Figure 4 uses ¹ mn = ¡0:2¡ 1
2°, ® = 2, ° 2 f¡0:9;0;0:9g, q = 0:5, y = 0:3 and y = 0:8. Note
that when ° = 0, Y ranges from 0:25 to 0:75.
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speaking, a yes-pressure group should always encourage voters to participate by
increasing ¹ my.
3.4.2.2. No-Pressure Groups. For no-pressures groups the recommendation is
not that straightforward. On the one hand, an increase in N leads to more par-
ticipating no-voters so that the participating no-voters are a majority for lower y.
On the other hand, an increase in N leads to more participating voters so that
the quorum is met for lower y. When the referendum is valid more often, this can
lead to a higher probability of accepting the proposal. To analyze these opposite
e®ects in more detail, the following proposition states the equilibrium probabilities
as function of N.
Proposition 7. (Simple-Hearted Voters and No-Pressure Groups)
Suppose ° = 0 and Y >
1¡y
y .





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 if Y <
q
y and N <
q¡yY
1¡y ;




1¡y · N ·
qY
2Y ¡q;
or if Y ¸
q





2Y ¡q · N:
ii) Suppose Y < q. Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 if Y < 1
2q;
or if Y ¸ 1
2q and N <
qY
2Y ¡q;
pb if Y ¸ 1
2q and
qY
2Y ¡q · N ·
q¡yY
1¡y ;




The ¯rst statement assumes that Y > q. This case is depicted in Figure 5.
When Y < q=y the quorum is not met when N = 0. The equilibrium probability
equals zero until the quorum will be met when the proportion of yes-voters equals
y. When Y ¸ q=y the quorum constraint is binding from the beginning onwards.
When N is su±ciently high, the quorum constraint is always met and the majority
constraint determines the equilibrium probability. Since an increase in N makes a
valid referendum more likely, pb is increasing in N. On the other hand, an increase in
N makes a majority of the participating no-voters more likely, so pm is decreasing in
N. It is clear that the maximum probability of accepting the proposal is attained for
N = qY=(2Y ¡ q). The condition Y < 1
2q=y implies that the maximum probability
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Figure 5. The e®ect of the average moral pressure of no-voters on
the probability of acceptance.
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of accepting the proposal is below 1. The condition Y > (1¡y)=y implies that even
when N = 1, the yes-voters can constitute the majority of the participating voters,
so that P[A] > 0.
The second statement assumes that the propensity to vote of the yes-voters is
below the quorum. When the propensity is below 1
2q, the quorum constraint and the
majority constraint cannot be simultaneously met and the probability of accepting
the proposal is 0. When Y ¸ 1
2q, the equilibrium probability is also zero for low
N. Only for higher N it becomes positive. Note that in this case N > q > Y , so
that both constraints are binding. The equilibrium probability is determined by pb
until N is so high that the quorum is always satis¯ed. From here on the majority
constraint is binding.
For the calculating and the a®ectionate voters similar reasonings hold. It should
not come as a surprise that the equilibrium for the calculating voters is unique and
as function of ¹ mn °atter than for the simple-hearted voters. For the a®ectionate
voters there are multiple equilibria possible as before. Again, when N is slightly
below the value implied by the quorum, which is 2q ¡ Y , the only equilibrium has
P[A] = 0 (in the ¯gure the quorum is optimal for ¹ mn + 1
2° = ¡0:2).
11Figure 5 uses ¹ my = 0:2 + 1
2°, ® = 2, ° 2 f¡0:9;0;0:9g, q = 0:5, y = 0:3 and y = 0:8. Note
that when ° = 0, N ranges from 0:25 to 0:75.
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It is clear than in all stable equilibria with P[A] > 0, the probability of acceptance
is increasing for low N and decreasing for high N. There thus exists a value of N
for which P[A] attains its maximum. Denote this value by ^ N. Under the conditions
















if Y < q:
The expression in the second line follows from setting the derivative of pb to zero and
noting that the maximum should be attained before the majority constraint takes
over or the propensity to vote exceeds 1. Loosely speaking, a no-pressure group
should decrease ¹ mn when N is below ^ N and increase ¹ mn when N is higher than
^ N. This is in line with intuition: when the propensity to vote of no-voters is rather
high, the quorum is likely to be met. To ensure that the participating no-voters
form the majority, a no-pressure group should encourage no-voters to vote. When
on contrary the propensity to vote is rather low, the quorum will probably not be
met. A no-pressure group should now lower the propensity to vote even further to
decrease the probability that the quorum is met.
3.5. Conclusion
In this paper we studied the impact of the quorum on referendum outcomes.
Although a quorum is potentially useful to attain the population majority outcome,
this crucially depends on the ability of setting the quorum at the appropriate level.
Insu±cient knowledge or a lack of political power to do so tend to favor the status
quo. Moreover, when voters care more about the outcome when they are partici-
pating, there can be a second equilibrium in which the referendum is always invalid.
Pressure groups opposing the proposal should also strategically aim for an invalid
outcome when turnout is expected to be low.
This paper thus adds another critique concerning the use of referenda to the list
of Nurmi (1998). Without resorting to compulsory voting, the choice is between
imposing a quorum and accepting its possible distortions on the one hand and
not imposing a quorum and accepting the possible non-representativeness of the
participating voters on the other. Clearly, if a low turnout is expected, a referendum
is not the ideal tool for decision making. Also topics for which minority groups have
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some strong opinions should be excluded from opinions. When the turnout on both
sides is expected to be at least moderate a referendum can be appropriate. The
results of this paper suggest that in this case imposing a quorum is more harmful
than not imposing one. This argument for abolishing the quorum complements the
arguments of Felsenthal and Machover (1997) who show that the highest degree of
democratic participation is achieved, i.e. the opinion of the average voter achieves
its maximum impact, in the absence of a quorum. Without a quorum, each side
can only reach its aim by convincing voters of its position and of the necessity to
vote. This is clearly more in line with democratic principles than giving one side
the possibility to abuse the rules of the game.
However, in a recent referendum in Portugal about easing restrictions on abor-
tion, the Catholic Church did not urge voters to stay at home. Interestingly, late
polls suggested a signi¯cant majority of proponents, with as only doubt \whether
enough voters will turn out for the result to be constitutionally binding" (The
Economist 2007). This would have been the ideal case to discourage opponents
from participating. Although this would just have been strategically exploiting the
referendum rules, reactions on their campaign in Italy might have made the Catholic
Church to act closer in line with the democratic principles underlying referenda.
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Appendix 3.A. Di®erent Intensities of Voters' Preferences
Suppose that the proposal should only be accepted if at least a fraction ^ y of
the population is in favor. We call this the optimal outcome. The referendum de-
sign is broadened by also allowing for a quali¯ed majority among the referendum
participants. Let the quali¯ed majority µ denote the required fraction of partici-
pating voters in favor of the non-default outcome. De¯ne q¤ = ^ yY + (1 ¡ ^ y)N and
µ¤ = ^ yY=q¤. The following proposition considers simple-hearted voters, analogue
results hold for calculating or a®ectionate voters.
Proposition 8. (Intensities of Voters' Preferences)
Assume that ° = 0 and ¹ my; ¹ mn 2 (¡®
2; ®
2).
i) When ¹ my = ¹ mn, the optimal outcome is only achieved in the unique equilibrium
of the referendum with a required majority of µ¤, a quorum of at most q¤ and default
outcome D 2 fA;Rg.
ii) When ¹ my 6= ¹ mn, the optimal outcome is only achieved in the unique equi-
librium of a referendum with either a quali¯ed majority of at most µ¤ and quorum
q¤ or a referendum with quali¯ed majority µ¤ and a quorum of at most q¤. In both
cases the default outcome is D = R if ¹ my > ¹ mn and D = A otherwise.
Statement i) follows by noting that µ¤ = ^ y and that the participation rate equals
q¤. Statement ii) follows by noting that the participation constraint or the (quali¯ed)
majority constraint (or both) should be exactly binding when a fraction ^ y of the
population is in favor. A su±ciently low quorum or quali¯ed majority is always met
when the other constraint is satis¯ed.
Note that in the paper the required majority among referendum participants
is set at 50%. Although allowing for a quali¯ed majority would introduce other
referendum designs with the same outcome, focussing on a majority of 50% is the
most neutral from a political point of view.
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Appendix 3.B. A Non-Optimal Quorum when ° 6= 0
First consider the model with calculating voters, so ° < 0. De¯ne ^ p as the
probability for which the propensities to vote of yes-voters and no-voters are equal.





N(0) ¡ Y (0)
¢
:
The uniform distribution of the moral pressures has the convenient property that
the sum of the propensities to vote s is constant










¹ mn + ° ¡ °p
®
= 1 +
¹ my + ¹ mn ¡ °
®
:
When only the majority constraint is binding, the equilibrium condition pm ¡












When only the quorum constraint is binding, the equilibrium condition pq ¡
Á(y ¡(q ¡N(pq))=(Y (pq)¡N(pq))) = 0 de¯nes a second order polynomial equation
















yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0) ¡ q
¢
:
Similarly, when both conditions are binding, the equilibrium condition p¡Á((q¡

































The equilibrium probabilities are related to the quorum in the following propo-
sition.
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Proposition 9. (Calculating Voters and a Not-Optimally Set Quorum)
Suppose ° < 0 with 1 +
Á°
®s > 0.
i) Suppose ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and
N(1)











s · q · yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0);
0 if yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0) · q:
ii) Suppose ¹ my < ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and N(0) < Y (0). Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
pm if q · yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm);
p
+




2s · q · yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0);
0 if yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0) · q:
The proposition requires ° > ¡®s=Á. The ¯rst statement assumes that the
quorum is correctly set. This case is depicted in Figure 3. The condition N(1)=s > y
implies that pm < 1. Similar to the model with simple-hearted voters, pm > » (this
is made formal in the proof of the proposition). The second statement assumes that
the default outcome is incorrectly set. Although the equilibrium probability pm is
positive, it is below ».
Now consider the model with a®ectionate voters, ° > 0. The only candidates for
the equilibrium probabilities are again pm, p§
q and p
§
b . Before stating the proposition





(^ p + »)

















From the de¯nition of p§
q it can be seen that p+
q and p¡





b only exist for q ¸ qb.
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Proposition 10. (A®ectionate Voters and a Not-Optimally Set Quorum)
Suppose ° > 0 with 1 ¡
Á°
®s > 0.
i) Suppose ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and Y (0) < N(0). Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
1 if
N(1)
s · y and q · yY (1) + (1 ¡ y)N(1);
pm if
N(1)






s · y and yY (1) + (1 ¡ y)N(1) · q · qq;
or if
N(1)
s ¸ y and
2N(pm)Y (pm)
s · q · qq;
p¡
q if 1
2s < q · qq;
p
+
b if 1 ¡ 2
Á°
®s ¸ 0 and qb · q < 1
2s;
or if 1 ¡ 2
Á°
®s · 0 and
2Y (0)N(0)




b if 1 ¡ 2
Á°






ii) Suppose ¹ my < ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») and
N(0)
s < y. Then
P[A] =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
pm if q · yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm);
p
+
b if Y (») ¡ N(») ¸ ¡2
°
®»
and qb · q · yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm);
p
¡
b if Y (») ¡ N(») ¸ ¡2
°
®» and qb · q ·
2Y (0)N(0)
s ;
or if Y (») ¡ N(») · ¡2
°
®»






The proposition requires ° < ®s=Á. The ¯rst statement assumes that the default
outcome is correctly set. This case is depicted in Figure 3. The condition Y (0) <
N(0) excludes the case where yes-voters have always the highest propensity to vote.
When N(1)=s < y, the majority constraint is always satis¯ed for a low quorum.
Otherwise the equilibrium probability pm is below 1 though above ». For both
cases, the quorum constraint becomes binding when the q increases. There are two
possible equilibria, p+
q and p¡
q . A necessary condition for their existence is Y > N,
so they should be higher than ^ p. They should be lower than pm, since equilibria with
a higher probability are not possible. It follows that p+
q exists from the point where
it equals minf1;pmg until qq, while p¡
q exists when the quorum is higher than 1
2s but
at most qq. When the probability of acceptance is below ^ p, it follows that Y < N.
This shows that both constraints are binding. The equilibrium with p
+
b exists until
Zwart, Sanne (2007), Coordination, Expectations and Crises
European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/12342118 3. FIXING THE QUORUM: REPRESENTATION VERSUS ABSTENTION
1
2s, since it then equals ^ p. When it starts from p
+
b = 0, the p
¡
b equilibrium does
not exist. When p
+
b exists from qb onwards, p
+
b > 0 and the p
¡
b equilibrium exists
between qb and 2Y (0)N(0)=s. For a higher quorum the equilibrium with P[A] = 0
exists.
The second statement assumes that the default outcome is incorrectly set. Sim-
ilar to the simple-hearted voters, pm is below ». There exists a range with three
equilibria when ° is not too small.
When pressure groups can a®ect the turnout of voters, the equilibria are found
by using Propositions 9 and 10 and rearranging the conditions.
Appendix 3.C. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
This proposition is proved in the main text. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.
Assume that ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn+°(1¡2») (the proof of statement ii) with ¹ my < ¹ mn+°(1¡2»)
follows in the same way). An equilibrium is characterized by p ¡ P[A] = 0 and the
analysis can be con¯ned to p 2 [0;1]. Note that Y (p) = 1
2 + (¹ my + °p)=® is strictly
decreasing in p and N(p) = 1
2+(¹ mn+°¡°p)=® strictly increasing. The participation
rate equals
yY (p) + (1 ¡ y)N(p) = 1 +
y(¹ my + °p) + (1 ¡ y)(¹ mn + ° ¡ °p)
®
:
The ¯rst step is to determine the quorum values for which the population major-
ity outcome can occur. When the proposal should be accepted if and only if y ¸ 0,
it follows that P[A] = ». When ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»), so that Y (») > N(»), there
is already a majority of yes-voters for y < 1
2. To ensure that the proposal is only
accepted for y ¸ 1
2, the quorum constraint should be exactly binding for y = 1
2. This
implies that the quorum should be q¤ = 1
2Y (»)+ 1
2N(»). When ¹ my = ¹ mn+°(1¡2»),
so that Y (») = N(»), the fractions of participating voters in favor and against are
identical to the population fraction. Any quorum below q¤ is always met and the
majority constraint correctly determines the outcome.
The second step is to establish that only the population majority outcome can
occur for the found quorum values. Suppose ¯rst that the quorum is q¤.
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When Y (p) > N(p) the participation rate is increasing in y. Since for y = 1
2 it
equals q¤, the quorum constraint is only met when y ¸ 1
2. Since in this case also the
majority constraint is met, the probability of accepting the proposal is ».
When Y (p) = N(p) the participation rate is constant and equal to q¤. The
fractions of participating voters in favor and against are identical to the population
fractions. The quorum is always met and the majority constraint only when y ¸ 1
2,
so P[A] = 1
2.
When Y (p) < N(p) the participation rate is decreasing in y. Since for y = 1
2
it equals q¤, this means that the quorum constraint can only be met for y < 1
2.
However, for these cases the majority constraint is violated and P[A] = 0.
To summarize p ¡ P[A] = p ¡ »1 1fY (p)¸N(p)g (see also Figure 1). Remember that
Y is decreasing in p while N is increasing and that Y (0) ¸ N(0), hence any solution
p¤ of p¡P[A] = 0 thus satis¯es Y (p¤) ¸ N(p¤). Since p¡P[A] is strictly increasing
on [0;1], any solution is necessarily unique. The claim in statement i) now follows
by noting that p¤ = » is a solution with Y (p¤) = N(p¤). The claim in statement ii)
follows by noting that p¤ = » is a solution with Y (p¤) > N(p¤).
Now suppose that Y (») = N(») and that the quorum is below q¤. Since Y (p) >
N(p) for p < », the quorum will be met for y < 1
2 and P[A] > 1
2. This shows that
p ¡ P[A] < 0 for p < ». Likewise it follows that p ¡ P[A] > 0 for p > ». The
equilibrium found above is thus unique. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.
Assume that ¹ my ¸ ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») (the proof with ¹ my < ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2») follows
in the same way). In the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2, the quorum
values for which the population majority outcome occur are found. It an identical
way it also follows that p ¡ P[A] = p ¡ »1 1fY (p)¸N(p)g. However, now Y is increasing
in p while N is decreasing (see also Figure 2). The proof of statement i) follows by
noting that p¤ = » is a solution with Y (p¤) = N(p¤) when ¹ my = ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»),
and a solution with Y (p¤) > N(p¤) when ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»).
The proof of statement ii) follows by noting that since p¡P[A] is strictly increas-
ing for p such that Y (p) ¸ N(p), any other equilibrium should satisfy Y (p) < N(p).
But for these p the probability of acceptance P[A] is zero, so that p ¡ P[A] = p.
This shows that p = 0 is the only candidate for a solution. This is only possible if
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Y (0) < N(0), so if Y (0) ¡ N(0) = (¹ my ¡ ¹ mn ¡ °)=® < 0. This gives the condition
for uniqueness. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.
In equilibrium p = P[A] for all voters. The propensity to vote of a yes-voter i with
parameters (¹ mi;®i;°i) is 1
2 +(¹ mi +°ip)=®i, which follows from the assumption that














Similarly, N = 1
2 + ¹ mn + ° ¡ °p. The proofs of Propositions 1-3 go through with
the found expressions for Y and N when ® is taken to be 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5.
i) In this case Y ¸ N. First consider Y > N. When the quorum is su±ciently
small, the probability of acceptance is determined by the majority constraint. Since
N=s < 1
2 and by assumption N=s > y, it follows that pm 2 (0;1). The major-
ity constraint and the quorum constraint coincide for q = 2Y N=s. The quorum
constraint is the only binding constraint until it can never be satis¯ed, so until
q = yY + (1 ¡ y)N. For a higher quorum the probability of acceptance is 0. Now
consider Y = N. This implies that pm = ». The quorum is always satis¯ed as long
as q · Y = N = 1
2s. A higher quorum can never be satis¯ed.
ii) In this case Y < N. Since N=s > 1
2 and by assumption N=s < y, it follows
that pm 2 (0;1). When the quorum is so low that it is always satis¯ed, i.e. below
yY +(1¡y)N, the probability of acceptance is determined by the majority constraint.
When q increases, both constraints are binding until the majority and the quorum
constraint can not be simultaneously met. This happens when (q ¡ N)=(Y ¡ N) =
N=s, which is identical to q = 2Y N=s. For a higher quorum the probability of
acceptance is 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6.
The proof follows by similar reasoning as the proof of Proposition 5. The only
technical detail is that for N · 1
2q a proportion y that satis¯es the quorum constraint
also satis¯es the majority constraint. Clearly (1¡y)N · 1
2(1¡y)q. That 1
2(1¡y)q ·
yY follows from q · yY + (1 ¡ y)N · yY + 1
2(1 ¡ y)q · yY + 1
2(1 ¡ y)q + yq and
moving all terms involving q to the left hand side. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 7.
The arguments of the proof are similar to previous ones. In case Y ¸ q, pm < 1 if
N=s > y for N = qY=(2Y ¡ q). This is implied by Y > 1
2q=y.
When Y < 1
2q, the majority constraint and the quorum constraint cannot be
met simultaneously. It is clear that yY · 1
2yq. That 1
2yq · (1 ¡ y)N follows from
q · yY + (1 ¡ y)N < 1
2yq + (1 ¡ y)N · 1
2yq + (1 ¡ y)q + (1 ¡ y)N and moving all
terms involving q to the left hand side. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8.
This proposition is proved in the text. ¤
Proof of Proposition 9.
In proving the proposition, the following relations between ^ p, » and pm are used
^ p ¡ » = ¡
¹ my ¡ ¹ mn ¡ °(1 ¡ 2»)
2°
;
pm ¡ ^ p =





pm ¡ » =






i) First consider ¹ my > ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»)0. The derived relations above show
that ^ p > pm > », so Y (pm) > N(pm) and Y (») > N(»). Note that no equilibria
with p¤ > pm can occur. The condition that N(1)=s ¸ y guarantees that pm < 1.
The majority constraint is the only binding constraint until it crosses with the
quorum constraint, which happens for q = 2Y (pm)N(pm)=s. When the quorum
constraint takes over, it does so until it can never be satis¯ed, which happens for
q = yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0). When 1
2(^ p + ») > pm it is clear that p+
q cannot be an
equilibrium. That this is the case follows by using 1
2(^ p+»)¡pm = 1
2(^ p¡pm)+1
2(»¡pm)
and the derived relations above so that
1
2
(^ p + ») ¡ pm = ¡
1
4°










When the quorum is above yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0), the quorum constraint can never
be satis¯ed and p¤ = 0.
Now suppose ¹ my = ¹ mn+°(1¡2»). Then ^ p = pm = », and 2Y (pm)N(pm)=s = 1
2s.
So, p¤ = » for q · 1
2s. Since 1
2(^ p + ») ¡ pm = 0, the equilibrium with p+
q does not
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exist for a higher quorum. The equilibrium probability is p¡
q until q is raised so high
that it becomes 0.
ii) The relations derived above show that » > pm > ^ p, so Y (pm) < N(pm)
and Y (») < N(»). The condition N(0) < Y (0) implies ^ p > 0 so that pm > 0.
When the quorum constraint is su±ciently small p¤ = pm is the equilibrium. The
quorum constraint becomes binding when (q¡N(pm))=(Y (pm)¡N(pm)) = y. Since
((1 ¡ 2Á°=®s)=(2 ¡ 2Á°=®s))^ p < ^ p < pm it is clear that p
+
b is the equilibrium that
takes over from pm and that p
¡
b does not exist. For q = 1











(Y (0) + N(0))




(Á®=°s)(Y (0) ¡ N(0))
2 = (Á°=®s)^ p
2:
The value of p
+


























































































^ p = ^ p:
Since ^ p = 1
2(®=°)(N(0) ¡ Y (0)) > 0 the p
+
b equilibrium exists when q · 1
2s. For a
higher quorum Y > N and the quorum constraint is the only binding constraint.
Since 1
2(^ p + ») > ^ p, only p¡
q can be an equilibrium. To ¯nd p¡
q in q = 1
2s, ¯rst
rewrite q = 1
2s = ¡1
2(N(0)¡Y (0))+N(0) = ¡(N(0)¡Y (0))(y¡»=Á)+N(0), then
1
2(Á®=°)(yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0) ¡ q) = ¡1
2(®=°)(N(0) ¡ Y (0))» = ¡^ p» so that
1
2

















(^ p + »)2 ¡ ^ p» =
1
2
(^ p + ») ¡
1
2
(» ¡ ^ p) = ^ p:
The p¡
q equilibrium exists until the quorum can never be satis¯ed, which is the case
for q = yY (0) + (1 ¡ y)N(0). For a higher quorum p¤ = 0. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 10.
From 2N(0)Y (0)=s · 2(1
2s1
2s)=s = 1
2s it follows that qb < 1

















(^ p ¡ »)
2 +
¡






so that qq = 1
2(°=Á®)(^ p ¡ »)2 + 1
2(Y (0) + N(0)) ¸ 1
2s. The inequality is strict when
^ p 6= », so when ¹ my 6= ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»).
i) First consider ¹ my > ¹ mn +°(1¡2»). The relations derived at the beginning of
the previous proof show that pm > » > ^ p, so that Y (pm) > N(pm) and Y (») > N(»).
When N(1)=s · y, the majority constraint is always satis¯ed and the equilibrium
probability is 1 until the quorum constraint is crossed for the quorum yY (1) +
(1 ¡ y)N(0). When N(1)=s ¸ y it follows that pm < 1. The majority constraint
is binding until (q ¡ N(pm))=(Y (pm) ¡ N(pm)) = N(pm)=s, which is the stated
condition. When the quorum constraint becomes binding p+
q is the equilibrium
since 1
2(^ p+») < pm implies that p¡
q only exists for lower probabilities then 1
2(^ p+»).
So, p+
q stops to exist at qq. Note that for this quorum the minimum of p+
q is achieved
which equals 1
2(^ p + »). Since this is bigger than ^ p, indeed Y > N. By assumption
N(0) > Y (0) so that ^ p > 0 and p+
q exists until qq. From here p¡
q decreases when q
decreases. In the previous proof it was shown that p¡
q = ^ p for q = 1
2s. This shows
that Y > N so that p¡
q exists for q > 1
2s.
Note that the equilibrium p¤ = ^ p does not exist! The only quorum candidate
would be q = 1
2s. But for this quorum Y (^ p) = N(^ p) = 1
2s, so the quorum is always
met. But, if only the quorum constraint binds, pm is the only equilibrium candidate,
but pm > ^ p.
When the quorum decreases from 1
2s, both constraints are binding. When p <




b are equilibrium candidates. In
the previous proof it was shown that p
+
b = ^ p for q = 1
2s, so that Y < N. The
minimum value of p
+
b is attained in qb and equals ((1¡2Á°=®s)=(2¡2Á°=®s))^ p. The
equilibrium with p
+
b does not exist on the whole interval from qb to 1
2s if 1¡2Á°=®s <
0. In this case it only exists when q > 2Y (0)N(0)=s. When it does exists on the
whole interval, p
¡
b exists from qb to N(0)Y (0)=s. In both cases, p¤ = 0 when q is
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so big that the majority constraint and the quorum constraint cannot be satis¯ed
simultaneously. This is the case for q ¸ 2Y (0)N(0)=s.
Now consider ¹ my = ¹ mn + °(1 ¡ 2»). The relations derived in the previous proof
show that ^ p = » = pm. Note also that 2N(pm)Y (pm)=s = qq = 1
2s (see the expression
for qq derived at the beginning of this proof), so the p§
q part does not exist. Note
also that qb < 1
2s, which shows that the p
¡
b arm does exist.
ii) The relations derived in the previous proof show that ^ p > » > pm, so that
Y (pm) < N(pm) and Y (») < N(»).
Since by assumption N(0)=s < y, it follows that pm > 0. This is the only
equilibrium until the quorum constraint becomes binding in q = yY (pm) + (1 ¡
y)N(pm). The equilibrium with p¤ = p
+
b can only exist when ((1 ¡ 2Á°=®s)=(2 ¡





























^ p ¡ » < 0:
When this is the case, the p¤
b equilibrium exists from qb until yY (pm)+(1¡y)N(pm).
Note that p
+
b > 0 since ^ p > 0. When the p
+
b equilibrium exists, the p
¡
b equilibrium
takes over from qb, otherwise directly from yY (pm) + (1 ¡ y)N(pm). It exists until
p
¡
b is zero, which happens at 2Y (0)N(0)=s. For a higher quorum the majority and
the quorum constraint are mutually exclusive and p¤ = 0. ¤
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